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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis involves a theoretical and empirical examination of issues in financial risk 
management with a focus on the Australian environment. The primary aim of the thesis 
is to contribute to the understanding of the use and impact of derivative financial 
instruments for financial risk management. The majority of published work in this area is 
from the U.S.A. Therefore, the analysis and results contained in this thesis are of interest 
to an international audience. The results provide new evidence, in addition to 
confirmatory evidence, in relation to a number of issues. 
The thesis is divided into three sections with the conclusions provided in chapter eleven. 
Following the introduction in chapter one, the first section (chapters two to five) 
examines issues associated with risk management. Chapter two considers some of the 
professional standards for the management of risk that have been issued by various 
professional and regulatory bodies. Chapter three examines different types of derivative 
contracts and how derivatives may be used. Measuring risk is an essential part of 
managing it. Financial risk is often difficult to identify from outside the organisation 
because organisations may hedge any portion of the exposure. Furthermore, financial risk 
may arise and then cease to exist as contracts are settled in such short periods that there is 
little evidence outside the firm to allow identification of them. However, there have been 
attempts to measure exposure to financial risk and these are covered in chapter four. 
Chapter five examines the theoretical issues associated with hedging financial risk and 
the potential benefits obtained from hedging. 
Section two (chapters six and seven) considers the use of derivatives in Australian 
Commonwealth public sector organisations. Risk management has traditionally been 
seen within the context of private sector organisations. However, the issue is becoming 
increasingly relevant and important to public sector entities as governments around the 
world implement policies that involve corporatisation, devolution of financial 
responsibility and impose competitive neutrality on their departments and bodies. 
Australia is no different and in some circles is seen as a world leader in the evolution of a 
business-orientated public sector. However, the strict translation of private sector theories 
xii 
and practices to the public sector, in which there are fundamental differences, may not be 
feasible nor desirable. Further, risk management in the public sector may require different 
practices and methods to achieve the desired outcomes. Chapter six introduces the 
empirical aspects of the thesis by considering the legal power of Commonwealth 
organisations in Australia to enter into derivative contracts. Public sector organisations, 
in particular Commonwealth statutory authorities, do not always have the powers 'of a 
natural person' afforded to companies governed under Australian corporations law. Such 
inconsistency is the base for uncertainty and possible additional costs for parties 
contracting with these organisations. Chapter six concludes with possible solutions to 
remove the uncertainty with respect to the legal power of Commonwealth organisations to 
enter derivative contracts. Chapter seven examines the use of derivative contracts in 
Commonwealth organisations through financial statement analysis and a questionnaire 
survey. This chapter represents the first public study of derivative use in Commonwealth 
organisations in Australia. 
Section three (chapters eight, nine and ten) considers important issues in the efficiency of 
derivatives markets. Three issues are considered. Chapter eight qonsiders the price and 
volatility effects surrounding expirations of 90-day Bank Accepted Bill futures contracts. 
The evidence as presented in chapter eight for the Australian 90-day Bank Accepted Bills 
market is not sufficient to conclude that there are abnormal price or volatility effects 
surrounding the expiration of equivalent futures contracts. Hedgers therefore are unlikely 
to experience higher volatility if contracts are closed out or rolled over on maturity day. 
Another potential problem when hedging is pricing derivative contracts, such as options. 
When derivatives, in particular option contracts, are used in risk management the price of 
the contract must be ascertained. The Black-Scholes option pricing model is commonly 
used to price options. If the model incorrectly prices options then risk management 
strategies will be less effective. One bias, which has been identified in studies using 
overseas data, is the volatility 'smile'. Risk management strategies using options should 
take account of the effect of this bias. Chapter nine documents the volatility smile in the 
Australian stock options market. Chapter ten extends chapter nine by considering time 
varying volatility in option prices. Obtaining estimates of the volatility of the underlying 
asset price that provide more accurate Black-Scholes option prices is important. 
Generally, for options already trading, the implied volatility of previous day option prices 
xiii 
is found to produce lower pricing errors over a range of different volatility estimates, 
including those obtained from a Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedastic 
(GARCH) model. However, if the option is not traded, GARCH estimates provide a 
better alternative than historical estimates. 
xiv 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
1 Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is financial risk management with applications drawn from 
Australia. Financial risk management has become a topic of considerable interest to 
academics and businesses over the past 20 years. There have been a number of factors 
that have been suggested as possible reasons for this interest. These include increases in 
the volatility of financial prices and rates in many countries, which has also coincided 
with the relaxation of many controls on interest rates and foreign exchange rates. For 
some firms the lack of appropriate management of financial risks has caused financial 
difficulties. This thesis considers some of the issues surrounding financial risk 
management in Australia and in particular financial risk management associated with the 
use of derivative financial contracts. 
Risk management has become an increasingly important tool in the management of 
modern businesses. It is argued that appropriate and well-employed risk management 
practices can add significant value to an entity and its stakeholders. However, the area is 
relatively new from a research perspective and our understanding is hampered by the 
relative infancy of the literature. Risk management has traditionally been seen within the 
context of private sector organisations. However, the issue is becoming increasingly 
relevant and important to public sector entities as governments around the world 
implement policies that involve corporatisation, devolution of financial responsibility and 
the imposition of competitive neutrality on their departments and bodies. Australia is no 
different and in some circles is seen as a world leader in the evolution of a business-
orientated public sector. However, the strict translation of private sector theories and 
practices to the public sector, in which there are inherent differences, may not be feasible 
or desirable. Further, risk management in the public sector may require different practices 
and methods to achieve the desired outcomes. In this thesis, I address several issues 
2 
associated with risk management in general within the Australian environment, in 
addition to specific issues relevant to the public sector. The importance of this research is 
highlighted by the failure of several overseas public sector entities due to poor risk 
management (for example, the London Borough Council of Hammersmith and Fulham in 
the U.K. and Orange County in the U.S.A.) and the recent criticism by the Australian 
Commonwealth Auditor-General of the lack of risk management in the operations of the 
Commonwealth Department ofDefence, amongst others.1 This thesis adds to our stock of 
knowledge in the area of risk management. The findings have wide applicability, both to 
managers and the various stakeholders, including government itsel£ The thesis highlights 
key issues to be considered in the adoption of risk management practices and more 
broadly explores some policy issues. 
Australia has developed similarly to many other Western nations in relation to standards 
to manage risk and a number of professional organisations in Australia have promulgated 
such risk management standards. Chapter one of section one explores these standards in 
the Australian private and the public sectors. 
The use of derivative financial contracts is an extremely popular way to manage financial 
risk. Such popularity is often attributed to the considerable leverage that can be obtained 
with derivatives. Derivative contracts obtain value from the value of an underlying asset; 
but generally provide no right of ownership to the underlying asset until maturity date or 
exercise of the contract by the holder. Although the numbers and types of derivative 
contracts are considerable, many are based on options or forward contracts. Further 
details of these and other derivative contracts are provided in chapter three of section one. 
For financial risks to be managed they must be identifiable and measurable. Identifying 
and measuring financial risks is often complex due to the short-term exposure that 
accompanies them. This short-term nature of financial risks makes it difficult for parties 
external to the organisation to identify risk exposures and measure their impact on the 
I ANAO (2000). 
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firm. A range of different measurement methods used to measure financial risk 1s 
explored in chapter four of section one. 
Although derivative contracts are commonly used to manage financial risk, a complete 
theory on the use of derivatives for hedging has not been developed. A variety of reasons 
have been put forth for their use including issues associated with taxation, bankruptcy and 
agency relationships. These issues are explored in chapter five of section one. Further 
analysis of these issues from an Australian Commonwealth public sector perspective is 
explored in chapter seven of section two. 
Both chapters in section two consider the use of derivatives in the Australian 
Commonwealth public sector. Chapter six identifies considerable legal uncertainty 
regarding the use of derivatives by Commonwealth authorities and chapter seven 
considers the use of derivatives by these organisations. 
The third section of this thesis considers issues relating to the efficiency of Australian 
derivative markets. For risk to be correctly managed with derivative contracts, derivative 
markets should correctly price the various contracts that are traded. Furthermore, the 
underlying spot markets need to correctly price the assets so that hedging contracts can be 
unwound without suffering unexpected price or volatility impacts. Further details of the 
material covered in the three sections of this thesis are discussed below. 
1.1 Section One: Financial Risk Management 
Financial risk management is the management of a firm's exposure to movements in 
financial prices or rates. Risk is a broad concept and many academics and professional 
organisations have attempted to define it. Chapter two considers definitions of risk. 
Financial risk management is determining what financial risks are to be assumed, 
transferred, reduced or avoided. The management of financial risk is a relatively new 
management field and has become of more interest through the increased impact that the 
volatility of financial prices may have on a firm. Furthermore, numerous professional and 
regulatory bodies have promulgated standards for the management of risk. A review of 
these standards is also presented in chapter two. 
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Derivative contracts can be used to unbundle and transfer financial risks. Like many other 
contracts, derivative contracts are contractual agreements and some can be tailor-made to 
suit each contracting party. This means the number of different types of derivative 
contracts is limitless. Chapter three explains exchange-traded derivatives, which are 
standardised and trade on organised share and futures exchanges, as well as some over-
the-counter derivatives that are not traded on an organised exchange. Derivative contracts 
can be used for three main purposes: arbitrage, hedging and speculation. These purposes 
are also discussed in chapter three. 
Financial risks are often classed as foreign exchange rate risks, interest rate risks or price 
risks, and these risks may be temporary or permanent, as well as direct or indirect. These 
issues, as well as measuring the impact of financial risks on a firm, are explored in 
chapter four. 
Firms that hedge financial risk must do so for a reason. Common factors that have been 
cited as reasons for hedging include: 
• Reducing corporate taxation 
• Reducing costs of bankruptcy and financial distress 
• Influencing the level of external finance 
• Reducing the agency costs of debt (reducing the asset substitution problem) 
• Maximising managerial utility 
• Creating a valuable security and/or improving contractual terms, reducing trading 
costs and contract scale. 
These issues are explored in chapter five. 
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1.2 Section Two: Derivatives and the Commonwealth Public 
Sector 
Hedging using derivative contracts is not a riskless operation. The use of derivatives 
creates many new risks for the parties involved. One particular risk arising from the use 
of derivatives is legal risk. Legal risk is of particular importance for public sector 
organisations and has been the subject of court cases overseas, in particular the U.K. and 
the U.S.A. In some of these cases it has been held that the public sector organisation 
entering the derivative contracts did not have sufficient power to do so and the deals were 
held to be null and void. There are many Commonwealth public sector organisations and 
the legal power of these organisations to enter derivative contracts is discussed in chapter 
six. There is considerable uncertainty with respect to the legal power to enter derivative 
contracts that some Commonwealth organisations have. Chapter six suggests a solution to 
this problem. 
Chapter seven documents the use of derivative contracts by a sample of Commonwealth 
organisations. Apart from documenting the .extent of derivative use, this chapter 
considers the attitudes of managers of these organisations toward derivative use. Issues 
that are important regarding the use of derivatives in the public sector include: budgeting 
purposes, reducing risks faced by management, changing the volatility of cash flows, 
improving the value of the organisation and reducing political risk or pressure. 
1.3 Section Three: Efficiency of Derivative Markets . ID 
Australia 
Apart from legal issues associated with derivative use (for public sector organisations), 
there is also an issue associated with the efficiency of the markets in which derivative 
contracts are traded. One such issue concerns potential price and volatility effects when 
derivative contracts on the underlying asset mature. In the derivative markets in 
Australia, and particularly in the 90-day Bank Accepted Bills (BABs) futures market, 
futures and options on the futures contracts on BABs all expire at the same time. If, on 
the expiration day the effect of the expiration of the derivative contracts causes liquidity 
in the underlying market to diminish, then hedgers may be facing greater risks. An 
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assessment of these risks through price and volatility effects in the BAB market is made 
in chapter eight. 
Another efficiency issue is considered in chapter nine. This relates to pricing biases in 
the Black-Scholes option pricing model. When using derivatives, for example, options, a 
pricing model is often required to establish a fair price. The Black-Scholes option pricing 
model has become popular for valuing options. However, evidence indicates that it is 
biased. This bias should be considered when pricing options for hedging purposes. 
Considering implied volatilities can identify this bias. The evidence from overseas 
indicates that implied volatilities are higher for options that are further from at-the-
money. This bias is documented for Australian share options in chapter nine. 
Chapter ten extends the work of chapter nme by considering alternative volatility 
estimates for option prices. The Black-Scholes option pricing model requires the 
following inputs: estimates of the current asset price, the risk free rate of interest, the 
exercise or strike price, the time to maturity and the volatility of the underlying asset 
price. Of these inputs, the volatility of the underlying asset price is the most difficult to 
estimate. Furthermore, the Black-Scholes model is sensitive to estimates ofthis variable. 
Obtaining an estimate of volatility that results in a more accurate estimate of the option 
price would result in risk management strategies being more precise in hedging risks. 
There are many different techniques that can be used to provide an estimate of the 
volatility of the underlying asset, for example, the variance of past asset prices. Where 
options are already trading on the asset, the use of lagged implied volatility is also an 
alternative. Estimates obtained from a GARCH model is another. Chapter ten considers 
the effect of different estimates of volatility on Australian listed share option prices. 
Generally, option prices based on previous day implied volatilities provide closer next 
day option prices compared to estimates using other measures of volatility. 
In summary, this thesis addresses several issues associated with risk management within 
the Australian environment, including specific issues relevant to the Commonwealth 
public sector. This thesis adds to our stock of knowledge in the area of risk management. 
The findings have wide applicability, both to managers and the various stakeholders, 
7 
including government itself. The thesis highlights key issues to be considered in the 
adoption of risk management practices and more broadly explores some policy issues. 
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SECTION 1 
FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
Overview 
This section is comprised of four chapters. The focus of the section is on risk and risk 
management, derivative contracts, the measurement of financial risk and theories of why 
firms hedge financial risk. While risk has been of interest to managers for a considerable 
period of time, it has only been in more recent times that financial risk management has 
become a major component of management. Although there is no single reason cited for 
the increase in attention given to financial risk management, it has coincided with 
increased globalisation of organisations, a reduction in financial regulation in many 
countries and lower barriers to entry into foreign markets. For many organisations, this 
has resulted in increased exposures to movements in foreign exchange rates, interest rates 
and commodity prices. In addition, it is generally conceded that since the 1970s there has 
been an increase in volatility in many financial series including foreign exchange rates, 
interest rates and commodity prices? Volatility is synonymous with risk, therefore it 
could be concluded that increases in volatility indicate increases in risk. 
Risk is a broad concept and a definition of risk may incorporate the chance of a gain as 
well as a loss, or only the chance of a loss. The categorisation of risks into the chance of 
a gain or loss, or only the chance of a loss, provides two distinct directions for risk 
management. These issues are explored in chapter two. 
If the risks faced by an organisation are not managed appropriately then the implications 
for the organisation could range from losses in earnings to bankruptcy. To help manage 
risk, Standards Australia, the Commonwealth Government and professional organisations 
have set standards and guidelines for risk management. Generally, these standards and 
2 See Smithson (1998) for examples of increases in volatility in financial rates and prices. 
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guidelines are not specific, especially in regard to the management of financial risk, but 
apply to a broader concept of risk. A review of the standards is also provided in chapter 
two. 
The management of financial risks is often undertaken through the use of derivative 
financial contracts. There is a broad range of derivative contracts - from contracts with 
standardised terms and conditions that are traded on organised exchanges to individual 
tailor-made contracts. Derivative contracts that are traded on organised exchanges are 
known as exchange traded derivatives, while tailor-made derivative contracts are traded 
between financial institutions and their clients. These tailor-made derivatives are known 
as over-the-counter derivatives and their terms and conditions may be quite unique. 
Chapter three includes definitions and explanations of derivative contracts. 
Although derivative contracts are commonly used for risk management, which is 
essentially hedging risks, derivatives are also used for speculation and arbitrage. It is 
important to understand the distinction between these three uses. Generally, hedging 
reduces the financial risks faced by an organisation, speculation increases the risks and 
arbitrage results in zero risk, but a positive return. These three uses are also explored in 
chapter three. 
Measuring financial risk is an essential part of financial risk management. Financial risks 
can be either temporary or permanent. The measurement of exposure to temporary 
financial risks is often difficult unless access to non-public information is obtained. 
Permanent financial risk exposure is often evident through analysis of financial 
statements. The sensitivity of share prices to financial risks is commonly determined 
through regression analysis although the empirical results have been mixed in this regard. 
Gap analysis and duration measures are commonly used to measure exposure to interest 
rate risk. The measurement of financial risk is covered in chapter four. 
The various techniques used to reduce, transfer or avoid financial risks are often called 




Risk and Risk Management* 
2 Introduction 
The management of risk is not new. However, the management of financial risk is more 
recent. This chapter considers the changing definition of risk over the last fifty or so 
years. Often risk is regarded as the possibility of incurring a loss and there is little 
consideration given to risk being regarded as having a positive aspect. However, the 
concept of risk may be divided into two types: dynamic and pure. Dynamic risk has both 
negative and positive aspects and pure risk has only negative aspects. This is discussed in 
sub-section 2.1, while in sub-section 2.2 financial risks are defined. The measurement of 
risk in a broad sense is introduced in sub-section 2.3 and the various standards and 
guidelines available in Australia to facilitate the management of risk are explored in sub-
section 2.4. Sub-section 2.5 concludes the chapter. 
2.1 Definitions of Risk 
Mehr and Hodges (1963) define risk as "uncertainty regarding a loss" (p. 15). This 
definition implies that risk is only concerned with the possibility of losing something; 
nothing is mentioned of the chance of gain. In 1995 the Councils of Standards Australia 
and Standards New Zealand (AS/NZS) defined risk as "the chance of something 
happening that will have an impact upon objectives" (AS/NZS 4360, 1995, p. 4). 
The distinction between these two definitions is recognised in Reilly (1989) where he 
states, "one way to define risk is as the uncertainty of future outcomes. An alternative 
definition might be the probability of an adverse outcome" (p. 256). But as far back as 
• Parts of this chapter have been condensed and published in Oliver, B., 1999, Financial risk management: a 
structured approach, Regional Business Focus 10, 11-14. 
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1921 the distinction between risk and uncertainty was recognised. Mehr and Hodges 
(1963) refer to Knight (1921) who regards risk as measurable and uncertainty as 
immeasurable. In this context the practical distinction between risk and uncertainty is 
that risk has a known distribution of outcomes, while in the case of uncertainty the 
distribution is unknown and the events are unique. However, the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty was not universally accepted. Hardy (1923) considers risk and 
uncertainty to differ only in the amount of information available: "Rather it appears 
probable that the cases of statistical probability and the cases of true uncertainty are 
essentially alike, differing only in amount of information we happen to have at hand to 
deal with them, the length of time necessary to accumulate a line of cases big enough to 
establish a statistical frequency, or the fineness of the classification we are using" (quoted 
in Mehr and Hodges 1963, pp. 11-12). This thesis concentrates on the risks to an 
organisation's operations rather than the broader concept of uncertainty. 
Mehr and Hodges (1963) attempt a different approach in defining risk. Rather than 
considering risk as measurable or immeasurable, they propose two types of risk (if risk is 
defined according to AS/NZS 4360). The two types of risk proposed by Mehr and 
Hodges (1963) are dynamic (or speculative) risks and static (or pure) risks with each 
classification having several subdivisions. From this perspective risks can be defined as 
events where the outcome is uncertain. Whenever there is uncertainty there is risk. 
Whereas dynamic risks allow the chance of a gain or loss, pure risks do not provide the 
opportunity for gain. This then allows risks to be classified as either dynamic or pure. 
Mehr and Hodges (1963, p. 4) provide examples ofboth: 
Dynamic (speculative) risks include: 
• Management risks, including marketing, financial and production risks 
• Political risks 
• Innovative risks 
Static (pure) risks include: 
• Physical damage to assets 
• Fraud and criminal damage 
• Adverse judgements at law 
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• Damage to property of others (causing reduced earning power) 
• Death or disability of employees or owners 
This classification of risks can be viewed as a distinction between risks that can generate 
both a positive and negative benefit (speculative risks) and those risks that can generate 
only a negative benefit (pure risks). The question that managers must face is: what risks 
to accept and what risks to avoid? To make such decisions requires an estimate of the 
likelihood of the particular event, as well as the impact on the organisation of such an 
event. The level of risk, either pure or dynamic, that an organisation chooses to face is a 
function of risk preferences. The preference for pure risk will depend upon the cost of 
avoiding, transferring or reducing the risk relative to the impact of the loss to the 
organisation. The preference for dynamic risk will depend upon not only the cost of 
avoiding, transferring or reducing the risk, but also the preference for the chance of a gain 
as well as a loss. If the level of risk exposure is a function of risk preferences, whose risk 
preferences are they? The managers, the shareholders, the debt holders or some other 
related party? 
Schrand and Unal (1999) segregate risk into two types based on the information 
advantage a firm possesses with respect to the sources of risk. The sources of risk arise 
from 'core-business' risks or 'homogeneous' risks. Core business risks are where firms 
earn rents or economic profits for bearing risk related activities in which the firm has a 
comparative advantage. Homogeneous risks are where firms earn zero economic rent in 
efficient markets for bearing financial risks such as unexpected changes in interest rates, 
foreign currency exchange rates or commodity prices. However Schrand and Unal (1999, 
p. 982) also state "there is not a clear distinction between core-business risks and 
homogeneous risks". Therefore, it is unclear how managers of firms with many 
shareholders are expected to manage risk. 
The concept that managing risk is essentially controlling costs was recognised in the early 
1960s. Mehr and Hodges (1963) consider that "the particular costs that the risk manager 
seeks to control are of two kinds: ( 1) the costs of risk: risk costs arise because potential 
losses are uncertain, and they are incurred regardless of whether the losses materialise. 
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That these losses might materialise is sufficient to produce a cost; (2) the costs of losses: 
loss costs come about when losses actually materialise, and they are incurred regardless of 
whether the frequency and severity of loss occurrence are relatively accurately predicted. 
That the losses do materialise produces the cost" (p. 51). This is a very narrow view of 
the risk management function and although Mehr and Hodges (1963) do recognise that 
many events also have a chance of gain, the emphasis of their work is on the losses rather 
than the potential for gains. Much of the academic work prior to the 1960s concentrated 
on the concept of pure risk. It is the area of dynamic risk management that has received 
the most development since then. 
2.2 Financial Risk 
As mentioned previously, dynamic risks involve the chance of a gain as well as loss. For 
example, a floating interest rate loan has the chance that interest rates will move up and 
higher interest will be payable (a loss), as well as the chance that interest rates will fall 
and lower interest will be payable (a gain). Of course, there is also the chance that interest 
rates will remain constant. Many risks associated with business decisions are dynamic. It 
is these risks that create the incentive to invest in the first place. If there were no chance 
of a gain then there would be less profit motive and less incentive to undertake business 
operations. To help allow better decisions to be made as to whether to accept or avoid 
risks, those risks need to be identified. There are three types of risk in most organisations. 
Harrington and Niehaus (1999) consider these to be price risk, credit risk and pure risk. 
Credit risk and pure risk can both be regarded as static risks as there is no chance for a 
gain. Credit risk is the risk that a firm's customers and the parties to which it has lent 
money will fail to make promised payments. In such cases the customers either pay the 
loan off or default. There is no additional benefit to the firm other than the customer 
paying off the loan. Pure risk is considered to be risks such as damage to assets, legal 
liability, worker injury and employee benefits. Again, in these cases there is no additional 
benefit to the firm. Price risk has additional potential benefits. Price risk is further divided 
into commodity price risk, exchange rate risk and interest rate risk. Collectively they 
represent financial risks. 
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2.2.1 Commodity Price Risk, Exchange Rate Risk and Interest Rate 
Risk 
Price risk can be defined as " ... the variability in cash flows due to possible changes in 
output and input prices" (Harrington and Niehaus 1999, p. 4). 
Three specific types of price risk are commodity price risk, exchange rate risk and interest 
rate risk. 
2.2.1.1 Commodity Price Risk 
Commodity price risk is the risk of changes in prices of commodities that may be receipts 
or inputs for some firms and expenditure or outputs for others. For some firms, 
commodity price risk may be extremely important. For example, airlines may be 
extremely susceptible to changes in oil prices. These are input commodity price risks. On 
the other hand, oil-producing firms may also be susceptible to changes in oil prices, 
which are output commodity price risks. 
2.2.1.2 Exchange Rate Risk 
Input and output prices for many firms may also be influenced by exchange rates. 
Exchange rate risk can be categorised as transaction exposure, translation exposure or 
economic exposure. Transaction exposure arises when a firm has an account either 
receivable or payable which is denominated in a foreign currency. Between the times the 
account is drawn and when it is converted back to domestic currency the firm is exposed 
to movements in the exchange rate. Foreign exchange transaction exposure is often 
temporary. 
Translation exposure is a foreign exchange exposure created through assets and liabilities 
held overseas. If a firm purchases and holds assets denominated in a foreign currency 
then the value of those assets may be influenced by changes in the exchange rate. 
Translation exposure is taken into consideration as an accounting procedure. 
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Foreign exchange economic exposure is a broader concept of exposure to foreign 
exchange risk than transaction or translation exposure. Economic exposure relates to the 
impact on the quantity of goods and services demanded or supplied by the firm as a result 
of the effect on prices from changes in foreign exchange rates. In other words, as a result 
of exposure to changes in foreign exchange rates, the prices of inputs and outputs will 
change and this will change the amount that a firms sells or buys. Of course, economic 
exposure can occur in relation to other risks, although firms are more likely to distinguish 
between transaction and economic exposure for foreign exchange rates and interest rates 
than for commodity prices (Smithson 1998, p. 11). 
2.2.1.3 Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is the risk that the operations of an organisation will be influenced by 
changes in interest rates. Interest rate risk is commonly associated with interest rate 
revenues and expenses. Changes in interest rates affect the amount of interest an 
organisation must pay on loans, borrowings and other interest rate sensitive liabilities. If 
interest rates increase then an organisation with loans that are charged a variable rate of 
interest will incur increased interest expenses. Changes in interest rates also affect the 
amount of interest an organisation receives on bank deposits and other interest rate 
sensitive assets. An increase in interest rates will generate higher interest revenues. These 
are similar risks to transaction exposure (as explained in sub-section 2.2.1.2 Exchange 
Rate Risk). 
Smithson (1998) suggests that interest rate economic exposures are also a source of risk 
and are more likely to affect sales receipts; that is, changes in interest rates can change the 
quantity a firm sells (p. 11 ). Such exposure would arise if the products the firm sells are 
interest elastic. 
Conceptually, the market value of an asset is equal to the discounted future cash flows 
from that asset or liability. Therefore, an increase in interest rates increases the discount 
rate on those cash flows and reduces the value of the asset. Conversely, a decrease in 
interest rates reduces the discount rate on those cash flows and increases the present value 
ofthe asset. 
16 
2.2.2 Temporary and Permanent Financial Risks 
Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) consider that financial risks can be permanent or 
temporary. Temporary price risks arise when the exposure occurs for a limited period of 
time. For example, a firm purchasing goods from overseas using a foreign currency has a 
temporary foreign exchange exposure. Similarly, a firm borrowing in the short term may 
have a temporary interest rate exposure. Permanent financial risks arise when a firm is 
continually exposed t9 financial risks, for example, an Australian firm whose products are 
always sold to Japan and is paid in Yen. In this case the firm is permanently exposed to 
movements in the exchange rate between the Australian dollar and the Japanese Yen. 
Permanent price exposure can also result from dramatic movements in a firm's input and 
output prices: the more easily an asset (as a unit of output) can be replaced by other 
assets, the more volatile is its price in an unstable financial environment. For example, a 
gold mine is subject to price risk from the mined gold, but if it is leveraged with floating 
interest rate loans it is also subject to interest rate risk. Gold prices may fall when interest 
rates rise, making the firm's overall risk even greater (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990, 
p. 15). 
2.3 Measurement of Risks 
Prior to deciding what risks are to be assumed, transferred, reduced or avoided, the 
measurement of the risk is necessary. The measurement of risk is ultimately concerned 
with the definition of risk. If risk is defined as "the chance of something happening that 
will have an impact upon objectives" (AS/NZS 4360, 1995, p. 4) then this provides some 
indication as to the measurement of risk. From this definition two words are important: 
'chance' and 'impact'. Chance relates to the probability of a particular event and impact 
relates to the influence the event has on the objectives of the organisation. 
While no discussion of the underlying philosophy or meaning of probability is attempted 
here, an understanding of probability theory is necessary to understand the concept of 
risk. A probability is a quantitative measure of uncertainty - a number that conveys the 
strength of our belief in the occurrence of an uncertain event (Aczel 1993). In this sense 
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the uncertain event is extended to take on different numerical values- a random variable. 
If an uncertain event is a random variable, and for each event a probability of that event 
can be determined, the range of possible events can also be determined. This provides a 
probability distribution. Nothing in probability theory requires that probability 
distributions be regular in form or have neat mathematical characteristics. However, the 
distribution of most random variables does exhibit some regularity and from this the 
distributions can be represented or approximated. Examples of this are normal and 
binomial probability distributions. If a probability distribution of all possible events can 
be constructed then a complete picture of the chance of any particular event can be 
determined. However, for all possible events within an organisation this information 
would be too much to manage effectively. To reduce the amount of information without 
loss of content, measures of central tendency are required. 
Two important characteristics of probability distributions are measures of central 
tendency and measures of dispersion. The use of the mean and standard deviation has 
become so common in defining risk that some authors define risk in terms of "the 
variability of possible outcomes from investment. This can be measured by the standard 
deviation of the distribution of possible outcomes" (Bishop et al. 2000, p. 1 09). Defining 
risk in such a way implies that the probability distribution of returns is normal. The mean 
equals both the mode and the median, and the fiftieth percentile being the median is 
always the mean. The probability density function of a normal random variable with a 
mean of J-l and standard deviation of cr can be defined as: 
1 -{x--}1)2 / 
f(x)=(-)e /1d ~2rccr ... 2.1 
for -oo < x < oo. 
The mean and standard deviation of a normal distribution explain completely the 
important characteristics of that distribution, but many events do not have normal 
distributions. However, the 'central limit theorem' (CLT) provides a solution to this 
problem. The CL T states that that "if a population distribution is non-normal, the 
sampling distribution of the mean is considered to be approximately normal for large 
samples'' (Hamburg 1985, p.158). Although CLT suggests that even when distributions 
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are non-normal a sufficiently large sample approximates normal, there are cases where 
the normal distribution is inappropriate. In relation to problems of pure (or static) risk 
this was recognised by Mehr and Hodges (1963, p. 136): "Static losses of financial 
importance generally have low to extremely low loss frequency. The lower the loss 
frequency, the greater the number of exposure units required before a normal distribution 
becomes a reasonable approximation of a binomial, Poisson, gamma (or other) 
distribution". These other distributions are common in pure risk cases where there is 
either only one loss possible (binomial) or where the total number of losses possible in a 
given period is not large in number (Poisson). Another feature of a normal distribution is 
its symmetry. There is as equal a chance of an observation below the mean as above it. 
With dynamic risks the total possible loss may be 1 00%, but the total gain may be 
unlimited. This results in asymmetry in the distribution and a logarithmic normal 
distribution may be more appropriate. However, irrespective of whether risk is dynamic 
or pure, it is the probability of a range of outcomes that determines the level of risk. In 
regard to dynamic risk it is a function of the trade-off between risks and return that 
determines the selection of particular projects and investments. Again, the level of 
acceptable risk is a function of risk preferences. 
2.3 Risk Management in Financial Organisations 
Guidelines and standards for risk management in Australia can be divided into risk 
management for financial organisations and risk management for non-financial 
organisations, as well as standards and guidelines for private and public sector 
organisations. The basis for the segregation of financial and non-financial organisations is 
due to the greater economic significance of a failure of a financial organisation. As a 
result risk management in financial organisations is more regulated than in non-financial 
organisations. 
The structure of the Australian financial system has developed in response to regulatory 
change. The current Australian financial system is regulated through three main 
Commonwealth organisations: the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC). The RBA has responsibility for the maintenance of financial 
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system stability, APRA has responsibility for prudential regulation and supervision of 
authorised deposit taking institutions and ASIC has responsibility for market integrity and 
consumer protection (Viney 2000, p. 64).3 
APRA sets numerous standards and provides guidance on risk management of financial 
institutions. The standards include standards on capital adequacy, credit risk and market 
risk.4 However, this thesis concentrates on risk management in non-financial 
organisations and hence the following sections consider risk management for non-
financial organisations. 
2.4 Standards and Guidelines for the Management and 
Reporting of Risk in Australia 
For non-financial organisations the basic risk management requirements can be divided 
into several areas. These include guidelines on how to manage risk, how to report the 
management of risk and how to measure risk. However, standards and guidelines for risk 
management are not always neatly divisible into these elements. Some publications merge 
the elements providing guidelines on how to manage risk with those on how to report to 
shareholders and stakeholders the management of risk. The reporting of risk management 
practices is also often embodied in issues associated with corporate governance that are 
often considered through audit committees. Furthermore, there are guidelines and 
standards for both private sector and public sector organisations. The reason for this 
distinction is unclear, but it may be due to greater political influence in the public sector. 
Recent publications that provide standards and best practice guidelines on how to manage 
risk include the Australian Standard, Risk Management (AS/NZS 4360, 1995) and 
Guidelines for Managing Risk in the Australian Public Service (MAB/MIAC, 1996). The 








Australian Financial Markets Association provides standards and guidelines for 
management of over-the-counter financial contracts (AFMA Manual, 1996). In regard to 
reporting aspects of risk exposure, the Australian Accounting Standard, Presentation and 
Disclosure of Financial Instruments (AAS33, 1996) and International Accounting 
Standard Exposure Draft, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (E62, 
1998) provide guidance. 
As mentioned earlier there are numerous other publications that address various aspects 
of risk management. 5 The following sections consider guidelines and standards on 
management, reporting (both accounting for and disclosure of) and the measurement of 
risk in Australia. Apart from accounting standards that are incorporated into 
Corporations Law, many of the guidelines and standards are not legally enforceable. 
However, in cases where legal issues arise regarding management of risk, these standards 
and guidelines could be used for determining reasonable business practice. 
2.4.1 The Australian and New Zealand Standard: Risk Management 
AS/NZS 4360, 1995 (the Standard)6 
In October 1995 the Council of Standards Australia approved the first risk management 
standard for Australia.7 The scope of the Standard is to provide a "generic guide for the 
establishment and implementation of the risk management process involving the 
identification, analysis, assessment, treatment and ongoing monitoring of risks" (the 
Standard, p. 4). The Standard provides a framework for the management of risk within 
any organisation or entity. This framework is shown in Figure 2.1. The framework 
consists of six elements of an iterative process for risk management. The six elements are: 
the establishment of the context, the identification of risks, the analysis of those risks, the 
assessment of risks, the treatment of risks and monitoring and reviewing the complete 
process. These are discussed below. 
5 These include ASX listing requirements and GBE governance arrangements. 
6 Standards Australia is a not-for-profit organisation. The essence of its operation is to bring together 
individuals and organisations committed to the common objective of establishing Australian Standards as 
national benchmarks for products and services in order to enhance quality of life and industry efficiency 
(AS/NZS 4360). A similar organisation operates in New Zealand and Standards are often issued jointly. 
The Standards are voluntarily applied. 
7 Although AS/NZS 3931 (Jnt) Risk analysis of technological systems-application guide was released prior 
to AS/NZS 4360, 3931 was only an interim standard. 
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2.4.1.1 The Context 
The context of risk within an organisation relates to defining the relationship between the 
organisation and its environment and the capabilities and the strategies it has in place to 
achieve them. According to the Standard, the risk management process is to occur within 
the organisation's strategic and organisational context. As a result of establishing the 
context of risk management, risk assessment criteria are then to be determined. The 
Standard is unclear on how such criteria are to be determined, other than to indicate they 
often depend upon an organisation's internal policy, goals, objectives and interests of 
stakeholders and that they are the criteria against which risk is to be assessed. From the 
risk assessment criteria a structure can be developed to ensure that significant risks are 
not overlooked. After establishing the context for risk management within an 
organisation the next step is to identifY the risks. 
2.4.1.2 Risk Identification 
The purpose of this element is to identifY the risks to be managed. The Standard provides 
information on generic sources of risk and their areas of impact on an organisation (see 
Appendix C of the Standard). The issue stressed in this element is the need for 
comprehensive identification of risk using a well-structured process. Although the 
Standard mentions 'tools and techniques' to identifY risks, no detail is provided. Once 
risks within an organisation are identified analysis can then occur. 
2.4.1.3 Risk Analysis 
The objective of the risk analysis element is to provide information to assist in the 
assessment and treatment of risks. The Standard provides some guidance on the potential 
sources of information for risk analysis such as past records, industry practice and 
experience and specialist and expert judgement. Also included are examples of the 
techniques used to obtain the information including interviews and computer modelling. 
An overview of the types of analysis that may be used including quantitative, qualitative 
and sensitivity analysis is also provided. Once risks are identified and analysed within the 













Figure 2.1: Risk Management 
Source: AS/NZS 4360, 1995, Figure 4.1, p.ll 
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2.4.1.4 Risk Assessment 
This element involves comparing the level of risk found during the analysis process 
against the risk criteria to determine whether the risks are to be accepted or not. If a risk 
is considered by management to be low or acceptable the Standard suggests that such 
risks should be monitored and periodically reviewed to ensure they remain acceptable. 
Risks that do not fall into the low or acceptable category become part ofthe next element, 
risk treatment. 
2.4.1.5 Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment involves identifying the range of options for treating risk, evaluating those 
options, preparing risk treatment plans and implementing them. The Standard provides a 
detailed process for the treatment of risks including reduction in likelihood of the 
occurrences or consequences, transference of the risks or retention of them. Although 
examples of mechanisms to achieve these objectives are provided in the Standard there 
are no details on them; they are simply listed in an appendix. 8 Once the risks are treated 
the final element of the risk management process is monitoring and review. 
2.4.1.6Monitoring and Review 
The purpose of monitoring and review is to ensure that changing circumstances do not 
alter risk priorities and to ensure that management plans remain relevant. The need for 
continual monitoring and review creates the iterative process. The Standard does not 
prescribe how often the monitoring and review is to be undertaken. 
2.4.1. 7 Documentation 
The Standard provides some examples of the documentation required for the risk 
management process to be undertaken, but it is very generic. Each stage of the risk 
management process should be documented and the documentation should include 
assumptions, methods, data sources and results. Generally, the documentation includes a 
policy statement, a compliance and due diligence statement, a risk register, a treatment 
8 See Appendix G of the Standard. 
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schedule and action plan and documents detailing records of monitoring and audit. The 
reasons for the documentation include: 
(a) To demonstrate the risk management process is conducted properly 
(b) To provide a record of risks 
(c) To provide a plan for approval and implementation 
(d) To provide accountability 
(e) To facilitate continuing monitoring and review 
(f) To provide an audit trail 
(g) To share and communicate information 
This approach to risk is very broad and encompasses any aspect of risk that may affect the 
operations of the organisation. A broad practical guide to the management of risk follows 
from this definition. However, due to the broad approach adopted, it fails to provide the 
detail on how to identify specific aspects of risk that could affect the objectives of an 
organisation and it fails to provide specific detail on how to manage those risks. For 
example, the Standard recognises that currency fluctuations are a source of risk, but no 
guidance is provided on how to identify them or how they could be managed. 
2.4.2 Guidelines for Managing Risk in the Australian Public Service 
(Management Advisory Board/Management Improvement Advisory 
Committee Report 22 1996) 
The Management Advisory Board and its Management Improvement Advisory 
Committee (MAB/MIAC) jointly published a document purporting to provide guidance 
on managing risk in October 1996.9 MAB/MIAC Report 22 essentially follows AS/NZS 
4360 by adopting the six risk management elements recognised in the Standard. 
9 The Management Advisory Board (the Board) obtains its authority from the Public Service Act 1922. Its 
role is to advise the Commonwealth Government, through the Prime Minister, on significant issues 
regarding the management of the Australian Public Service (APS). In December 1989, the Board 
established the Management Improvement Advisory Committee (MIAC) to bring together a number of 
senior public servants to discuss significant management issues and initiatives in the APS and to develop 
detailed advice for the Board. 
25 
The definition of risk in Report 22 is also similar to that in the Standard by considering 
that risk has two elements: the likelihood of something happening, and the consequences 
if it happens. 
Report 22 provides more detail for the establishment of the context of the risk 
management process than the Standard. In particular, Report 22 provides eight questions 
to answer in establishing the context for managing risk. These key questions are: 
1. What is the policy, program, process or activity? 
2. What are the major outcomes expected? 
3. What are the major threats and opportunities the program presents? 
4. What are its strengths and weaknesses? 
5. Who are the stakeholders? 
6. What are the significant factors in the agency's internal and external environment? 
7. What problems were identified in previous reviews? 
8. What risk criteria should be established? 
Answers to these questions are considered by MAB/MIAC to provide the context for 
managing risk. 
The major difference between the Standard and Report 22 is the overall perspective. 
Report 22 essentially imparts a public sector viewpoint onto the Standard. Some parts of 
Report 22 provide more guidance on managing risk than does the Standard (such as 
establishing the context of risk management as detailed above), but guidance on how to 
manage specific risks such as foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk are not covered 
in sufficient detail to be of practical use. 
2.4.3 Governance Arrangements for Commonwealth Government 
Business Enterprises (GBEs) 
A review of the GBE governance arrangements recommended, "a GBE's Board should 
establish processes and practices within the organisation to manage all risks associated 
with the GBE's operations" (Humphry 1997, recommendation 26, p. 54). While the 
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concept of corporate governance is one of risk management, specific attention on how to 
manage risk was not considered in the Review. However, the Review did recommend, 
"in normal circumstances GBEs should only use derivative financial instruments for the 
purpose of hedging exposures" (paragraph 5 .19). In terms of reporting risk management 
practice, the Review considered that corporate plans to be the most appropriate risk 
management reporting mechanism (paragraph 5.22). The details of how this is to be 
achieved were not provided. Also recommended was the presentation of a Statement of 
Corporate Intent (SCI) which "should include key features of a GBE's risk management 
plan, including strategies for managing operational and financial risk" (attachment C). 
But the Review provided no definition of operational or financial risk. 
2.4.4 Risk Management for Companies Listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) 
The ASX has no listing rule specifically dealing with how to manage risk. However for 
reporting periods ending on or after 30 June 1996, the ASX requires listed companies to 
include in their annual report a statement which sets out the main corporate governance 
practices in place during the reporting period. The report is to outline the company's 
approach to identifying areas of significant business risk and the arrangements in place to 
manage those risks. 
2.4.5 Corporations Law 
The Corporations Law as embodied in the Corporations Act (1989) and numerous 
amendments, contains no specific requirements on how to manage risk. Requirements to 
disclose matters specifically on risk management are embodied in Australian Accounting 
Standard 33 Presentation and disclosure offinancial instruments (AAS33). Although the 
Accounting Standards are incorporated into the Corporations Law, they do not prescribe 
approaches to particular management styles, but are more to do with accounting and 
disclosure matters. 
Directors of companies do have fiduciary duties which are prescribed in Corporations 
Law that imply competence and other matters indirectly related to risk management. 
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2.4.6 Group of Thirty Recommendations10 
In 1993 the Group of Thirty (G30) released their recommendations for defining "a set of 
sound risk management practices for dealers and end-users" (Group of Thirty 1993, 
Foreword). The recommendations of the G30 are for over-the-counter derivatives and 
have been the basis of the subsequent recommendations of many organisations, for 
example, the Australian Financial Markets Association. Some of the more important 
recommendations are that an organisation should: 
(a) Clearly define the purpose of derivative transactions used by the firm. The purpose 
should be integrated in the risk management policies of the firm and be approved by 
senior management. Appropriate controls should be in place to implement the 
policies. 
(b) For risk management purposes, dealers should mark their derivative positions to the 
market on at least a daily basis. 
(c) Market risk should be calculated daily based on 'value-at-risk' methods as well as the 
components of market risk across term structure. Components of market risk include 
absolute price or rate changes, convexity, volatility, time decay, basis or correlation, 
and discount rate. Stress testing should also be undertaken. 
(d) Independent risk management policies should be established to consider risk limits, 
design stress scenarios and monitor variances between actual volatility and predicted 
levels. 
(e) Independent credit risk management policies should be established including approval 
of credit exposure standards, the setting of credit limits and reviewing and monitoring 
of risk reduction arrangements. 
(f) There should be written authorisations for derivative transactions. 
(g) Financial reports should include details of the purpose of the derivative transactions, 
the extent of the transactions, the degree of risk involved and how the transactions are 
accounted for. Disclosure is recommended on management's attitude towards risk 
10 The Group of Thirty (G30) is a private, independent, Washington-based international organisation whose 
charter is to raise awareness and understanding of major international economic and fmancial issues (Carew 
1996). 
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and how risks are monitored and controlled, and an analysis of positions (including 
credit risk) at balance date. 
(h) Legal and regulatory uncertainties regarding derivative transactions should be 
identified and removed. 11 
2.4. 7 Standards and Guidelines for Australian OTC Financial Markets -
the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA) Manual (1996) 
AFMA is a national industry body of organisations participating in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) financial markets. There are two categories of members, full and consultative. 
Full members of AFMA include all the commercial, investment and merchant banks in 
Australia, the larger corporations, central borrowing organisations and other major 
financial institutions that operate as professional market makers in the OTC market in 
Australia. Consultative members of AFMA include a wide range of organisations 
associated with financial markets such as legal and accounting firms. At an international 
level the associated organisation is the International Securities Market Association 
(ISMA). 
AFMA provides a range of guidelines and standards for members on codes of conduct, 
market and general conventions, documentation, dealer accreditation and compliance. 
The guidelines and standards are not solely for financial institutions, but also end-users of 
derivative products. Risk management is covered under General Conventions in the 
AFMA Manual (1996). Essentially the AFMA guidelines and standards follow from 
those of the Group of Thirty and are explained in more detail in the previous sub-section. 
11 See chapter six for further details on this issue. 
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2.4.8 Accounting Standards 
There is considerable controversy regarding the accounting for and disclosure of 
derivatives and other types of financial instruments. This is evident in the Australian and 
U.S. accounting profession as well as at an internationallevel. 12 At an international level, 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) issued Exposure Draft E40 in 
September 1991. Due to a considerable number of comments another exposure draft was 
issued in Janu~ry 1994. However, this evoked considerable critical response and the 
IASC then divided the project into phases, the first being disclosure and financial 
statement presentation. This phase was completed in March 1995 with the promulgation 
of lAS 32 (International Accounting Standard: Financial instruments: disclosure and 
presentation). lAS 32 deals with: 
(a) Classification by issuers of financial instruments as liabilities or equity, and the 
classification of related interest, dividends, and gains and losses. This includes 
separation of certain compound instruments into their liability and equity components; 
(b) Offsetting of financial assets and financial liabilities; and 
(c) Disclosure of information about financial instruments. 
The second phase of the development of international accounting standards on derivatives 
is to consider the issues of recognition, measurement and hedge accounting. This is 
pursued in Exposure Draft E62 (Financial instruments: recognition and measurement) 
issued in June 1998. The general thrust of E62 is that derivatives are to be regarded as 
on-balance sheet assets or liabilities. For example, a forward contract to buy foreign 
currency is to be recorded as a liability when the contract is entered into. An option 
contract is also recognised as an asset or liability when the option is purchased or written. 
The amount recorded is initially at cost (E62 1998, paragraph 44 ). Subsequent to 
acquisition, derivatives are generally to be recorded at fair value (E62 1998, paragraphs 
12 The Financial Accounting Standards Board in the U.S.A. released in draft fonn in June 1996, FASB133-
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities. This was then modified and re-released in 
August 1997 and then fonnally issued in June 1998. Since then FASB133 has been amended by FASB137 
and FASB 138. Evidence of the controversial nature of accounting for derivatives is also recognised in 
Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998). In their survey of U.S.A. non-fmancial firms using derivatives, 
accounting treatment is the issue causing the most concern with 37% of finns indicating a high concern and 
only 15% low or no concern with the issue (p. 6). See also Wilson, Waters and Bryan (1998). 
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46-66). Changes in recorded value are generally to be taken to the profit and loss 
account. 
The accounting profession in Australia has also taken on the task of developing 
accounting standards for derivatives and similar instruments and, as with the U.S.A. and 
the international accounting standards, it also has been controversial. The process began 
with Exposure Draft ED59 Financial instruments which is based on E40 of the IASC. 
ED 59 was then replaced with ED65 Presentation and disclosure of financial instruments 
in June 1995. The main difference between ED59 and ED65 is that the prior exposure 
draft provided standards on presentation and disclosure as well as recognition and 
measurement for financial instruments, whereas the latter considered only presentation 
and disclosure standards. The main controversial area was the recognition and 
measurement of financial instruments. The accounting standard on presentation and 
disclosure offinancial instruments (AAS33) was released in December 1996.13 
AAS33 covers a wide range of items from cash and accounts receivable to interest rate 
and currency options, swaps and other derivative financial instruments. 14 
prescribes disclosure requirements in relation to the following: 
AAS33 
(i) The terms and conditions of financial instruments and the accounting policies 
adopted 
(ii) Objectives with regard to derivatives, the context of those objectives and the 
strategies for achieving them 
(iii) Interest rate risk 
(iv) Credit risk 
(v) Net fair value 
(vi) Financial assets recognised at an amount exceeding their net fair value 
(vii) Hedges of anticipated future transactions 
13 In conjunction with AAS33 is Australian Accounting Standard Board 1033 (AASB 1033). Compliance 
with AASB 1033 is required under Corporations Law. 
14 The following discussion draws heavily from AAS33. 
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The purpose of the disclosure requirements required by AAS33 is to enhance 
understanding of the significance of recognised and unrecognised financial instruments to 
an organisation's financial position, performance and cash flows. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Risk management is an important facet of the management of an organisation. 
Inappropriate management of risk can have wide ranging consequences for any 
organisation. This chapter introduces some of the issues associated with risk and risk 
management, including financial risk. A definition of risk is that it is the chance of an 
event occurring that will impact upon the objectives of the organisation. Such a definition 
incorporates both the chance of something that will have a positive effect on the 
organisation, as well as the chance of something that will have a negative effect on the 
organisation. This captures both positive and negative characteristics of some risks. 
Risks with only a negative element are pure risks and risks with both positive and 
negative elements are dynamic risks. 
This chapter sets a framework for the thesis and explores current practice as specified by 
various bodies for the management, measurement and reporting of risk in non-financial 
organisations in Australia. The various standards and guidelines are often very general in 
application to financial risks, do not carry the force of law and offer little help in relation 
to the measurement of financial risk. 
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Chapter 3 
Derivative Contracts in Australia 
3 Introduction 
Derivative contracts can be used to unbundle and transfer financial risks from those who 
do not wish to bear them to those who do, or vice versa. This chapter considers aspects of 
derivative contracts and how they can be used to unbundle and transfer financial risks. 
Sub-section 3.1 defines derivative contracts as contracts that derive value from an 
underlying asset. Sub-section 3.2 provides examples of derivative contracts that are 
traded on organised exchanges while sub-section 3.3 considers examples of derivatives 
that are traded over the counter. Sub-section 3.4 looks at the purpose of derivative 
contracts and some of the practical issues surrounding the use of derivatives for the 
management of financial risk. Sub-section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Derivative Contracts 
Derivative products are defined by Carew (1996, p.97) as "contracts or instruments whose 
value stems from that of some underlying asset, such as commodities, equities or 
currencies, or from an index such as the share-exchange index, or from an indicator such 
as an interest rate. Derivative products include swaps, forwards, futures, options (puts 
and calls), swaptions, caps, floors and collars". Therefore, a derivative is a contract that, 
depending upon the terms of the contract, creates rights and/or obligations for the 
contracting parties. The rights and obligations are commonly financial in nature, but they 
may require one party to deliver a commodity as specified in the contract. The 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (1997, p. 17) considers derivative 
contracts to be based on one or both of two primary elements: 
The forward element, under which there is an obligation to deliver or make a cash 
adjustment at some future time based on the current or future value of an asset or the 
level of a rate or index (the underlying), and 
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The option element, which gives the buyer of the option (the taker) the right, but not 
the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset at a certain stated price on or before a 
specified future date. 
If the definition of a derivative is taken literally then most financial securities could be 
classified as 'derivatives' since the value of most financial securities stem from some 
underlying asset. Over time the types of financial contracts have expanded in terms of 
complexity and number, and the term 'derivative' has become a catch-all term to cover a 
range of instruments from basic or 'plain vanilla' options, futures and forwards to 'exotic' 
contracts with complex pricing structures, terms and conditions. This chapter considers 
some of the different types of derivative contracts available in Australia. 
The terms of some derivative contracts can be specified by the parties to the contract. 
Therefore, the list of possible derivative contracts is unlimited. However, many 
derivative contracts have generic terms and have become sufficiently popular that 
organised exchanges have made them available for public listing, such as exchange-
traded derivatives. The alternative to exchange-traded derivatives is over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives. Derivative contracts of the OTC type can have terms agreed to by 
each party to the contract. However, even many OTC derivatives have common terms 
and can be categorised by these terms. An example is forward contracts in foreign 
currency where most banks and financial institutions offer contracts to exchange a set 
amount of foreign currency at an agreed future date. As these contracts have a limited set 
of conditions they can be classified in one group as forward contracts on foreign 
exchange. In Australia there has been a considerable increase in the number of different 
types of exchange-traded derivative contracts. It appears that the exchanges are 
attempting to gain a greater share of the OTC market by listing numerous derivative 
contracts. An example is the flex option where each party can specify some of the terms 
of the option. 
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3.2 Exchange-Traded Derivatives 
Exchange-traded derivatives are derivative contracts that are traded on formal exchanges. 
In Australia, this includes the Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASX) and the Sydney 
Futures Exchange Limited (SFE). ASX derivatives are securities on shares and include 
three broad categories: third-party issued option contracts, company issued option 
contracts and third-party issued warrants. Within these categories there are numerous 
contracts. Option contracts include share options, low exercise price options, long-term 
options and flex options. The different types of warrants include equity warrants, basket 
warrants, capital plus warrants, fractional warrants, fully covered warrants, index 
warrants, instalment warrants and endowment warrants. 15 This sub-section reviews some 
of the broad aspects of these contracts. The distinction between the exchange-traded 
contracts and over-the-counter contracts is becoming less obvious due to the various types 
of contracts with specific terms that are now available from the ASX. The over-the-
counter derivatives have traditionally been developed for interest rate and foreign 
exchange markets, while exchange-traded derivatives have traded in shares, futures and 
certain commodities and bonds. 
Equity options began trading on the ASX in 1976. Initially, these were call options on the 
major shares trading on the ASX, with puts being listed in 1982. There are now 
approximately 50 call and 50 put share options trading on the ASX with a variety of 
exercise prices and maturity dates. All are of American type. Generally, each option 
represents 1,000 underlying shares with no adjustment for dividends. The term to 
maturity of these options varies from up to one month (spot options) to three years (long-
term exchange-traded options or LTOs). In 1994 the ASX introduced flexible options 
(flex options). These options allow the parties to the contract to tailor the terms and 
conditions to suit their needs.· They are similar to over-the-counter options, but with the 
added benefit of lower risk than an over-the-counter derivative, as they are registered, 
margined and cleared through the ASX Options Clearing House rather than a possibly 
higher risk counterparty. Low-exercise price options (LEPOs) were introduced in 1995. 
15 Details of the specifications of the derivative contracts trading on the ASX can be obtained from the ASX 
website: http:/ /www.asx.com.au. 
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LEPOs are European call options with generally an exercise price of one cent. These 
features make LEPOs very similar to share futures contracts. 
There are a number of different types of warrants issued and traded on the ASX. The 
different types of warrants in this class include equity call and put warrants, index 
warrants, instalment warrants, endowment warrants, low exercise price warrants and 
capital plus warrants. A major difference between options and warrants is that warrants 
do not carry the same counterparty risk as options. Warrants are not guaranteed by the 
ASX as equity options are and they are issued by an approved warrant issuer. Generally, 
the terms of warrants can be tailored to various conditions and, as such, are similar to 
over-the-counter products. However, the approved warrant issuer agrees to make the 
market and this increases liquidity relative to over-the-counter products. 
Currently there are approximately nineteen futures contracts trading on the SFE. These 
can be broken down into share futures contracts (12), commodity futures contracts (3) and 
financial futures contracts ( 4). Also trading on the SFE are options on futures contracts. 16 
3.3 Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are those contracts that are not traded on a 
recognised exchange such as the ASX or SFE. OTC derivative contracts can be tailored 
to individual requirements, as they are not in a standardised form. The OTC market can 
be divided into two categories: the forward foreign exchange market and the remainder. 
Forward foreign exchange contracts are a simple contract for the sale and delivery of 
foreign currency from a few days to one year or more in the future. There are also options 
on foreign currency with variants. 
OTC contracts that are not forward foreign exchange contracts can be based on any 
underlying commodity or contract that both parties choose to enter. There are numerous 
16 Details of the specifications of the contracts trading on the SFE can be obtained from the SFE website: 
http://www .sfe.com.au. 
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contracts that have become common. The more common include swaps, options and 
forward rate agreements. 
The most common swaps are an exchange of interest rate or foreign exchange rate 
obligations. Interest rate swaps involve the exchange of fixed interest rate obligations for 
floating interest rate obligations. One party borrows at a fixed interest rate and another 
borrows at a floating interest rate and they then 'swap' their loan repayments. In practice 
when the two loans have the same repayment dates the interest payments are usually 
netted off with the balance being paid. Interest rate swaps allow companies to change 
fixed interest rate loans into floating interest rate loans and vice versa. This can allow 
better management of interest rate risk. 
Variants of standard interest rate swaps include forward swaps that are an interest rate 
swap beginning on a future date. Zero-coupon swaps are when the fixed-interest payment 
is paid out when the swap matures and is amortised, and escalating swaps involve a swap 
where a single swap rate applies to a principal, which increases (escalating swap) and 
decreases (amortised swap) over time. Basis swaps involve different time periods and/or 
exchange of different securities. Non-par swaps are based on non-market interest rates, 
and roller coaster swaps involve a variation of the principal or the coupon during the life 
ofthe swap. 
Swaps involving an exchange of foreign currency are known as currency swaps. In 
currency swaps both the principal and the interest payments in one currency are swapped 
for payments in another currency. Currency swaps allow companies to better manage 
foreign exchange rate risk by allow exposure in different currencies to be changed. 
Although there are a large variety of swaps they mainly involve a swap of a payment 
stream. The swap payments are determined by the price of the underlying commodity or 
security. For example, an equity swap is a swap of a variable cash flow for a fixed cash 
flow. 
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Basic OTC option products include options on interest rates (caps and floors) and 
swaptions, which are options to enter into a swap at a future date. Options on 
government securities are also common. Variants on options include barrier options that 
have payoffs and survival depending upon the underlying share price movement over the 
option life. Examples of barrier options include down-and-in options where the option 
does not begin unless the underlying security price falls to a particular level. Up-and-in 
options work in the other direction and do not begin unless the security price moves up to 
a particular level. Down-and-out options expire if the underlying security price falls 
below a particular level, and up-and-out options expire if the underlying security price 
rises to a particular level. Asian options have the final value based on the difference 
between the exercise price and the average price of the underlying security taken on 
specified dates over the option life. 
Forward rate agreements (FRAs), or forward contracts, are one of the more simple 
derivative contracts. They can be based on any underlying commodity or security that 
two parties choose. . Traditionally they have been based on agricultural commodities, 
gold, currencies and interest rates. 
Other OTC derivatives also include interest rate derivatives, credit derivatives, pollution 
swaps, weather derivatives and wine derivatives, with numerous variants on these. For 
interest rate derivatives, the risk that is priced is the movement in interest rates whereas 
credit risk derivatives are priced according to the likelihood of a borrower being unable or 
unwilling to repay a loan. Credit derivatives have numerous variants including credit-
default swaps, total-return swaps and credit-spread options. As the name implies, credit-
default swaps allow one party to swap the risk of a default on a security for a zero-default 
risk security. Total-return swaps allow the full risk of a security (credit risk and market 
risk) to be transferred. Credit-spread options are linked to movements in credit risk 
margins. The other derivatives are also linked to the underlying asset or commodity in 
some way or form. 
38 
3.4 Purpose of Derivative Contracts 
Hull ( 1997, p. 1 0) categorises the purpose of derivative contracts according to the three 
types of traders that use derivatives: hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs. This sub-
section explains these three categories. 
3.4.1 Hedgers 
Hedgers attempt to reduce the risks they face through hedging. Carew (1995, p. 27) 
defines hedging as: 
Taking steps to protect against, or at least reduce, a risk; a form of insurance. The 
term is common in futures and foreign exchange markets where traders use 
facilities available to protect themselves against future price or exchange rate 
variations. 
In relation to foreign currency risk, Australian Accounting Standard AAS20 Foreign 
currency translation defines hedging as: 
Action taken, whether by entering into a foreign currency contract or otherwise, 
with the object of avoiding or minimising possible adverse financial effects of 
movements in exchange rates (paragraph 3). 
To hedge an underlying exposure, or risk, a number of variables require estimation. The 
first requires the identification of the risk exposure. This may be interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange rate risk, or any other of the many risks faced by the firm. 17 Once the risk is 
identified then hedging that risk with derivatives can be accomplished by entering the 
appropriate number of the appropriate type of derivative contracts. Ascertaining what is 
appropriate is often difficult. The following sub-sections explain some of the issues. 
3.4.1.1 Hedging with Futures and Options 
Deciding between hedging using futures or options is often regarded as the choice 
between contingent and fixed exposures (Peirson et al. 1998, p. 932). A contingent 
exposure is where the risk is dependent upon the occurrence of an event that may or may 
not happen. An example would be where a firm offers to purchase a building overseas 
17 See chapter four for details of identifying fmancial risk exposures. 
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where the offer price is based on a foreign currency. Whether the finn is exposed to 
foreign exchange risk is contingent upon whether the bid is accepted or not. If the bid is 
accepted then the finn will be exposed to movements in the exchange rate; if the bid is 
rejected then the finn will not be exposed. Therefore, if a finn has a contingent exposure 
a forward, or futures, contract will not necessarily hedge such a risk as these contracts 
create obligations at the time they are entered. In such cases the appropriate contract may 
be an option contract. 
However, this does not mean that if a finn has a fixed exposure then a forward or futures 
contract is the only contract. Specifically, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that 
although optimal hedging does not generally mean complete hedging, the use of options 
will be preferred over forwards or futures. They argue that options typically allow firms 
to co-ordinate investment and financing plans more precisely than forwards or futures. 
However, if a finn has a contingent exposure, options should be the preferred choice and 
if a finn has a fixed exposure then options, forwards or futures should be the preferred 
choice. 
3.4.1.2 Hedging with Futures 
If a finn has a particular position in the cash or spot market, an opposite position in a 
futures contract can be entered to serve as a hedge. Gains (losses) in the futures contract 
offset losses (gains) on the cash or spot position. In a long hedge, the hedger is either 
currently short the cash contract or has a future commitment to buy the cash contract at a 
future point in time at the spot price at that later date. The risk here is that prices will rise 
and the hedger will have to pay a higher price for the goods. To offset this risk, a long 
futures contract is entered. In a short hedge, the hedger is either currently long the cash 
contract or has a future commitment to sell the cash contract at a future time at the spot 
price at that later date. The risk here is that the prices will fall and the hedger will obtain 
a lower price for the goods. To offset this risk a short futures contract is entered. 
Hull (1997, p. 32) considers three reasons why hedging using futures contracts is less than 
perfect: 
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1) The asset whose price is to be hedged may not be exactly the same as the asset 
underlying the futures contract 
2) The hedger may be uncertain as to the exact date when the asset will be bought or 
sold 
3) The hedge may require the futures contract to be closed out well before its 
expiration date 
These imperfections give rise to basis risk, which is the difference between the prices of 
the contracts in the spot and futures markets. 
3.4.1.3 Hedging with Options 
Options have non-linear payoffs at expiration. This means that for a premium the 
downside of a forward or futures contract may be avoided. Written options suffer 
potential downside losses, but in a hedge these losses are offset by the gains on the spot 
contract. There is no requirement for an organisation to hedge 100% of a particular risk. 
A common hedge is the minimum variance hedge, which is discussed below. 
Due to the non-linear payoffs from options there are numerous payoffs that can be created 
by combining different options (see Dubofsky (1992) for details of the different payoff 
diagrams). 
3.4.1.4 Determining the Appropriate Number of Contracts to Enter for a Minimum 
Variance Hedge 
When hedging a particular exposure the hedger must consider the number of contracts 
required to cover the exposure. For futures contracts this is known as the hedge ratio and 
for option contracts it is known as the delta. The hedge ratio, h, is defined by Hull (1997, 
pp. 35-36) as: 
... 3.1 
where: p = the coefficient of correlation between ~S and ~F, 
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crs = the standard deviation of ~S, 
crF =the standard deviation of ~F, 
~S = the change in spot price, S, during a period of time equal to the life of the 
hedge, and 
~F =the change in futures price, F, during a period of time equal to the life of the 
hedge. 
If a hedger has a long position in the underlying asset, and therefore a short position in the 
futures contract, the change in value of the hedge during the life of the hedge is: 
~s -h~F ... 3.2 
If a hedger has a short position in the underlying asset and a long position in the futures 
the change in value of the hedge is: 
MF-~S ... 3.3 
Irrespective of the type of hedge position the variance, v, of the change in value of the 




Setting this equal to zero, the hedge ratio that minimises the variance is: 
... 3.6 
The optimal hedge ratio is the product of the coefficient of correlation between the 
change in spot price and the change in futures price and the ratio of the standard deviation 
of the change in spot price to the standard deviation of change in futures price. It is often 
assumed that p = 1 and crs= crF, thus the optimal hedge ratio equals 1. This assumes that 
the futures price mirrors the spot price perfectly. 
An option delta is similar to the futures hedge ratio: the delta describes the change in 
value of the option relative to the change in value of the spot contract: 
Option delta = 80 
as 
where: 0 = the option price and 
S = the spot contract. 
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... 3.7 
Due to the number of variables influencing the option price, an option delta varies 
depending upon the spot contract price, ceteris paribus. Option deltas range from zero to 
+ 1 for call options and zero to -1 for put options. If the option is out-of-the-money and 
close to expiration it will have a delta close to zero, while an in-the-money option close to 
expiration will have a delta close to + 1 if it is a call, and -1 if it is a put. 18 
Other aspects of options that are relevant in hedging include option gamma, vega, theta 
and rho. Gamma is the rate of change of an option's delta with respect to a change in the 
price of the underlying asset or futures. For example, as the price of the underlying asset 
changes the price of an option on that asset will also change. The delta assumes that the 
option price will move in a linear fashion. If the gamma is large in absolute terms then 
the delta is highly sensitive to the price of the underlying asset. If the gamma is small in 
absolute terms then the delta is less sensitive to the price of the underlying asset. The 
gamma is the measure of the curvature of the option price with respect to the underlying 
asset price. A portfolio that is delta neutral provides protection against relatively small 
movements in the underlying asset price while a gamma neutral portfolio provides 
protection against relatively large movements in the underlying asset price. 
Vega is the rate of change of an option's price with respect to the volatility of the price of 
the underlying asset or futures. If the vega is high in absolute terms, the option's price is 
sensitive to small changes in volatility of the underlying asset price. Vega neutrality 
protects against variable volatility. Theta is the rate of change of an option's price respect 
to time and rho is the rate of change of an option's price with respect to the risk-free rate 
of interest. 
18 An out-of-the-money call (put) option is where the underlying asset value is below (above) the exercise 
price. An at-the-money option is where the underlying asset value equals the exercise price. An in-the-
money call (put) option is where the underlying asset value is above (below) the exercise price. 
43 
For hedging strategies to be effective, such as delta or gamma neutral, they often require 
frequent adjustments. Hedging strategies that involve frequent adjustments are known as 
dynamic hedges. Optimally this adjustment process should occur continuously, however 
this is not possible in practice, and it is not clear how frequently is should be done 
(Chance 1991). 
3.4.1.5 Measuring the Effectiveness of a Hedge 
There are many different types of hedges and to ascertain if a particular hedge has been 
successful it is important to be able to measure the hedge effectiveness. Measures of 
hedge effectiveness generally involve a comparison of returns from a hedged portfolio 
relative to an unhedged portfolio. For example, Howard and D'Antonio (1984) provide a 
measure of hedge effectiveness as the ratio of the Sharpe measure for portfolio 
performance for hedged and unhedged portfolios. If the ratio is one then the hedged 
portfolio has performed similarly to the unhedged portfolio. If the ratio is greater than one 
then the hedged portfolio has outperformed the unhedged portfolio, while if the ratio is 
less than one then the hedged portfolio has under-performed the unhedged portfolio. 
There has been considerable debate regarding the usefulness of Howard and D'Antonio 
(1984) and other measures of hedge effectiveness have been proposed. For example, 
Chang and Shanker (1987) standardise Howard and D'Antonio (1984) by the absolute 
value of the Sharpe measure of portfolio performance. However, many of these measures 
are simply variants on Howard and D'Antonio (1984). Howard and D'Antonio (1987) 
also provide further refinement to their original measure. Other work by Kuo and Chen 
(1995) and Satyanarayan (1998) are also further developments on Howard and D'Antonio 
(1984). 
3.4.2 Speculators 
Carew (1996, p. 305) defines a speculator as "a trader in any market who uses the market 
purely to make a profit, who may not have any direct interest in the commodity traded". 
Speculators assume risks in order to profit from price fluctuations. Given that financial 
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assets experience price fluctuations, speculators can take positions in any market which 
experiences price volatility. 
One reason why speculators enter derivative contracts is the considerable leverage on 
price volatility that derivative contracts provide relative to the underlying commodity. 
For instance, futures contracts often do not require any up-front payments (other than 
lodgement of a deposit and small transaction costs) and the premium on option contracts 
is often a small proportion of the total commodity price. However, derivative contracts 
may provide a similar volatility in price movement as the underlying asset. Hence, 
speculators can obtain exposure to movement in the underlying commodity price at a 
fraction of the cost. 
Speculation helps increase turnover which adds to market liquidity. Liquidity in the 
market is important for hedgers as it provides depth and breadth to the market. This 
allows hedgers to enter the market with greater confidence. 
Another function provided by speculators is the bearing of risk. As the speculator has no 
special commitment to the commodity being traded, but enters the market solely for the 
potential profit, then the speculator is taking on risk. The willingness of speculators to 
take on greater risk means that hedgers may be able to reduce risk by transferring it to the 
speculators. The ability to transfer unwanted risk to someone willing to bear it makes it 
possible for risk-averse economic agents to undertake socially useful projects that they 
would be unwilling to undertake ifthey had to bear all the risk themselves (Kolb 1996). 
Dubofsky (1992) categorises speculators in futures markets into two sub-groups: position 
traders and day traders. 19 Position traders are longer term speculators entering contracts 
and holding the position for periods longer than one day. Most position traders use 
spreads (Kolb 1996). A spread is a position in two or more related contracts that reduces 
the risks relative to a single position. 
19 This sub-grouping can be applied to any market. 
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Day traders, as their name implies, operate within a trading day and do not hold positions 
over night. Their main goal is to profit from price fluctuations within the day. Kolb 
(1996) discusses a further kind of speculator, the scalper. Scalpers have a shorter time 
horizon than the day traders and often enter and leave markets and contracts within a few 
minutes. Scalpers are attempting to profit from very small movements in prices. 
There are numerous techniques used by speculators in attempting to make profits. 
Generally, the techniques can be categorised as technical or fundamental. Technical 
speculating is attempting to determine future price movements through analysis of past 
price movements, while fundamental speculating is attempting to determine future price 
movements from analysis of current economic variables. 
3.4.3 Arbitrageurs 
An arbitrageur profits by observing that a commodity or financial asset sells for different 
prices in different markets. Arbitrage is the opportunity to earn a return without risk or 
investment. The existence of arbitrage opportunities violates the basic idea of the trade-
off between risk and return (Kolb 1996, p. 64, n. 22). If zero arbitrage is assumed then 
two cash flows which are the same must have the same price. For many commodities that 
also have derivative contracts, the particular cash flows of the underlying commodity may 
be replicated through the derivative contracts. If the replicated cash flows can be priced 
then this should equal the price of the derivative contract if, amongst other things, zero 
arbitrage is assumed. 20 The assumption of zero arbitrage is a basic assumption for many 
pricing models. For example, if the futures price on a share index is greater than the 
current index price compounded for interest net of dividends and transaction costs then 
arbitrage profits can be made by borrowing and buying the shares underlying the index 
and entering a short futures contract. Such a strategy provides a positive return with no 
initial investment. Conversely, if the futures price is less than the current index price 
compounded for effects of dividends, interest and transaction costs then arbitrage profits 
20 Although many strategies may be initially regarded as arbitrage strategies, some are very high risk (see 
Jorion 1999). 
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can be made by doing the reverse, that is, shorting or selling the shares underlying the 
index, and entering a long futures position.21 
3.5 Conclusion 
Financial risk is commonly managed through the use of derivative contracts. The basic 
concept of a derivative is defined as a contract where its value is derived from the value 
of an underlying asset. However, many contracts have their value derived from the value 
of an underlying asset. Therefore, the classification of contracts as derivative contracts is 
possibly driven by market developments. Two main markets for trading derivatives are 
derivative exchanges and over-the-counter markets. 
In Australia, exchange-traded derivative markets include the Australian Stock Exchange 
Limited and the Sydney Futures Exchange Limited. Numerous financial institutions trade 
over-the-counter derivatives, these are commonly interest rate and foreign exchange rate 
derivatives. Although there are a large number of different types of derivative contracts, 
they can generally be classified as option type or forward type contracts. Option type 
contracts provide the holder with a right to either buy or sell the underlying asset, whereas 
forward type contracts provide the holder with an obligation to buy or sell the underlying 
asset. Essentially, these two types of derivatives are the building blocks for exchange-
traded and over-the-counter derivatives. 
The purpose of derivatives can be determined by considering the types of traders that use 
them, namely hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs. Hedgers use derivatives to reduce 
the risk they face, speculators take on risk and arbitrageurs use derivatives to exploit 
pricing differences between various contracts. All perform important functions in the 
derivatives market. 
21 For details of arbitrage trading strategies see Hull (1997). 
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Chapter 4 
Measurement of Financial Risk 
4 Introduction 
Measuring risk is an essential part of managing it. There are many risks associated with a 
firm's operations and even when the area of risk is reduced to financial risk, there are still 
many aspects that require consideration. Beaver and Wolfson (1995) raise two major 
problems with risk measurement and these are concerned with two aspects of risk: 
accounting exposure and economic exposure. This chapter considers the different 
methods that have been used in the literature to measure financial risk exposures. 
A major problem in identifying financial risk exposure relates to the potential for firms to 
hedge any proportion of the risks. For example, an Australian firm with a US$1 million 
foreign exchange exposure may hedge any proportion of this exposure. If the firm is 
committed to buy the US dollars in three months, it may take a forward contract to buy 
only US$0.5 million and speculate on the remaining US$0.5 million. This makes 
interpreting empirical results difficult. Therefore, the only way to know the financial 
risks facing the firm is to know the underlying exposures. Furthermore, the tools that a 
firm may employ to manage risks are extensive. Risk management can be pursued 
through the operations of the firm, through financial structures, through accounting 
choices or through the use of derivatives (Petersen and Thiagarajan 1997). 
Sub-section 4.1 introduces different concepts associated with the identification and 
measurement of financial risk. Sub-section 4.2 considers the measurement of foreign 
exchange risk while sub-section 4.3 covers the measurement of interest rate risk. Sub-
section 4.4 looks at asset price risk. The measurement of total financial risk of the firm is 
covered in sub-section 4.5. Sub-section 4.6 considers financial distress costs and sub-
section 4. 7 considers changes in financial risk. Sub-section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
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4.1 The Identification and Measurement of Financial Risk 
Although there are a large variety of risks that an organisation faces, there are some risks 
that are often common across many organisations. These include foreign exchange rate 
risk, interest rate risk and asset price risk. Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) consider 
these types of risks as financial price risks. Financial price risks can be either temporary 
or permanent. Temporary price risks usually arise from individual transactions, and as 
the name suggests, are temporary. Conversely, permanent price risks are constant. 
Apart from permanent and temporary exposure to financial price risks, a firm's exposure 
to foreign exchange rates, interest rates and price movements may be direct or indirect. 
Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) refer to these as direct and subtle exposures, 
respectively. A direct exposure is when there is clear identification of the risk. For 
example, an Australian importer orders products from Germany, paying in Deutsche 
Marks (DM) when the products are delivered within 90 days. If, during those 90 days, 
the price of a DM rises (the value of the Australian dollar falls), the Australian importer 
will have to pay more Australian dollars for the product. An unusual example of an 
indirect or subtle exposure is provided by Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990, p. 25). 
This example concerns the exposure faced by aluminium producers in Iceland. A primary 
input to aluminium production is electricity that is obtained from the geothermal power 
stations in Iceland. As the price of oil rises, competitors who use oil fired electrical 
generators face rising costs, but the costs for the Icelandic producers remain unchanged. 
Thus, as oil prices rise, Icelandic producers' costs fall relative to those of their 
competitors; thus the value of the Icelandic firms rises. Conversely, if oil prices fall, 
Icelandic firms face higher costs relative to their competitors. This results in aluminium 
producers in Iceland being subject to oil price risk. 
4.2 Measuring Foreign Exchange Rate Risk 
Foreign exchange rate risk is the risk that movements in foreign exchange rates will 
significantly affect a firm's performance. Exposure to foreign exchange rates comes in 
three forms: 
• Transaction exposure 
49 
• Economic exposure 
• Translation exposure 
Transaction exposure arises from the risk that movements in foreign exchange rates will 
directly affect expected future cash flows. For a firm or organisation to have transaction 
risk, some or all of the expected future cash flows would be denominated in a foreign 
currency. A movement in the foreign exchange rate will increase or decrease the 
domestic equivalent cash flows and affect the firm's value. 
Economic exposure is a broader type of transaction exposure. Economic exposure to 
foreign exchange rate movement extends to all expected future cash flows and not only to 
those denominated in a foreign currency. For instance, if there is an appreciation in the 
domestic currency, an organisation with domestic sales may face decreased sales since 
local customers could obtain alternative foreign products at lower prices. Economic 
exposure implies that organisations with no foreign currency cash flows can be exposed 
to movements in foreign exchange rates. For example, an Australian firm with foreign 
competitors may experience changes in future expected cash flows due to changes in 
competitors' prices as a result of exchange rate movements. 
Translation exposure relates to the effect of foreign exchange rate movements on 
financial statements. In Australia, the accounting standards for foreign currency 
translation are embodied in the accounting standard AAS20. The accounting standard 
provides details for the reporting of foreign currency translation exposures. Essentially 
each asset, liability, revenue or expense arising from entering a foreign currency 
transaction is to be measured and brought to account in the domestic currency using the 
exchange rate in effect at the date of the transaction (AAS20, paragraph 48). Generally, 
differences in monetary items due to changes in the foreign exchange rates are to be 
recorded in the profit and loss statement in the period in which the exchange rate changes. 
Assessing the impact of foreign exchange risk on a firm is complex. For instance, 
measuring economic exposures is difficult due to the complex interactions between the 
effects of movements in foreign exchange rates on all future expected cash flows. It could 
50 
be expected that many organisations would be influenced to some extent by movements 
in foreign exchange rates, even though they may not have any expected future foreign 
currency cash flows. 
Madura (1992) provides a method for measuring an organisation's economic exposure to 
foreign exchange rate risk. This method is to apply regression analysis to historical cash 
flow and exchange rate data as follows: 
.. .4.1 
where: PCFt = percentage change m inflation-adjusted cash flows measured in the 
firm's home currency over the period t, 
PERt = percentage change in the exchange rate of the currency over the period t, 
llt = random error term, 
ao = intercept, and 
a1 = slope coefficient. 
PCFt could also be substituted for share price returns (Adler and Dumas 1984). In 
addition, Madura (1992) suggests that if an organisation is influenced by numerous 
currencies, a composite currency index could be used. 
Burgman (1996) uses a composite index where foreign exchange rate sensitivity was 
computed as the absolute value of P2 in the regression: 
fi =Po+ P1rew + P2rs 
where: ri = return on the share of firm i, 
few = return on an equally weighted stock index, and 
rs = return on a composite exchange rate. 
.. .4.2 
The US$/SDR rate is determined by the values of five major currencies. Jorion (1990) 
adopted a similar approach. However, using over 250 companies Jorion (1990) finds 
most exposure coefficients to be small and varying across time. Alternatively, Dumas 
and Solnik (1995) find that foreign exchange risk premiums are a significant component 
of rates of return on shares in international asset markets. 
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Madura (1992) suggests two steps are involved in measuring transaction exposure: 
(1) Determining the expected future foreign currency cash inflows and outflows, and 
(2) Determining the overall risk exposure to those currencies. 
This approach in assessing foreign exchange exposure is limited as access to expected 
future foreign currency cash flows is generally not publicly available. Furthermore, when 
more than one currency is involved, correlations between currencies need to be 
considered. 
Adler and Dumas (1983) argue that a firm's sensitivity to exchange rates can be 
decomposed into at least five categories: 
(1) The impact on short-term nominal net assets with maturity equal to the target 
date22 
(2) The impact on longer term nominal net assets with maturities falling beyond the 
target date 
(3) The impact on the salvage value of existing physical assets to be replaced or 
acquired 
( 4) The impact on sales prices and unit costs, and 
(5) The indirect impact via sales prices on the volume of sales and consequently on 
the planned volume of production and other physical activities. 
Unfortunately Adler and Dumas (1983) also note that accounting measures of exposure 
have imperfectly dealt with the first two categories above, the fifth has been completely 
ignored and there is some confusion regarding the rest (p. 972). 
In an Australian context, Di Iorio and Faff (1997) consider the correlation between 
Australian share returns and U.S. share returns after controlling for foreign exchange rates 
22 The target date being a cut-off date when the consolidated net worth or the consolidated cash balance of 
the firm is measured. 
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between Australia and the U.S.A. They find that 17 of the 24 industries in Australia in 
their sample demonstrated a statistically significant sensitivity to the exchange rate factor. 
Their results also suggest that Australian industries are exposed to exchange rate risk over 
and above that which can be specifically associated with the U.S. market. 
Loudon (1993) considers the share return sensitivity of a sample of Australian firms to the 
Trade Weighted Index (TWI) using a regression model. Loudon rejects the use of 
individual currencies due to multicollinearity across each currency. However, he does 
recognise that "in the absence of knowledge of the specific currency exposure of sample 
firms, it is not obvious that the multi currency approach would be superior" (Loudon 
1993, p. 23). By using a broad based currency index such as the TWI, the results are not 
strong (only 9 out of 141 companies have exposure significantly different from zero). 
Loudon also considers the sensitivity to the U.S. dollar, but the results are not very 
different from the TWI. 
Derivative financial contracts such as foreign currency forward contracts are commonly 
used to manage foreign exchange risk. Using regression analysis on share returns, Guay 
(1997) reports that the coefficient on the foreign exchange variable was significant and 
higher for firms which did not use derivatives and insignificant for firms which did use 
derivatives. This shows a correlation between foreign exchange exposure, derivative use 
and share returns. In particular, organisations that use derivatives have lower foreign 
exchange exposure. 
On a similar issue, Cummins, Phillips and Smith (1997) use several variables to test the ' 
hypothesis that insurance firms use derivatives to manage exchange rate risk. The first 
variable measures the proportion of assets in non-U.S. and non-Canadian shares and 
bonds. It is presumed that overseas holding of these securities will expose firms to 
exchange rate risk. The second and third measures attempt to control for the level of 
foreign assets and liabilities. These measures do not provide a specific measurement of 
foreign exchange exposure, but are more of a signal as to whether the firm is likely to 
have such exposure. The authors provide evidence to support their hypothesis that 
insurance firms engage in derivative transactions to manage foreign exchange rate risk. 
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Foreign exchange risk exposure is very specific to the operations of each firm and 
therefore it would be unlikely that many share returns would be sensitive to a general 
foreign exchange index such as the TWI and even the U.S dollar exchange rate for that 
matter. Furthermore, if these firms are hedging foreign exchange exposures then the 
results are not surprising. An alternative approach could be to determine to which 
currencies each firm was most likely exposed and determine the sensitivity of that 
particular share to that particular currency. Also, it would be interesting to determine 
whether or not these firms had a policy of hedging their foreign exchange exposures. 
Although the results generally indicate that foreign exchange risk is significantly 
associated with share returns, some studies have not found significant results. This 
inconsistency is not unexpected given the difficulty in identifying foreign exchange 
exposures, and that exposures can be of a temporary nature and not necessarily reported 
to the share market. However, Smithson (1998) cites numerous examples of firms that 
either went bankrupt or suffered considerable losses as a result of exposure to foreign 
exchange risk. 
4.3 Measuring Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is risk that movements in interest rates will significantly affect a firm's 
performance. Interest rate risk is more commonly associated with financial institutions 
due to the interest rate sensitivity and size of their monetary assets and liabilities. The 
maturity gap approach is the method most financial institutions use to manage exposure 
to interest rate changes (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990, p. 28). The procedure is to 
determine the difference between interest rate sensitive assets (RSA) and interest rate 
sensitive liabilities (RSL). This difference (or GAP) is then multiplied by the change in 
interest rate to determine the impact on the net interest income: 
GAP = RSA-RSL .. .4.3 
and~ Net interest income= GAP x ~r 
where: ~r = change in interest rate, and 
~ Net interest income = change in net interest income. 
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Alternatively, duration analysis can be used to assess interest rate risk. Duration 
measures the zero-coupon equivalent term for a coupon-paying instrument. If the 
instrument is held for its duration, the instrument is immunised from movements in the 
interest rate. The price risk offsets the coupon reinvestment risk. The duration of assets 
and liabilities is additive and, as such, the duration technique can be expanded to deal 
with the impact of changes in interest rates on the value of the entire firm (Smith, 
Smithson and Wilford 1990, p. 34). Duration is essentially the measurement of the 
change in present value of assets associated with a change in interest rates. Unfortunately, 
information necessary to calculate duration is often not publicly available. 
A further method to measure interest rate risk is sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis 
involves simulating the effect on net interest income of changes in interest rates. The 
effects of changes in interest rates require detailed specification of assets and liabilities 
and, like duration, information to perform the simulation is not usually publicly disclosed 
(Ahmed, Beatty and Takeda 1997). 
A further method to measure interest rate risk discussed in the literature is the percentage 
change in the market value of equity associated with a change in interest rates (Flannery 
and James 1984). 
The research on interest rate risk had developed in two main directions. One direction 
has a theoretical focus, where measures such as duration and gap are extended into more 
complex models (Bierwag and Kaufman 1985). The second direction has an empirical 
focus, where gap analysis or duration measures are assumed to adequately measure 
interest rate exposure levels and other issues are explored. Schrand (1997) considers the 
association between stock prices, interest rates and derivative use for a sample of savings 
and loan institutions in the U.S.A. Schrand (1997) uses gap analysis as the measure of 
interest rate sensitivity, on the basis that it is a commonly used measure and data required 
to measure duration are not available. She finds that derivative activities are positively 
associated with lower stock price interest rate sensitivity after controlling for interest rate 
gap. Ahmed, Beatty and Takeda (1997) provide evidence of interest rate risk 
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management in a sample of 152 bank holding companies in the U.S.A. They find that 
banks primarily focus on managing interest rate sensitivity of net income rather than 
interest rate sensitivity of equity returns. 
Flannery and James (1984), using a sample of financial institutions in the U.S.A., find 
evidence of a positive relationship between equity returns and interest rate changes and 
that the co-movement of equity returns and interest rate changes is positively related to 
the net asset maturity gap. 
Faff and Howard (1997) consider the sensitivity of Australian banking and finance share 
index returns to changes in interest rates. Using regression analysis they find little 
significance in results. One reason for the lack of significance could be the result of 
hedging strategies that the sample of firms employs. 
Sweeney and Warga (1986) use a two-factor arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model (for 
example, Roll and Ross 1980), with observable variables at the macro level using full 
information maximum likelihood estimation on groups of twenty-five individual firms. 
Little evidence of interest rate sensitivity is reported. A reason for the lack of evidence 
supporting interest rate effect is that any effect may wash itself out across different firms. 
For example, positive interest rate sensitivity for one firm will cancel an equal, but 
opposite negative interest rate sensitivity for another firm. 
Guay ( 1997) proxies interest rate exposure as the absolute value of the coefficient in a 
univariate regression of monthly share returns on the monthly percentage change in the 
Eurodollar interest rate. Schrand and Unal (1999) use a one-year maturity gap net of the 
impact of off-balance sheet hedging activities. The gap is the difference between the 
book values of assets and on-balance sheet liabilities that mature in one year. Schrand 
and Unal (1999) recognise that duration gap (which is the difference between the duration 
of assets and liabilities and considers the entire distribution of cash flows) is a better 
measure of interest rate risk than net maturity gap (for more details see Bierwag and 
Kaufman 1985). However, information to calculate duration gap is not publicly available 
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and although duration gap can be estimated from the maturity gap, previous attempts have 
not provided a successful method of estimation (Schrand and Unal 1999). 
Accounting ratios have also been used to measure interest rate risk exposure. These 
include the cover ratio that is defined by Daugaard and Valentine (1995) as: 
Cover = Earnings before interest and tax I interest costs. 
This measure shows how many times interest payments are covered by gross income. 
Although the evidence indicating firm exposures to interest rate risk is not considerable, 
Smithson (1998) provides examples of where interest rate risk was the cause of 
bankruptcy or potential bankruptcy in firms. This suggests that, at least for some firms, 
interest rate risk is a significant factor in the viability of the firm. However, like foreign 
exchange risk, identifying firm exposure to interest rate risk is difficult. 
4.4 Measuring Asset Price Risk 
Asset price risk is the risk that movements in asset prices will significantly affect a firm's 
performance. Due to the broad definitions of assets there are numerous methods to 
measure asset price risk. Cummins, Phillips and Smith ( 1997) measure asset price risk as 
the proportion of assets invested in relatively risky (in terms of price and/or liquidity 
measures) assets. Specifically, they include separate variables that measure the 
proportion of assets invested in shares, real estate, privately placed bonds, and both 
private and publicly traded collateralised mortgage obligations (p. 9). 
Asset price risk may also be regarded as business risk. There have been studies that have 
suggested that business risk can be measured by earnings volatility (Ferri and Jones 1979, 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 1984 and Titman and Wessels 1988). Industry classification has 
also been used as a measure of business risk (Ferri and Jones 1979). However, these 
studies do not provide evidence of the how well a proxy earnings volatility or industry 
classification is for asset price risk. 
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For asset price risk relating to specific assets, studies have generally concentrated on 
regressing specific asset prices on variables such as share returns or changes in 
accounting numbers. For example, to measure the effect of gold price risk on gold 
mining firms, Petersen and Thiagarajan (1997) consider the exposure of operating cash 
flows and its components to changes in gold prices. They regress numerous accounting 
variables such as percentage change in total gold sales revenue and operating costs on the 
percentage change in gold prices. Gold price changes are measured as the percentage 
change in the average of monthly gold prices. Faff and Brailsford (1999) investigate the 
sensitivity of Australian industry equity returns to oil prices. They use a market model 
augmented for an oil price variable and find the majority of industries to be insensitive to 
changes in oil prices. Faff and Brailsford (2000), using a Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) framework, find support for the two-factor oil model, especially in the 
industrial sub-sample. The results are weaker for sub-periods and for the resources sub-
sample. 
4.5 Total Financial Risk 
Total financial risk is the risk a firm faces from movements in foreign exchange rates, 
interest rates and asset prices. This combines the financial risks into one measure. Smith, 
Smithson and Wilford (1990) provide two methods to measure the exposure of firms to 
total financial risk. These are flow measures and stock measures. Flow measures are 
based on simulation models. Beginning with base-case assumptions about the financial 
prices, the firm obtains forecasts for revenue, costs and the resulting pre-tax income. The 
firm then considers alternative values for an interest rate, an exchange rate or a 
commodity price and obtains a new forecast for revenues, costs and pre-tax income. By 
observing how the firm's forecast sales, costs and income move in response to changes in 
these financial prices, the managers of the firm are able to track a risk profile of the firm. 
The problems with this approach are: 1) substantial data are required, and 2) it relies on 
accurate, explicit forecasts for sales and costs under alternative scenarios about the 
financial pnces. This approach is usually only possible for analysts within an 
organisation due to limited access to information. 
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Stock measures are based on publicly available information and are similar to methods 
used to calculate beta in the capital asset pricing model and also similar to the method 
used for measuring foreign exchange rate risk. Assuming a firm's share price is a 
measure of the value of the firm, the change in share price can be regressed against 
changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices and the return on the 
market: 
where: R1 = return on the share over period t, 
p = measure of market risk, 
Rm,t = rate of return on the market portfolio over period t, 
~P1R/PIR = percentage change in the interest rate, 
~PpxfPFx = percentage change in the foreign exchange rate, and 
~Pep/Pep =percentage change in commodity prices. 
.. .4.4 
The estimate of p 1 provides a measure of the sensitivity of the value of the firm to 
changes in interest rates, P2 estimate the sensitivity to foreign exchange rates and PJ 
estimates the sensitivity to commodity prices. This regression can be extended to include 
specific interest rates, for example, prime lending rates, specific foreign exchange rates 
and specific commodity prices. 
Due to financial risk exposure being firm specific it is difficult to provide evidence that 
the model is supported empirically when using cross-sectional samples. Nevertheless, 
Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1990) compare results for three companies in different 
industries in the U.S.A. Their results provide evidence that share returns of the different 
companies are sensitive to different factors. For example, the share returns of the oil 
producer are sensitive to the price of oil and the share returns of the bank are sensitive to 
changes in interest rates. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Although there are a large variety of risks that may face a firm there are some risks that 
are common across firms. These include financial risks, which are often categorised as 
foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk and asset price risk, although the level of these 
risks vary across firms. This chapter has considered some methods that are used to 
identify and measure foreign exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and asset price risk. 
A firm is faced with financial risk when movements in foreign exchange rates, interest 
rates and asset prices significantly affect its performance, whether that performance is 
measured as share returns or operational capability. Foreign exchange risk has three 
components: transaction risk, economic risk and translation risk. Transaction risk is the 
risk that changes in foreign exchange rates will result in changes in a firm's domestic 
equivalent cash flows. Economic risk is a broader component than transaction risk. 
Economic risk captures the risk to all future expected cash flows from changes in foreign 
exchange rates. This implies that organisations may be subject to economic foreign 
exchange risk even though they may not have foreign denominated cash flows. 
Translation risk relates to the effect on financial statements from movements in exchange 
rates. Regression analysis is a common method of assessing share return sensitivity to 
foreign exchange risk. 
Interest rate risk is the risk that an organisation's performance may be significantly 
influenced by changes in interest rates. The influence may be on expected future cash 
flows (and share returns) or on accounting ratios. Assessing an organisation's exposure 
to interest rate risk may be undertaken through gap and duration analysis. Regression 
analysis is also used to determine sensitivity of share returns to changes in interest rates. 
Asset price risk is the risk that an organisation may be influenced by changes in asset 
prices. There are many operational definitions of asset price risk. For example, asset price 
risk has been regarded as business risk and measured by the volatility of earnings. Asset 
price risk has also been regarded as the effect on an organisation from movements in the 
prices of assets that the firm sells. 
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Regression analysis is often used to measure the level of exposure to financial risks. The 
results of most studies have found little or no significance. Some of the reasons why 
there is little or no significance include: 
• The firms may hedge any portion of financial risks 
• Financial risks may be temporary 
• Financial risk exposure is specific to the operations of each firm and information 
regarding the identification of exposure to financial risk may not be publicly 
available 
These results suggest that the identification and measurement of financial risk 1s a 
complex and difficult exercise. 
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Chapter 5 
Theories on Why Firms Hedge Financial Risk 
5 Introduction 
There is a considerable coverage in the literature as to why firms hedge financial risk. 
However, there is no clear theoretical exposition that allows for the modelling of hedging 
across all firms. A major reason for this may be that the reason driving hedging activities 
are firm specific. What is applicable to one firm may not be applicable to another. In 
sub-section 5.1 a background to the concept of hedging is provided, focusing on the use 
of derivatives. Some of the potential benefits of hedging are discussed. Generally, the 
benefits of hedging can be linked to either reducing risks faced by debt holders, equity 
holders or management. Sub-section 5.2 concludes the chapter. 
5.1 Hedging Financial Risk 
Hedging is one approach to reduce exposure to financial risk. According to the 
traditional theorists, a hedger would 
typically protect his inventory position of x units from the risk of such price 
fluctuation by simultaneously selling a sufficient number of futures contracts to 
cover delivery of x units; when he resells his inventory he would simultaneously 
liquidate his position in futures by purchasing the same number of contracts (of 
the same future) as before. If the net change in spot price is equal to the net 
change in the price of his future, that is if the price movements are parallel to 
each other, the gain he enjoys in one market offsets the loss in the other and he 
would be left with only his "normal" merchandising profit. Otherwise he would 
be left with a residual capital gain or loss (Johnson 1960, p. 140). 
Although the previous example refers to futures contracts, they are not the only contracts 
that facilitate hedging; the result is similar when compensating commitments are made on 
both sides of a transaction. However, the traditional theory of hedging does not have full 
support. Working (1953, p. 325) suggested that the hedger is not motivated primarily by 
desire to avoid risk: 
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The role of risk avoidance in most commercial hedging has been greatly over 
emphasized in economic discussions. Most hedging is done largely, and may be 
done wholly, because information on which the merchant or processor acts leads 
logically to hedging. He buys the spot commodity because the spot price is low 
relative to the futures price and he has reason to expect the spot premium to 
advance; therefore he buys the spot and sells the future. 
Further argument that hedgers are not motivated purely by the desire to avoid risk was 
presented by Johnson (1960) who reformulated the traditional theory of hedging by 
assuming that hedgers are motivated by a desire to reduce risk rather than avoid it. In 
particular, the hedger minimises price risk where price risk is "considered a reflection of 
the variance (or standard deviation) of a subjective probability distribution (or a 
subjective probability density function) for price change from t1 to tz that the trader holds 
at time tt, where actual price from t1 to t2 is treated as a random variable" (Johnson 1960, 
p. 143). Under Johnson's model the hedger minimises the variance of a two-asset 
portfolio, where the two assets are trading in the spot and futures or forward markets, 
respectively. This approach is similar to minimum variance portfolio theory. For then-
asset case where the hedger attempts to minimise the variance on a portfolio of spot and 
futures contracts: 
n n cr~ = L L {XiXn+jcri,n+j +Xn+iXn+jcrn+j,n+j +XiXjcri.J 
i=l j=l 
... 5.1 
where: cr2 P = the variance of holding from t1 to t2, Xi units in the spot market, i, with a 
variance of price change, cr2i, and holding Xj units in the futures market, j, 
with a price variance of cr2j, 
cri,n+j= the covariance between the spot, i, and futures, j, contracts, 
crn+j,n+j =the variance and covariance between futures contracts, j, and 
O"ij = the variance and covariance between spot assets, i. 
The combination also has an actual return, rp given by: 
n n 
r = ""x.r. + ""x.r. p L.J II L.J JJ . .. 5.2 
i=l j=l 
and an expected return, E(rp) given by: 
n n 
E(rp) = z:xiE(rJ + z:xjE(r) ... 5.3 
i=l j=l 
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where: ri and E(ri)= price changes and expected price changes in spot market i and rj, and 
E(rj) = price changes and expected price changes in futures market j. 
The optimal portfolio is the one that maximises the expected return while minimising the 
risk, in other words the hedger wishes to minimise the variance on this portfolio for a 
given expected return. This assumes that the hedger or manager is risk averse. 
Furthermore, the financial risks faced by the firm are diversifiable, which means that if 
the firm is a company then shareholders can manage the financial risks by holding a well-
diversified portfolio, or hedging themselves (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990, p. 358). 
Therefore, unless non-diversified owners hold the firm, the reduction in financial risk by 
managers will not be beneficial to shareholders. This implies that the decision to manage 
financial risk is a financing decision. Therefore, to gain an understanding of the value of 
risk management, research on the value of financing the operations of the firm is relevant. 
The original contributors to this work were Modigliani and Miller (1958). The original 
version of Modigliani and Miller (M&M) states that if there are no taxes, no transaction 
costs and if the investment policy of the firm is fixed, then the financial policies are 
irrelevant to firm value. The M&M theory can be restated in terms of risk management: 
"If financial policies matter, that is, if risk management policies are going to have an 
impact on the value ofthe firm, then it must be that the financial policies impact taxes or 
transaction costs or the firm's investment policies" (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990, 
p. 362). If risk management is value creating it must be through benefits from reduced 
taxes, reduced transaction costs or benefits from investment policies of the firm. Since 
the mid 1980s the potential benefits from risk management have been explored more fully 
and essentially relate to breaches of the M&M assumptions. 
There are at least six areas where a firm may find value from hedging exposure to risk. 
However, before those areas are considered, it is useful to consider the relationship 
between firm value and hedging in greater detail. To understand whether or not a 
corporation should hedge a particular exposure or position two issues must be resolved. 
The first concerns the specification ofthe objectives ofthe firm. This is necessary, as the 
decision to hedge can then be assessed against those objectives. The second issue, which 
is linked to the first, relates to what exposures need to be hedged. Firms are exposed to 
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many risks and if hedging helps the firm achieve its objectives then the risks have to be 
identified so appropriate hedging policy can be implemented. The generally accepted 
objective or goal of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth (Smith, Smithson and 
Wilford 1990). Given this objective, the decision to hedge must be based on whether 
hedging increases shareholder wealth (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990). Shareholder 
wealth, E(Vj ), can be expressed as: 
T E(NCF ) 
E(V)= L J,! 
J t=o (l+r/ 
where: E(NCFj,t) =the expected net cash flow for the firm in period t, and 
rj = the appropriate discount rate fot the firm. 
... 5.4 
Therefore, a sufficient condition for hedging to be beneficial is that hedging causes E(Vj) 
to increase. An increase in E(Vj) will occur if the expected net cash flow increases and/or 
the discount rate reduces. Therefore, hedging will be wealth increasing if it results in an 
increase in the expected net cash flow and/or a reduction in the discount rate, holding all 
else constant. Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) identify at least two conditions that must be met 
for hedging to be worthwhile: "(1) It must change the firm's cash flows in a way that 
shareholders value and the benefit to shareholders must be greater than the cost of 
hedging; and (2) Hedging on corporate account must be the least expensive way to bring 
about the beneficial change in cash flow" (p. 144 ). If the firm's shareholders do not hold 
diversified portfolios then hedging may have an effect on the discount rate. This suggests 
that the impact on the discount rate will be a function of the level of diversification by 
each shareholder. Shareholders that are diversified will not experience a reduction in risk 
if the firm hedges while shareholders that are not diversified will. This suggests that a 
clientele effect may arise. Firms that do not hedge attract diversified shareholders and 
firms that hedge attract non-diversified shareholders. However, there may be competing 
factors that drive diversified shareholders to hold shares in firms that have large non-
diversified shareholdings. These competing factors generally are based on agency issues. 
For example, shareholders that are well diversified do not have the same incentive as non-
diversified shareholders to monitor the performance of the firm or to pressure 
management to ensure that shareholder value is maximised. Therefore, diversified 
shareholders can 'free-ride' by investing in firms that have large non-diversified 
shareholders. To encourage non-diversified shareholders to remam, the diversified 
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shareholders may allow the firm to hedge. If the cost of the loss in diversification were 
less than the cost of monitoring a firm with no large shareholdings then the diversified 
shareholders would be willing to allow a firm to hedge to satisfy the risk preferences of 
the non-diversified shareholders (Fite and Pfleiderer 1995). 
The question as to the value of diversification by the firm has been questioned recently by 
many authors including Berger and Ofek (1994), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes 
(1996). Berger and Ofek (1994) compare the stand-alone value of diversified firm 
segments to specialised firms and find 13 to 15 percent value loss from diversification.23 
One reason why firms pursue risk-reducing strategies is presented by Amihud and Lev 
(1981). They argue that imperfect monitoring and contracting allow managers to take 
actions that are in their own best interests and not necessarily those of shareholders. This 
arises because shareholders can easily control the risk of their individual portfolios in the 
capital markets, but managers can only reduce their human capital risk at the firm level 
(also see Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Thus, for managers, diversification may have a 
positive net present value. May (1995) extends the work of Amihud and Lev (1981) by 
examining managers' motive to pursue risk reduction. Essentially, May finds that when 
managers have more wealth vested in the firm's equity, acquisitions by the firm are more 
diversifying. 
Even if the firm has diversified shareholders then there still may be benefits to these 
shareholders from the firm hedging. One benefit would be if the firm's hedging operation 
substituted for a lack of international diversification by shareholders. Lins and Servaes 
(1999) find that concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders enhances the valuation 
effects of diversification in Germany, but not in Japan or the U.K. A recent study by 
Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (2000) finds that the value of a firm with international 
operations is 2.7% higher than a comparable single-activity domestic firm. 
Of course, this benefit arises simply by not considering 'diversification' in a sufficiently 
broad manner. If 'diversification' were defined as holding the world portfolio then 
23 Lins and Servaes (1999) fmd no significant discount in Germany, but a significant diversification 
discount of 10 percent in Japan and 15 percent in the U.K. 
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shareholders would not benefit from the firm hedging. Therefore, the benefit of hedging 
will occur only if the risks faced by the firm can be transferred "out of the system" (Fite 
and Pfleiderer 1995). For example, if the average firm in country A has a positive 
exposure to the risk of changes in oil prices (expected returns increase when oil prices 
rise), while country B has a negative exposure, investors in both countries can benefit by 
investing in the firms of each other's country (this is the standard diversification 
argument). If, for some reason, the investors do not diversify across country A and B, but 
instead hold only portfolios comprising shares in their own country, then the risk can still 
be reduced by firms in each country hedging their risk to oil price exposure. However, 
this does not provide any argument for firms rather than investors hedging. With 
diversification, one argument is that it is less costly for the investor to diversify than the 
firm. 
One argument in support of hedging at the corporate level is to reduce transaction costs 
(Fite and Pfleiderer 1995). However, it is not clear that transaction costs would be lower 
if the firm rather than the shareholders hedge. Each shareholder is exposed to risks that 
are external to their investment portfolio. Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) provide an example 
of an airline pilot who is exposed to oil price risk by virtue of their occupation (assuming 
that compensation to the pilot is a function of oil price risk). The pilot could skew their 
investment away from shares that are negatively affected by oil price risk towards shares 
that are positively affected. If the pilot holds shares in a firm that has a negative exposure 
to oil price risk, they prefer that the firm hedge the risk if it is not too costly. At the same 
time an employee of an oil producer who holds shares in a company with a negative 
exposure to oil price risk prefers the company to bear this risk. The negative exposure to 
oil price risk is a valuable hedge for the employee since it tends to offset the positive 
exposure to oil price risk resulting from employment in the oil producing firm. 
Therefore, even shareholders who hold diversified portfolios may disagree over what a 
particular firm's hedging policy should be (Fite and Pfleiderer 1995). If the hedging 
policy is not what the shareholders require then they will have to undertake further 
hedging to offset the firm's position. This results in another round of transaction costs. 
Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) argue that such a situation is likely to create a clientele effect 
and therefore the better strategy from the shareholder perspective is to simply maintain a 
stable policy on hedging. 
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A problem with this approach is defining 'stable'. Does stable mean hedging a certain 
dollar amount of exposure or hedging a certain type of exposure such as interest rate or 
foreign exchange rate exposure? In either case, the shareholders have to be informed of 
the policy so they can adjust their portfolios accordingly. For all of the above situations, 
the direct benefits shareholders obtain by hedging are unclear and difficult to quantify. 
There is no single, accepted framework that can be used to guide hedging strategies 
(Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993). However, while there is no single accepted 
framework to guide hedging, the literature has identified a number of potential benefits. 
The purpose of hedging is to reduce the impact of changes in interest rates, foreign 
exchange rates or commodity prices on the volatility of expected cash flows or income 
streams. There are at least six areas where hedging has been recognised in the literature as 
being potentially beneficial to firm value, shareholder value or managerial value. These 
are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections and they include: 
• Reducing corporate taxation 
• Reducing costs ofbankruptcy and financial distress 
• Influencing the level of external finance 
• Reducing the agency costs of debt (reducing the asset substitution problem) 
• Maximising managerial utility 
• Creating a valuable security and/or improving contractual terms, reducing trading 
costs and contract scale 
The public sector provides a umque setting from which to investigate reasons for 
derivative use as those mentioned above and in detail in the following sub-sections have 
been developed from a private sector perspective. There is little evidence on the use of 
derivatives in the public sector. However, many of these reasons cited in the literature 
may not apply to public sector organisations. For instance, many public sector 
organisations are not liable for taxation. Further, public sector organisations do not 
experience similar levels of bankruptcy as private sector organisations. The issues 
associated with the use of derivatives in the Australian Commonwealth public sector are 
explored in chapter seven. 
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5.1.1 Asymmetric Taxation 
The benefit of hedging to lower taxes is created through the difference between taxes on 
the expected income versus the expected tax. Specifically, Smith, Smithson and Wilford 
(1990) show that, when the taxation rate is convex, there is a tax benefit to hedging. 
However, the benefit in reducing taxation through hedging is commonly attributed to 
Smith and Stulz (1985). To explore the taxation benefits of hedging Smith and Stulz 
(1985) employ a state-preference model of firm value. The following example best 
explains the benefit (a similar example is in Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990). 
Assume a firm has equal probability of earning either -$400 or +$600 in the next period. 
The expected earnings, E(E) are $100: 
E(E) = 12( -$400) + 12($600) = $100 ... 5.5 
Therefore, if the earnings stream is perfectly hedged then the expected payoff is $100. 
Assume that the tax rate on pre-tax income is 36% and also assume in the first instance 
that any tax losses can be fully claimed. This means that if the firm makes a loss of $1 
today it has a value of $1 in reducing taxes in future (this also assumes zero interest rates 
and zero transaction costs). With this tax system, the tax on the expected (hedged) income 
(T[E(I)]) is $36: 
T[E(I)] =Tax rate(E(E)) = 0.36 ($100) = $36. . .. 5.6 
If the income stream is not hedged then the tax on the expected (hedged) income is the 
same as the expected tax: 
E(T) = 12[0.36( -$400)] + 12[0.36($600)] = $36. . .. 5.7 
In the above example, there is no reduction in tax attributed to hedging, as the tax on the 
expected (hedged) income equals the expected tax, which is the tax on the unhedged 
mcome. 
If the taxes on losses do not have a similar value as the tax on profits then benefits from 
hedging can arise. Asymmetry in taxation on profits and losses can be generated by not 
providing a reimbursement of tax when a loss occurs. In the previous example the 
negative tax effect on the loss of $400 (12[0.36( -$400)] = -$72) is assumed to be fully 
valued. Taxation systems in the U.S.A., Australia and the U.K. do not provide an 
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immediate reimbursement when a loss occurs. If the loss can be used as a tax benefit to 
offset tax liability in the future, often known as tax losses carried forward, then 
asymmetry in taxation arises, and the tax benefit of a loss has a value less than 1 00% of 
an immediate reimbursement (assuming a positive interest rate). In many countries, tax 
losses can be carried forward and used as a tax offset on future tax gains.24 Therefore, 
when interest rates approach zero and losses can be carried forward indefinitely, the value 
of the tax on losses approaches 100%. Alternatively, while there are positive interest rates 
and a limited period in which losses can be carried forward, the tax benefits from hedging 
will be positive. When tax losses have a different value from tax gains, convexity in the 
tax schedule occurs. 
From the previous example, assume that tax losses are valued at only 90% of their current 
amount. Therefore, if the firm makes a tax loss of $1, the benefit will be only $0.90. 
This may be due to the present value of having to carry forward the tax loss, or a limited 
period in which the tax loss can be claimed as an offset. With this new tax regime, the tax 
on the expected income remains at $36: 
T[E(I)] =Tax rate(E(E)) = 0.36 ($100) = $36. . . .5.8 
However, the expected tax rises to $43.20: 
E(T) = 0.90(12[0.36(-400)]) + 12[0.36(600)] = $43.20. . . .5.9 
In this case the firm would save $7.20 in tax by ensuring that the income stream is hedged 
rather than un-hedged. In this case the benefit from hedging is generated through the 
asymmetry in taxation of profits and losses. 
Tax benefits from hedging may also arise where the tax rate differs across different 
positive income levels. This situation is essentially the same as the case regarding tax 
losses; the benefit is generated where convexity in the tax rate occurs. An example 
similar to the tax loss example explains this benefit. 
24 In Australia, the taxation system allows, in certain circumstances, tax losses of previous years to be 
carried forward. 
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Assume a firm has equal probability of earning either $400 or $600 in the next period. 
The expected earnings, E(E) are $500: 
E(E) = ~($400) + ~($600) = $500. . .. 5.10 
Therefore, if the earnings stream is perfectly hedged then the expected payoff is $500. 
Assume that the tax rate on income below $550 is 36% and above $550 it is 50%. The 
tax on the expected income is $198: 
T[E(I)] =Tax rate(E(E)) = 0.36 ($500) = $198. . .. 5.11 
If the income stream is not hedged then the expected tax becomes: 
E(T) = ~[0.36($400)] + ~[0.50($600)] = $222. . .. 5.12 
Hedging the uncertain income stream results in a tax saving of $24. 
From the firm's perspective the tax benefits from hedging increase as: 
• The tax rate becomes more convex 
• The dollar equivalent of tax losses differs from tax gains 
• More of the firm's pre-tax income is in the convex region of the tax schedule. 
Convex tax schedules can be created through statute where taxation law imposes a 
different rate of taxation for different income levels. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) 
argue that effective convex tax schedules can also be created through tax preference items. 
In the U.S.A., apart from carry forward tax losses, tax preference items include foreign 
tax credits and investment tax credits. Therefore, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) 
argue the tax benefit ofhedging is greater if the firm has more tax preference items. 
If convexities in tax rates induce hedging benefits, does concavity produce reverse 
hedging behaviour? Smith and Stulz (1985) argue "that a firm that faces concavities in 
the tax function finds it profitable to 'reverse hedge', increasing the variability of its 
taxable income over that range of outcomes" (p. 395). This implies that firms that face 
lower tax rates on higher income levels are less likely to hedge. 
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Smith and Stulz (1985 p. 394) indicate that even if there are benefits from hedging 
through reduced corporate tax this may not transfer to individual shareholders: 
It could be the case that the decrease in the firm's expected tax liability from 
hedging is offset by an increase in the expected tax liability of the investors who 
enable the firm to hedge. Thus there may be no impact on expected taxes. 
Hedging instruments would be priced accordingly and there would be no benefit 
from hedging. However, in this case it would pay firms that expect to face a 
constant tax rate to offer hedging instruments to firms that expect their tax rate to 
be an increasing function of their cash flow. This mechanism tends to produce 
hedging instrument prices as if the marginal investor faces a linear tax function. 
One implication of Smith and Stulz (1985) is that the tax benefits of hedging are 
dependent upon individual shareholders. It is unclear that tax benefits of hedging by the 
firm are transferred to all shareholders. If this is the case then it may be preferable for a 
firm to simply provide a stable policy (create a clientele effect). 
An alternative way of considering the justification for hedging through taxation benefits 
is through an option pricing model. If the taxpayer's income is positive, the government 
receives a fixed percentage of that income. If the taxpayer's income is negative, the 
government does not pay any portion of the loss. Under these assumptions, the 
government's claim on the taxpayer's income is, in effect, a call option written by the 
taxpayer to the government on a fixed percentage of that income. If the taxpayer makes a 
loss the option expires worthless, but if the taxpayer makes a gain the government 
exercises the right to the tax on the income. Therefore, the value of the government's 
option is an increasing function of the volatility of the taxpayer's income. Hedging, 
which reduces that volatility, reduces the expected tax payments. 
Whether the Australian tax system provides incentives to hedge is an empirical question 
and there are a number of factors which impact on this issue: first, the effect of the 
imputation tax system; second, the effect of a flat statutory corporate tax rate; and third, 
the effect of specific tax provisions. In Australia, a dividend imputation tax system was 
introduced on 1 July 1987. The dividend imputation tax system partially integrates 
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personal and corporate taxes by permitting certain classes of investors a remission of tax 
at the shareholder level via a tax credit attached to a fully franked dividend.25 
Although there are many provisions under the imputation system, it essentially eliminates 
the double taxation of company dividends by taxing distributed company profit at the 
shareholder's personal marginal rate. This means that for an Australian resident 
shareholder, the company tax is essentially a withholding tax rather than a separate tax. 
The tax credits represent a rebate of paid company tax at the personal level (Officer 
1994). For non-resident shareholders, the imputation credit cannot be used as an offset to 
personal tax liability. However, if the dividend is a franked dividend, no withholding tax 
applies. If the dividend is an unfranked dividend, withholding tax at a standard rate of 
15% (if the recipient lives in a country with a double tax treaty with Australia) or 30% 
(for non-treaty countries) applies. Thus, in general, there is no double taxation of 
dividends. Therefore, as company taxation is a withholding tax on personal income, the 
taxation-induced benefits of corporate tax shields is reduced. This implies that firms 
expecting to pay fully franked dividends in the future have less incentive to hedge 
earnings than prior to the imputation system. 
With regard to taxation of capital gains, capital gains tax is only applicable on realised 
capital gains; therefore capital gains tax can be deferred indefinitely. However, as 
company profits are taxed at the corporate rate, retained profits that result in capital gains 
essentially are taxed twice if they are realised: firstly through company taxation and 
secondly by capital gains tax.26 
In a sample of 549 Australian companies, Tran and Porcano (1997) find that effective tax 
rates decline as profit increases. This implies, other things being equal, that firms with 
higher income levels would not benefit from hedging as would firms on lower income 
levels, providing the effect of hedging and effective tax rates were the same as hedging 
25 For details of the Australian dividend imputation system see Bishop et al. (2000). 
26 In Australia, capital gains taxes were recently reduced for individual shareholders to 50% of the personal 
tax rate. 
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and convex tax schedules. In Australia, the statutory tax schedule is relatively flat so the 
benefits of hedging would be reduced relative to a convex tax schedule.27 
An additional factor that complicates the potential tax benefits of hedging is differences 
between the taxation effect on the hedging instrument and the taxation effects on the 
underlying commodity or contract. For example, if a futures contract on bank bills is 
used to hedge an interest rate exposure, the gains or losses on the futures contract may be 
treated differently for tax purposes than gains or losses on the interest rate instrument. 
5.1.2 Reducing Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress 
A potential benefit of hedging is the reduction in expected costs of bankruptcy and 
financial distress. Firms go bankrupt when they cannot pay their debts as they fall due. 
Bankruptcy imposes costs on the firm through reorganisation and the direct costs of 
bankruptcy include accounting and legal fees. However, even if a firm is not bankrupt, the 
increase in probability of bankruptcy (financial distress) may increase indirect costs or 
costs of financial distress. 28 These include higher contracting costs of the firm with its 
customers, its employees and its suppliers (Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990). If a firm 
has increased variability in its earnings then the probability of financial distress and 
bankruptcy increase. However, the return distribution is asymmetric. If the earnings in a 
period are low or negative, the shareholders must pay the costs of bankruptcy (direct and 
indirect). If earnings are high, there is no bonus to offset the downside bankruptcy cost 
(Fite and Pfleiderer 1995). 
Hedging reduces the variability in earnings; therefore the probability of financial distress 
and bankruptcy is reduced. This results in lower expected costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy. The magnitude of the cost reduction depends upon two factors: 
1} The probability that the firm will encounter financial distress if it does not hedge 
27 Due to carried forward tax losses, the Australian tax schedule is slightly kinked at zero. 
28 The seminal paper on bankruptcy costs is Warner (1977). In Australia, Pham and Chow (1987) estimate 
that direct bankruptcy costs are approximately four percent of company assets and that indirect bankruptcy 
costs are in excess of 20 percent of company assets. Evidence by Robertson and Tress ( 1985) indicate that 
in Australia the cost of bankruptcy are a higher proportion of company assets for smaller companies relative 
to larger companies. 
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2) The costs it will face if it does encounter financial distress 
The reduction in costs (the benefit of hedging) will be greater- the greater the probability 
of financial distress - if the firm does not hedge, the greater the cost of financial distress 
(Smith, Smithson and Wilford 1990). The more volatile the firm's earnings, the more 
likely the firm is to face default. Therefore, firms with more volatile earnings wo\lld be 
expected to generate reduced costs of bankruptcy from hedging. Also, if bankruptcy costs 
have a large component of fixed costs then the benefits of hedging to reduce expected 
bankruptcy costs are greater for smaller firms than larger firms (Smith and Stulz 1985). 
Therefore, small firms with high volatility in earnings are expected to obtain the greatest 
benefits from hedging relative to larger firms with less volatile earnings. However, it is 
not clear that all the costs of hedging are proportional to firm size. The costs of hedging 
can be divided into direct and indirect. Direct hedging costs include the actual price paid 
for the hedging instrument. Direct costs are likely to be proportional to firm size: the 
larger the firm, the greater the size of the exposure that requires hedging; the greater the 
number of the hedging instruments, the greater the costs. Indirect costs of hedging 
include the costs of expertise required to manage the hedging operations. A certain 
amount of expertise is required to develop and manage any hedging strategy and although 
the costs of staff are expected to increase as the hedging requirements increase, it is 
unlikely to be proportional to firm size. Therefore, it is not clear that smaller, more 
volatile firms are likely to undertake more hedging than larger firms. 
Bankruptcy involves some exogenous transaction costs. As hedging reduces the 
variability of future earnings, hedging lowers the probability of incurring bankruptcy 
costs. If a hedge portfolio is held, which pays a positive amount when the firm would be 
bankrupt without hedging, then the expected costs of bankruptcy are reduced. However, 
for hedging to increase shareholder wealth, the firm must convince potential debt holders 
that it will hedge after the debt is issued and, hence, that expected bankruptcy costs are 
not as high as the firm's investment policy would otherwise suggest. But, as hedging may 
not be in the interests of shareholders (based on the diversification argument discussed 
previously), there is less incentive for the firm to hedge. However, Smith and Stulz 
(1985) consider two ways market forces create the incentive for the firm to hedge. The 
first is a reputation effect. If the firm is a frequent borrower it can build a reputation as a 
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hedger, but the reputation is not likely to be sufficient to insure that the firm will hedge 
when the probability of bankruptcy is large. A solid reputation is of no use when 
bankrupt. Second, hedging provides a means whereby the firm can reduce the costs of 
financial distress imposed by debt covenants that constrain the shareholder to take action 
they would otherwise avoid. For instance, binding debt covenants can force the firm to 
alter its investment policy; hedging can reduce the likelihood that covenants become 
binding. 
Another confounding effect is the probability of financial distress being directly related to 
the volatility of a firm's cash flow. If a firm has more volatile cash flows then it would be 
more likely to hedge. This would mean that, ex-post, the differences in volatility of cash 
flow between hedgers and non-hedgers would be similar. Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993) did not find any significant difference in volatility of pre-tax income between 
hedge firms and non-hedge firms. 
Heaney, Wai and Walker (1997) consider the use of hedging by Australian gold producers 
as a means of reducing the costs of financial distress (agency costs of debt). Hedging can 
be undertaken through gold loans?9 However, rather than regarding hedging as a 
technique for cost reduction, hedging is regarded as a means to increase the level of debt. 
Therefore, gold producers who use gold loans are expected to have higher levels of debt. 
Heaney, Wai and Walker (1997) find there is a statistically significant difference in 
leverage between gold loan companies and non-gold loan companies in a sample of 
seventeen matched pairs (gold loan firms matched with non-gold loan firms). 
Titman (1985) demonstrates that if a firm can sell forward contracts on its share, it can 
increase its debt level without increasing its probability of bankruptcy. This is 
tantamount to the proposition that firms can reduce the probability of bankruptcy by 
hedging. If a firm can reduce the probability of bankruptcy then the expected costs of 
financial distress will also be reduced. This then suggests that firms that hedge should 
29 Hedging is achieved by the gold producer borrowing gold that is immediately sold in the spot markets. 
The proceeds are used to fund investment in further production and the loan is repaid in actual gold, thereby 
reducing price risk. 
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have higher debt than firms that do not. However, this was not the purpose of Titman's 
(1985) paper. He was concerned with the development of an optimal capital structure: 
"by balancing the tax gain from leverage against the costs of bankruptcy an optimal 
capital structure is attained" (p. 20). 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) examine the reduction in transaction costs of financial 
distress for 169 U.S. firms which hedge, but do not find the expected significant positive 
association between hedging and leverage. Leverage is measured as the three-year 
average debt to size ratio and the coverage of fixed claims (measured as the ratio of the 
three-year average of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the three-year average 
of total interest expense). Although Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) do not find the 
expected positive relationship between hedging and leverage, they recognise the potential 
for confounding effects. The major confounding effect is the relationship between the 
firm's investment opportunity set and leverage. They argue that if there is not an effective 
control (in the logistic regression model that they use) for the firm's investment 
opportunity set, leverage can proxy for investment opportunities. 
5.1.3 Influencing the Level of External Finance 
Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984) are generally attributed with the pecking order 
theory of firm financing. Donaldson (1961) made the following observation: 
"Management strongly favoured (sic) internal generation as a source of new funds even to 
the exclusion of external funds except for occasional unavoidable 'bulges' in the need for 
funds" (p. 67). Myers (1984) extended this observation to a pecking order for financing 
decisions: 
1. Firms prefer internal sources of funds 
2. If external financing is required, firms issue the safest security first 
The safest security is debt, followed by hybrid debt/equity securities such as convertible 
bonds, then equity as a last resort. 
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Therefore, if hedging can reduce the likelihood that the firm will require external finance 
then hedging will be valuable. Hedging reduces the variability of the cash flows generated 
by the investments in place. The variability in the cash flow results in either: 
1. Variability in the amount of money raised externally, or 
2. Variability in the amount of investment 
If the supply of external finance were perfectly elastic, the optimal ex-post solution would 
be to leave investment plans unaltered in the face of variations in cash flows, taking up all 
the slack by changing the quantity of outside money raised. Unfortunately, this approach 
does not work well if the marginal cost of funds goes up with the amount raised 
externally. A shortfall in cash may be met with some increase in outside financing, but 
also some decrease in investment. Thus variability in cash flow now disturbs both 
investment and financing plans in a way that is costly to the firm. These costs result in 
the price of external financing being higher than internally generated funds. The extent 
that hedging can reduce the variability in either investment spending or external finance 
will determine the benefit from hedging (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993). However, 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) also suggest that financial distress is costly, and if 
there is an advantage to having debt in the capital structure (say due to taxes or agency 
problems associated with free cash flow) hedging may be used to increase debt capacity. 
For example, one of the primary lenders to McDonald's U.S. franchisees had accumulated 
a large portfolio of fixed-rate loans to them. It sold participation in these loans in the 
secondary market to investors who were willing to buy a portion of the portfolio if they 
could receive a floating-rate return. Interest rate swaps were used to convert the fixed-
interest payment stream on the participations to the floating rate that investors desired. 
This freed lending capacity so the bank could make additional loans to franchisees (Group 
of Thirty 1993, p. 37). A similar argument is adopted by Heaney, Wai and Walker 
(1997). They test whether the hedging attributes of gold loans allow gold producers to 
increase leverage. This reasoning is based essentially on Myers and Majluf (1984) who 
"assume information asymmetry between the firm and external investors where the 
managers maximise existing shareholder wealth and existing shareholders are passive. 
Under these conditions they (Myers and Majluf 1984) show that the level of under 
investment arising from information asymmetry varies from zero in the case of risk free 
debt to a maximum in the case of equity" (Heaney, Wai and Walker 1997, pp. 133-4). 
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Firms can use derivatives to reduce the explicit cost of finance. This is possible when 
there is a comparative advantage in either interest rates or foreign exchange rates. Where 
financial markets are segmented nationally or internationally a comparative advantage 
may allow a firm to lower its financing costs. For example, a borrower may issue debt 
where it has a comparative advantage, and use a currency swap to achieve funding in its 
desired currency at a lower cost than direct financing. 
Titman ( 1985) also recognised that hedging could allow an increase in the level of debt 
without increasing the probability of bankruptcy. In this case the hedging was on the 
future price of the firm's share and was created by purchasing the before company tax 
value of the firm's share at the beginning of the period, entering synthetic forward 
contracts for the sale of these shares at the end of the period and issuing risk-free bonds of 
the same dollar amount that the shares represent. These transactions result in zero outlay 
by the firm at the beginning of the period, but allow it to make use of the tax benefits of 
debt without increasing financial leverage and therefore bankruptcy. This allows the firm 
to issue as much debt as required to eliminate tax liabilities and results in an optimal 
capital structure. 
The argument that hedging reduces the total variability of cash flow may apply over a 
single time period, but when multiple time periods are involved, regular or routine 
hedging may not produce a more stable cash flow than not hedging. The issue here 
concerns the variability of the forward price relative to the spot price. If the forward price 
has a lower variation over the longer term than the spot price then hedging will reduce the 
variability in cash flow. This is an empirical question. 
Adam ( 1996) extends this by arguing that firms are concerned about their credit rating 
and use derivatives to avoid the use of debt. In other words, firms that use derivatives 
finance a larger fraction of their investment spending through retained earnings. To 
reduce the probability that external financing becomes necessary in the future, firms use 
derivatives to match their earnings stream with their financing requirements. 
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5.1.4 Reducing the Agency Costs of Debt (asset substitution problem) 
Myers (1977) shows that firms that issue debt (or finance with claims with higher priority 
than equity) create incentives for the shareholders to under invest. Since benefits from 
increased investments are shared with the debt holders, equity holders bypass some 
positive net present value projects. The value of a firm can be divided into two 
components, one being the present value of assets already in place and the second being 
the value of potential growth or expansion opportunities. If the existing debt claims are 
greater than the present value of assets already in place then equity holders have no 
incentive to take on projects that, although having a positive net present value, do not 
increase the value of the firm above the debt holders claim.30 
Bessembinder (1991) extends this analysis to show that by shifting individual future 
states from default to non-default outcomes, hedges increase the proportion of future 
states in which equity holders are the residual claimants. This reduces the fraction of the 
benefit from incremental investment that accrues to non-equity claimants, thereby 
reducing the incentives for equity holders to under invest (Bessembinder 1991, p. 531). 
Bessembinder (1991) predicts that hedging activities are greater where growth 
opportunities constitute a larger proportion of firm value, other things being equal, 
because reductions in agency costs are most valuable for these firms. 
Stulz (1990) provides a proof that through the financing policy, shareholders select a 
target for funds available to management for investment. Deviations from the target are 
costly to shareholders, since management over invests when funds are plentiful and under 
invests when they are scarce. As the dispersion of cash flow falls, the funds available to 
management are more likely to be close to the target. Stulz (1990) considers this as 
having important implications including: 
30 A simple example illustrates the under investment problem. Consider a firm where the debt holders' 
claims are $10,000 and are due for repayment, but the present value of the firm's assets in place is only 
$9,000. In this case the equity holders expect nothing and the debt holders expect 90 cents in the dollar of 
debt. If a growth opportunity arises with a net present value of $1,000 and, if accepted, the value of the 
finn will rise by $1,000 to $10,000, then the equity holders have no incentive to invest as their expected 
return remains at zero. This results in equity holders under investing. This also raises issues concerning the 
use of debt, as discussed previously. 
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1. The value of diversification. Diversification across projects and mergers for 
diversification purposes can increase shareholder wealth. The reason for this is that 
diversification and mergers can result in less volatile cash flows. 
2. The value of hedging. Shareholders can increase their wealth by finding ways to force 
management to commit to a hedging policy that decreases the volatility of cash flows. 
The basis for the above arguments in favour of hedging can be illustrated with an 
example. Assume that a firm has a single debt liability of $700 due in one year. Suppose 
that if the firm continues to operate it will have assets worth $600 (with certainty) when 
the debt comes due. In this case the shareholders will receive nothing and the debt 
holders will receive $600. Assume that the firm can change its operations and invest in a 
risky asset. The payoff for this risky asset is either $800 or $400, both with 50% 
probability. The expected payout to shareholders is $50 (50% x ($800-$700) + Max[O, 
50% x ($400-$700)]). The expected payout to debt holders is $550 (50% x $700 +50% x 
$400). 
The expected value of the firm's assets has remained at $600 (50% x $800 + 50% x 
$400), but the change to the risky investment has transferred $50 in expected payout from 
debt holders to shareholders. If shareholders are prevented by debt covenants from 
undertaking investments in risky assets then this may mean loss of positive net present 
value investment. For example, if a risky investment results in the cash flows to the firm 
of $400 and $1200 with equal probability, the value of the firm increases from $600 to 
$800 (50% x $400 + 50% x $1200). The project has a positive net present value. 
However, the expected payout to the debt holders is $550 (50% x $400 + 50% x 700). 
This is $50 less than the expected payout to the debt holders if the investment is not 
undertaken. Assuming that the debt holders are risk averse wealth maximisers, they 
would prefer $600 for sure than $550 with uncertainty. One way the positive net present 
value investment can be undertaken is to renegotiate the debt, which may be costly or 
impossible. 
An alternative could be to hedge the risk so that the expected outcome is attained. That 
is, the $800 becomes certain. The debt holders will then receive $700 (which is $100 
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more than the original case without the risky investment) and the shareholders will 
receive $100 (which is $100 more than the original case without the risky investment). 
By hedging the risk, the firm captures the value of the risky strategy; if the risk had not 
been hedged and the debt could not be renegotiated, the debt holders would have blocked 
the firm from obtaining the increase in value. This example assumes that the cost of the 
hedge is zero. However, providing that the cost of the hedge is less than the increase in 
value, then the hedge would be beneficial. 
The under investment problem is more pronounced for firms with more discretion in their 
choice of investment decisions; hedgers are predicted to be firms that derive a relatively 
higher proportion of their market value from growth options relative to assets in place 
(Mian 1996). To proxy the relative importance of discretionary investment decisions, 
Mian (1996) uses the ratio of market to the book value of total assets (market-to-book 
ratio).31 
Mian (1996) also argues that managers in regulated industries are likely to have less 
discretion in their choice of investment policies and that regulation also makes it easier 
for fixed claim holders to observe managerial action. As a result, firms in regulated 
industries face lower contracting costs and therefore have less of an incentive to hedge, 
but also note that other factors will interact and reduce the agency problem, for example, 
the level of management share ownership. 
5.1.5 Managerial Utility Maximisation 
The previous discussion considers that hedging influences the risks faced by debt or 
equity holders. An alternative view is that management undertake hedging activities to 
reduce their own risks and not necessarily the risks faced by debt or equity holders. In 
other words, management undertake hedging activities to maximise their utility, possibly 
at the expense of debt and equity holders. There are two arguments linking hedging with 
management. The first relates to management hedging to reduce their undiversified risks 
31 This also relates to the growth versus value research of Fama and French (1992). Firms with relatively 
higher (lower) market-to-book value (book-to-market value) are growth firms and firms with relatively 
lower (higher) market-to-book value (book-to-market value) are value firms. 
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and the second relates to management using hedging to signal skill. These arguments are 
discussed below. 
5.1.5.1 Managerial Risk Aversion 
The area of risk reduction from a managerial motive can be traced back to Amihud and 
Lev (1981 ). 32 They explain that firms pursue risk -reducing strategies such as 
diversification because it is in the manager's interests rather than the shareholder's and 
that imperfect monitoring and contracting provides the avenue for managers to pursue 
their own objectives at the expense of shareholders. There have been numerous papers 
that consider diversification at the firm level being based on managerial motives and 
much of this work can be directly related to hedging activities by the firm. For example, 
Smith and Stulz (1985) state that a merger can produce effects similar to those ofhedging 
through financial contracts (p. 392). 
From Smith and Stulz (1985), the level of hedging undertaken by the firm will be 
determined by the relationship between firm value, manager wealth and expected utility. 
If managerial wealth is concave relative to firm value (at end-of-period) then expected 
utility will also be concave and hedging firm value is optimal. If managerial wealth is a 
convex function of firm value then the decision whether to hedge or not is determined by 
the manager's expected utility. If the manager's expected utility is a concave function of 
firm value then the decision will be based on the trade-off between risk and expected 
return. Because the manager is risk averse they will want to give up some expected 
income to reduce risk. Therefore, some hedging will occur. If the manager's expected 
utility is a convex function of firm value (as well as the manager's wealth) then utility 
will be maximised when there is no hedging. These results imply that specifying the form 
32 The finance literature assumes that most investors will prefer to invest in a well-diversified portfolio to 
minimise portfolio risk. Since the liabilities of a finn's shareholders are limited to their shareholdings, the 
risks can be diversified with other investments. However, corporate managers are unable to achieve the 
same minimum level of aggregate risk as a large proportion of the manager's wealth is derived from the 
significant investment in human capital specific to the finn. Unlike financial capital, the risks associated 
with human capital are largely non-diversifiable (Amihud and Lev 1981). These non-diversifiab1e risks 
result in a welfare reduction (Crutchley and Hansen 1989). The loss of diversification opportunity is 
particularly costly to corporate managers due to their personal wealth constraint. Since risk averse managers 
bear an unavoidable burden of risk linked to the fortunes of the finn employing them, managerial self-
interest advocates argue that once presented with opportunities, managers have incentives to lower the non-
diversifiable employment risks by ensuring the continued viability of the finn (Amihud and Lev 1981). This 
is known as the 'managerial self-interest hypothesis'. 
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of managerial compensation will determine whether managers are motivated to hedge 
firm value. 33 
Making managerial wealth a concave function of firm value will bond the manager to a 
hedging policy. The practical effects of this are that managers with greater share 
ownership prefer more risk management (hedging), while those with greater option 
holdings would prefer less risk management, because shares provide linear payoffs as a 
function of share price whereas options provide convex payoffs (Tufano 1996). 
Along a similar line of argument, Campbell and Kracaw (1987) demonstrate that 
shareholders will prefer managers to hedge observable unsystematic risk because they 
expect this to induce the managers to be more productive and the anticipation of higher 
productivity will increase firm value. However, the increase in firm value will only occur 
if the incentive contracts between managers and shareholders incorporate the extent of 
managerial hedging or be adjustable in response to hedging activities. 
Schrand and Unal (1999) argue that managers effectively use hedging to substitute core 
business risks for homogeneous risk faced by the firm. Core business risk is associated 
with positive net present value projects while homogeneous risks are associated with zero 
net present value projects. When managerial compensation is tied to firm value and firm 
value is linked to positive net present value projects, managers then have an incentive to 
substitute core business risk for homogeneous risk. In such cases, hedging is not 
necessarily used to reduce total risk, but to shift risk from zero net present value projects 
to positive net present value projects.34 
May (1995) also finds that managerial motives impact on the decision to alter risk 
profiles. In particular, May finds that when firms take over other firms, the acquisitions 
33 Finn value is regarded as the market value of equity. 
34 The existence of multidimensionality in total firm risk is well acknowledged in the literature (Schrand and 
Unal 1999). For example, investment in a single project might expose a firm to such risks as input and 
output price risk, foreign exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk or 
political risk. 
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are more diversifying in nature when managers have more wealth invested in firm equity. 
This suggests that diversifying strategies by managers are based on managerial motives of 
risk reduction rather than shareholder motives and again, agency issues arise. 
5.1.5.2 Signalling Skill 
An alternative to the risk aversion hypothesis of Smith and Stulz (1985) is the signalling 
skill hypothesis of Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1995). 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) extend the work of Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986) and 
consider an environment in which uncertainty regarding managerial ability and project 
profitability implies that shareholders learn about the quality of the firm's management 
and investment projects from observations of firm performance. This learning links 
current profits with a manager's reputation and their compensation packages. By hedging 
price fluctuations, managers can alter risks of current profits that in turn affects the risk of 
their future compensation package. Managers' preferences regarding their future income 
can thus provide a motive for financial hedging (DeMarzo and Duffie 1995, p. 745). 
From this, DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) demonstrate that with nondisclosure of hedging 
activity, risk minimisation (full hedging) is an equilibrium policy for managers. If full 
disclosure of hedging positions is required, however, this equilibrium is typically 
destroyed. The most natural equilibrium is for managers not to hedge at all. Holding fixed 
the inferences made by shareholders about managerial ability given firm's performance, 
reduced profitability implies reduced wage variability, which benefits risk averse 
managers. With nondisclosure of hedging, reduced wage variability is the only effect, 
and full hedging is the natural equilibrium (p. 746). 
An important point regarding the work of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) is the issue of 
disclosure of hedging activity. If there is full disclosure then there is no incentive for 
managers to hedge. If there is non-disclosure then full hedging is the optimal outcome. 
This suggests that the results are sensitive to the type of information disclosed. 
A second effect of disclosure of hedging positions is the elimination of a source of noise 
from the firm's profits, making profits a more informative signal of managerial quality 
(DeMarzo and Duffie 1995). Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) provide an example ofthis issue: 
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Imagine that a charitable organisation hires a fundraiser to solicit donations, but is 
unsure of the fundraiser's ability. Assume that all the organisation observes is the 
amount of money the fundraiser turns in each day. Over time, the organisation 
will gather data to help it resolve the uncertainty concerning the fundraiser's 
ability. Obviously, a good fundraiser will on average tum in more than a poor one. 
Now imagine that each day the fundraiser, before turning in the money, goes to the 
track and wagers some of the day's proceeds on the horses. The fundraiser then 
turns in the amount raised plus or minus the winnings or losses at the track. The 
betting has clearly made it more difficult for the charitable organisation to 
determine the fundraiser's ability. For several days, a good fundraiser could tum 
in little due to losses at the track while a poor fundraiser might look good due to 
some lucky bets. In making its assessment of the fundraiser's ability, the 
organisation will put less weight on the daily amounts turned in when these are 
influenced by the noise of the wagers at the track. A fundraiser who knows he is 
good and who wants to have this revealed as soon as possible has a clear incentive 
to avoid the noise added by gambling (pp. 162-3). 
Although the above example is fanciful it highlights the possible reduction in noise that 
hedging may create. However, in a corporate setting, this assumes that the market is not 
aware of all the risk exposures faced by the firm. If the market knows all the risk 
exposures then there is no noise. The market is fully aware of the risks and can take 
appropriate action. If the market were not aware of all the risk exposures then disclosure 
would again reduce the noise. In reality, many exposures occur over a short time frame 
and market disclosure may not be possible. Furthermore, many exposures may reveal 
valuable information to competitors. Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) suggest also that, for 
many investors, it may be difficult to process all of the information necessary to describe 
the risk exposure of a large company. 
5.1.6 Creating a Valuable Security and/or Improving Contractual 
Terms 
Fite and Pfleiderer (1995) suggest that some firms hedge to create a marketable security. 
For example, assume that a firm has a unique operating exposure and another firm has a 
similar, but opposite exposure. If the second firm derives significant benefits from 
hedging (such as those discussed previously) then it may be profitable for the first firm to 
be counterparty to a hedging contract with the second firm, irrespective of whether the 
first firm obtains any of the benefits from hedging (as discussed previously). In other 
words, the unique exposure of the first firm places it in a position to profit from hedging. 
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Also, options, futures and forward contracts are denominated in large amounts and 
personal hedging of risks inherited from companies makes hedging by shareholders 
infeasible for all but the very large investors. Individual shareholders would more likely 
have to pay higher transaction costs for derivative contracts than companies due to the 
size of the transactions. 
5.2 Conclusion 
This chapter considers the issue of hedging financial risk. Generally, hedging is a 
mechanism whereby exposures to financial risks are reduced. Whether the reduction in 
risk is called risk avoidance or risk transference is not the issue. The issue is that the firm 
is faced with less financial risk after implementing the hedge than it was before 
implementation. However, to understand whether or not a firm should hedge, two issues 
must be resolved. The first concerns the objective of the hedging strategy and the second 
concerns the identification of the risks. 
In relation to the objective of the hedging strategy, the objective of the firm needs to be 
first identified. If the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder value then the 
objective of hedging must be to maximise shareholder value. Maximising shareholder 
value is generally interpreted as maximising the expected net cash flows of the firm or 
reducing the discount rate applicable to those cash flows. It is shown that the more likely 
result of hedging is to maximise the expected net cash flow to the firm rather than to 
reduce the discount rate. However, it is not clear that managers always act in the best 
interests of shareholders and if managers are acting in their own interests then hedging 
may be undertaken in the interests of maximising management value or utility. 
Essentially, the purpose of hedging is to reduce the impact of changes in interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates or commodity prices on the volatility of expected cash flows or 
income streams. This may be to either maximise the expected value of the firm or 
maximise the utility of the manager. Generally, this increase in expected value is created 
through reducing tax liabilities, reducing bankruptcy risk, influencing the level of debt or 
the agency costs associated with debt, reducing noise in earnings or reducing transaction 
costs. Hedging can reduce tax liabilities in cases where there is a convex tax schedule and 
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the hedged income is below the point of convexity in the tax schedule. Convex tax 
schedules can be created through different statutory tax rates across income levels and 
through tax preference items, such as previous years' tax losses being carried forward. 
Reducing bankruptcy risk is also regarded as a possible benefit of hedging. Bankruptcy 
imposes considerable costs on the firm and if the costs of hedging are less than the 
expected losses due to bankruptcy then hedging is a value increasing operation. 
Another benefit to hedging relates to the asset substitution and under investment 
problems. As hedging reduces the risk of future cash flows, shareholders have a greater 
incentive to avoid the under investment and asset substitution problem of Myers (1977). 
The managerial aspect of hedging arises from managerial risk aversion and signalling 
skill. Generally, management have an incentive to hedge some of the future firm value, 
but how much depends upon the preferences of the manager. Compensation plans, in the 
form of options, may induce managers not to hedge. 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) argue that management will undertake hedging activity, 
providing the details of the hedging activity are not disclosed. Hedging activity reduces 
the signal to noise ratio in earnings figures, but once disclosure occurs then the incentive 
for management to hedge is lost. 
A final benefit that may be obtained from hedging is through the creation of new 
securities. Firms with a particular risk exposure may be able to profit by selling that 
exposure to other firms who would obtain benefits from such an exposure. Hedging by 
firms may also be of a lower cost than hedging by individual shareholders due to 
economies of scale. 
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SECTION2 
DERIVATIVES AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SECTOR 
Overview 
Organisations operating in the public sector provide a rich ground to extend our 
understanding of why organisations use derivatives. For instance, bankruptcy is less 
likely in public sector organisations than those in the private sector due to either an 
explicit or implicit government guarantee. Further, many public sector organisations do 
not pay income tax. In Australia, there has also been a change in the way public sector 
organisations are held accountable. This change has been towards a private sector model 
of financial accountability and, as a result, these organisations are now being managed 
and expected to perform more like private sector organisations. As public sector 
organisations are being held more accountable in relation to financial outcomes, financial 
risk management is an important aspect of operations. 
There is very little evidence on the use of derivatives in the public sector. The following 
two chapters consider the legality of Commonwealth public sector organisations using 




Hedging and the Legal Power to Enter Derivative 
Contracts* 
6 Introduction 
In addition to reducing risks, the use of derivative contracts creates new risks for 
organisations. One of these is the risk that the capacity to enter the derivative contract is 
beyond the power of the organisation. The issue of the capacity of an organisation to 
enter contracts that are enforceable in law depends upon the legal power of the 
organisation. In the context of Corporations Law, companies generally have the power of 
a natural person. This means that contracts that are within the power of a natural person 
are enforceable against a Corporations Law company. Prior to 1984, the power of a 
company incorporated in Australia could have been limited through the Memorandum 
and Articles of Association. Contracts that were beyond the power of a company were 
recognised as being ultra vires. The doctrine of ultra vires was effectively abolished for 
companies incorporated in Australia in 1984.35 
However, recent court cases have raised uncertainty with respect to the legal authority of 
some overseas public sector organisations to enter derivative contracts. One well-
publicised case involves the London Borough Council of Hammersmith and Fulharn 
where the House of Lords ruled that all swap transactions entered into by the Council 
were beyond its powers (see Carew 1995 for details of this and other 'derivative 
disasters').36 There have been no similar decisions to Hammersmith in Australia and the 
question remains as to whether public sector organisations in Australia can legally enter 
derivative contracts. Uncertainty in legal power may mean that some of these 
• This chapter has been edited and published in Oliver, B., 1999, The legality of derivative contracts entered 
into by Commonwealth organisations, Accountability and Performance 5(1), 43-53. 
35 For a discussion of the doctrine of ultra vires see Ford and Austin (1995) pp. 481-501. 
36 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council and Others [1990] 2 QB 697. 
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organisations are not appropriately managing their financial risks. Third parties may also 
be reluctant to enter into derivative contracts with these organisations for fear that the 
contracts may be void. In some Australian States this problem has been resolved by 
creating Treasury corporations with clear power to enter these derivative contracts on 
behalf of the State-owned enterprises.37 There is no similar organisation at the 
Commonwealth level in Australia that centralises the risk management functions of 
Commonwealth authorities and companies. Significant uncertainty and inconsistency in 
the use of derivatives by these organisations exists. 
Australian Commonwealth organisations can be divided into two main groups. One 
group comprises organisations that cannot legally own monies or other assets separate 
from the Commonwealth. These organisations do not have a separate legal identity.38 As 
these organisations are not separate from the Commonwealth, they have limited 
contractual powers. For example, they do not have the power to borrow money. 
However, many of these organisations enter contracts that are denominated in foreign 
currencies. The foreign exchange risk exposure from these contracts is managed centrally 
through the Commonwealth Departments of Finance and Administration and Treasury. 
The foreign exchange risk faced by these organisations is expected to be collectively 
managed by these two central agency Departments. 39 
The second group of Commonwealth organisations have a separate legal identity. They 
can own monies and other assets in their own right and many have the power to borrow.40 
These organisations can be further divided into five sub-groups: 
37 See Martin and Wanna in Wanna, Forster and Graham (1996) for a general summary of some problems of 
regulating and oversight of derivative activity in public sector organisations, in particular the approach 
adopted for State-owned organisations. 
38 These include Departments of State, such as the Department of Primary Industries and Energy and 
statutory authorities whose enabling legislation does not give them legal ownership of money or property 
separate from the Commonwealth (for example, the Australian Taxation Office). For details of these 
organisations see the website http://fed.gov.au/sitelists/web_port.htm. 
39 A recent audit report by the Australian National Audit Office of three Commonwealth departments, 
(including the Department of Finance and Administration) and one Commonwealth organisation found 
foreign exchange risk management practices to be inadequate (ANAO 2000). 
40 As at 30 June 1995, the consolidated fmancial statements of the Commonwealth list approximately 192 
organisations. See footnote 43 for further details. 
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(a) Statutory authorities which have as their principal function public interest 
activities and which are mainly funded from the Commonwealth Budget (for 
example, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation) 
(b) Statutory authorities whose costs are wholly or partly recovered from levies or 
taxes imposed on industries identified as beneficiaries of the services provided 
(for example, the Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC)) 
(c) Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) (for example, the Australian Postal 
Corporation) 
(d) Commonwealth controlled companies limited by shares that are not GBEs (for 
example, Airservices Australia)41 
(e) Other companies such as those limited by guarantee (for example, the Australian 
Children's Television Foundation) 
The distinction between sub-groups (c) and (d) is not completely clear, but essentially 
depends upon the level of commercialisation. Organisations that have a high degree of 
commercialisation are more likely to be classified as GBEs.42 Different governance 
arrangements apply to each sub-group. 
This chapter concentrates on the first three of these sub-groups: Commonwealth statutory 
authorities and Commonwealth companies, including GBEs.43 Many of these 
organisations face considerable exchange rate and interest rate risks. The purpose of this 
chapter is to consider the legal power of these organisations to enter derivative financial 
contracts. For these organisations, derivative contracts should be used only for risk 
management purposes (Humphry 1997), and the contracts would be mainly foreign 
exchange rate derivatives such as forward foreign exchange contracts and interest rate 
41 Reference in this chapter to Commonwealth companies means Corporations Law companies in which the 
Commonwealth has a controlling interest. It does not include companies in which the Commonwealth has a 
controlling interest through one or more interposed Commonwealth statutory authorities or companies. A 
Commonwealth company that is owned by a statutory authority or other interposed organisation has its legal 
r:ower limited to the power of the parent organisation. 
2 GBEs are created because the government considers a need to place a commercial discipline on activities 
that were previously undertaken by government departments. 
43 In the consolidated financial statements of the Commonwealth as at 30 June 1995, approximately 192 
entities are listed. These include general government organisations and departments (171), public trading 
enterprises (12) and public fmancial enterprises (9). There are approximately 12 GBEs that comprise 
public trading enterprises (9) and public fmancial enterprises (3). Statutory authorities can be in any of 
these groups. The number of these organisations is continually changing due to privatisation, 
commercialisation and corporatisation. 
92 
derivatives such as interest rate swaps.44 Sub section 6.1 and sub-section 6.2 considers 
the uncertainty in legal power of Commonwealth companies and Commonwealth 
statutory authorities to enter into derivative contracts while sub-section 6.3 explores other 
implications of this uncertainty. Sub-section 6.4 suggests a solution to the problem and 
sub-section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.1 The Legal Power of Commonwealth Companies to Enter 
Derivative Contracts 
Commonwealth companies, like other Corporations Law companies, have the capacity of 
a natural person (Corporations Law s.124).45 Generally, Commonwealth companies have 
the power to enter derivative transactions through section 124. 
The doctrine of ultra vires in the Corporations Law was abolished in 1984 (Ford and 
Austin 1995, p. 483). Hence, the legal power of a Commonwealth company is equivalent 
to the legal power of a natural person. Attempts to limit the power of a company to 
contract with outsiders through objects stated in the objects clause of the memorandum or 
articles of association will be unsuccessful. However, it is still possible to restrict the 
power of a company through its constitution: "Section 162 [ s.125] allows the 
incorporators of a company (or later members who alter the memorandum or articles) to 
limit corporate power by the imposition of express restrictions on the exercise of power 
of a company" (Ford and Austin 1995, p. 490). Although an optional statement in the 
memorandum or articles does not alter the company's capacity it can "operate like an 
express prohibition to limit an exercise of corporate power by those who act for the 
company" (Ford and Austin 1995, p. 491).46'47 Therefore, banks and other third parties 
44 The exceptions may be organisations established to make a market in a particular contract. For example, 
the Australian Wheat Board may be required to develop a market in wheat futures in which case entering 
derivative contracts without cover may be necessary. Such a situation would be the exception rather than 
the rule. 
45 The Company Law Review Act recently amended the Corporations Law. The amendments came into 
effect on 1 July 1998. The sections referred to relate to the Corporations Law after 1 July 1998. Where a 
direct quote is made to the Corporations Law pre-July 1998, the corresponding section in the post-July 1998 
Corporations Law is in square brackets. 
46 Section 125 does not work like ultra vires; it only permits the seeking of an injunction and exposes 
directors to breaches of duty. 
47 From 1 July 1998, companies were no longer required to have a memorandum and articles of association. 
Instead they may either: 
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can be assured that derivative contracts entered into by Commonwealth companies are 
legally enforceable. 48 
6.2 The Legal Power of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities 
to Enter Derivative Contracts 
The power of a corporation created by statute has in general "no legal capacity beyond 
that necessary for the purpose for which it has been created unless the statute shows a 
legislative intention to create a corporation witha wider capacity" (Ford and Austin 1995, 
p. 481 ). Therefore, to ascertain whether a Commonwealth statutory authority has the 
power to enter derivative contracts, it must be determined whether the statute (enabling 
legislation) allows this activity. Generally, there are three major forms of statutory 
provision which apply:49 
(1) General statutory power 
(2) Power to enter into derivative contracts generally 
(3) Power to enter into specific derivative contracts 
If a statutory authority has a general statutory power there is uncertainty as to whether this 
would extend to derivative contracts. In Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports 
Corporation (1992) CLR 453; 109 ALR 321, the FAC (a Commonwealth statutory 
authority) proposed to dredge Botany Bay to obtain fill for use in constructing a third 
runway at Sydney airport. The F AC was given power in their enabling legislation over 
"extending or otherwise altering Federal airports and to do all things necessary or 
... ~ convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its function" (Ford 
and Austin 1995, p. 482). The High Court held that the project was an extension within 
the power and that the dredging work came within the necessary or convenient power 
-Have a single set of rules known as a constitution; or 
- Opt to have no constitution at all, but to rely on the basic rules of internal management that will be set out 
in the Corporations Law and be known as 'replaceable rules'. 
Existing companies will continue to have their memorandum and articles as their constitution unless they 
repeal them and adopt the replaceable rules or substitute them with a new constitution (Corporations Law 
sections 134-141). 
48 This is assuming that there are no other reasons that make the contracts void. 
49 There is little consistency in enabling legislation in relation to the use of derivatives. The selection of 
legislation used in this chapter provides only an example of the differences. 
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(Ford and Austin 1995, p. 482). Although the Court found in favour ofthe FAC, the case 
highlights the uncertainty as to whether derivative transactions would be considered in the 
same way. There are numerous statutory authorities that have broad powers specified in 
their enabling legislation. For example, the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 
1980 at section 8( 1) states " ... the Corporation has the power to do all things necessary or 
convenient to be done for, or in connection with the performance of its function". It has 
been argued that this broad power does not give the full capacity of a natural person (Ford 
and Austin 1995, p. 482). If the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation entered into 
derivative contracts to manage its financial risks as a result of promoting and controlling 
the export of grape products from Australia, or for any other function within its 
legislation, then it is unclear whether the derivative contracts would be within the powers 
vested in the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation by its enabling legislation. 
The Dairy Produce Act 1986 at section 9 states " ... the Corporation (ADC) may do all 
things that are necessary or convenient to be done in connection with the performance of 
its functions". As mentioned above, it is unclear whether section 9 alone provides power 
for the ADC to enter derivative contracts. This is clarified somewhat by section 79 of the 
Act which provides power to ADC to enter certain types of derivative contracts. 
Specifically, the ADC may enter currency contracts and currency futures contracts. 
Interest rate contracts are also permitted as are currency swaps, commodity swaps and 
options (including futures options). Therefore, the Act gives the ADC explicit power to 
enter those derivative contracts specified in the legislation. It is unclear whether the ADC 
has power to enter derivative contracts not specified in the legislation. However, as 
mentioned previously, statutory authorities have no power beyond their legislation unless 
there is clear intention to give them wider power. This means that some of the more 
structured securities that could be more useful to ADC in managing risk could be in 
breach of the Act. 
A further requirement in the Dairy Produce Act is that it restricts the use of the specified 
contracts to hedging purposes only (s. 79(3)). Although on the surface this may appear 
appropriate, it creates considerable uncertainty. Third parties to deriv:ative contracts 
entered into by the ADC would have to ensure that the contracts are not only within the 
scope of contracts allowed in the Act, but also that the ADC is using the contracts for 
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hedging purposes, otherwise they could be outside the powers of the ADC. Ascertaining 
whether the ADC has entered the contracts for hedging purposes may be extremely 
difficult. The details could be confidential to the ADC and revealing confidential 
information to third parties could be costly to the ADC. Furthermore, it adds to the 
search costs faced by third parties as well as increasing the risks when dealing with 
statutory authorities. Also, the purpose of the hedging transaction may change over time. 
For example, a derivative contract may initially hedge an underlying exposure, but if the 
underlying exposure is reduced or eliminated without closing out the derivative position 
then the derivative position becomes speculative. Apart from the considerable 
uncertainty this creates it is an interesting legal question whether a derivative contract 
legally enforceable when entered can later become unenforceable. 
Section 6 of the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) Act 
1987 gives ANSTO power "to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in 
connection with the performance of its function. In particular it has power: 
(a) To enter contracts ... and 
G) To do anything incidental to any of its powers". 
As previously mentioned, it is very uncertain as to whether this broad power would 
extend to derivative contracts. The ANSTO Act is silent on whether ANSTO has power 
to enter specific derivative contracts and silent on power to enter contracts for hedging 
purposes. The ANSTO Act however does give power to ANSTO to "deal with 
securities", but written approval of the Treasurer is required (s.34). "Securities" include 
shares, debentures, debenture shares, notes, bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange 
and similar instruments or documents. Derivatives are not mentioned in the definition of 
"securities", therefore it is unclear as to whether ANSTO could "deal with securities" to 
effectively manage its financial risks by using derivatives. Therefore derivative contracts 
entered into by ANSTO could be unenforceable, especially if written approval of the 
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Treasurer is not obtained. 5° 
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990 gives limited power to the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) to manage financial risk. However this case creates 
more concern than ANSTO as AMSA has power to borrow wholly or partly in foreign 
currency (s.40).51 The AMSA Act does not provide specific power for AMSA to enter 
derivatives, but AMSA is permitted to "invest money not immediately required for the 
purposes of AMSA in any manner that is consistent with sound commercial practice" 
(s.lO(f)). This raises considerable uncertainty with respect to derivatives. For instance, if 
AMSA had excess cash, decided to invest it in a portfolio of securities (which included 
derivatives) and suffered significant financial losses as a result, the investment could be 
within "sound commercial practice" and within the power of the Act. Many derivative 
products require no upfront 'investment', therefore section 10 would not apply. If AMSA 
entered into a foreign currency forward contract as part of a hedging program on a foreign 
currency loan, the forward contract could be held to be unenforceable on the ground that 
it does not have power to enter such contracts. Similarly, if AMSA entered an interest rate 
swap as part of interest rate risk management, a similar conclusion of unenforceability 
could be made. Although AMSA has power to borrow money in domestic or foreign 
currency it has no clear power to be able to manage with the use of derivative contracts 
the financial risk associated with these exposures. 
The Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 adds further uncertainty as to the power of 
statutory authorities to enter derivative contracts. Australia Post (that is, the Australian 
Postal Corporation) has, "for or in connection with the performance of its functions, all 
the powers of a natural person" ( s. 19). Examples of the contracts that Australia Post may 
enter include to "deal in futures and other contracts" (s. 19(1)(n)). Whether this broadens 
the power of Australia Post to enter any derivative contract is unclear. It is also uncertain 
as to whether the courts would make the link back to the clause "for or in connection with 
5
° Footnote IG) in the 1996 Financial Statements of ANSTO states: "Transactions denominated in a foreign 
currency are converted at a rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the transaction. At balance date, 
amounts receivable and payable in foreign currency are translated at the exchange rate prevailing at that 
date and any exchange differences are brought to account in the operating statement". This indicates that 
ANSTO does enter foreign exchange contracts and could be exposed to foreign exchange risk. Therefore, 
any forward contracts used to manage this risk could be unenforceable. 
51 Although ANSTO has power to borrow it can do so only with the approval of the Treasurer (s.33). 
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the performance of its functions". It would be easier to establish that derivatives used in a 
hedging program are "for or in connection with the performance of its functions" than it 
would be for derivatives used in speculation or arbitrage. Although Australia Post has the 
power to deal in futures and other contracts for or in the performance of its functions, the 
purpose for which these contracts are entered may make them unenforceable. 
There is considerable uncertainty with respect to the legal power of many Commonwealth 
statutory authorities to enter derivative contracts. Where the legislation provides only a 
general power to enter contracts it is unclear as to whether this would include derivatives. 
Where there is a power to use specific derivatives it is often unclear as to whether this 
power extends to hedging, speculation or arbitrage. Although having specific derivatives 
stated in enabling legislation does remove legal uncertainty relating to the use of those 
derivatives, new derivative products are continuously being developed and the legislation 
would require regular amendment to ensure legal certainty is maintained. An alternative 
is to make the legislation sufficiently broad to capture a broad range of derivatives. 
Where the legislation restricts derivative activity to hedging, numerous other problems 
may arise including difficulties in establishing whether the contracts remain legal, 
especially if the derivative position becomes speculative. In Australia, derivatives are 
mostly used for hedging purposes by these org~isations, however the distinction between 
speculation and risk management is a fine line and difficult to categorise. 52 The enabling 
legislation mentioned above is only a small selection. There are many Commonwealth 
statutory authorities and the inconsistency in power to enter derivative contracts is 
considerable, while the exposures may be very similar. 
6.3 Other Implications 
Commonwealth companies have much broader powers than statutory authorities and 
derivative contracts entered into by Commonwealth companies would be within their 
power. However, this provides the opportunity for these organisations to use derivatives 
for speculation and expose the Commonwealth to increased risk. Generally, 
Commonwealth companies, like Commonwealth authorities, should only use derivative 
52 See chapter seven for details. 
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contracts for hedging purposes (Huniphry 1997). Therefore, a mechanism is required to 
restrict Commonwealth companies to the use of derivatives for hedging purposes only. 
There are at least two parties in any derivative contract. Each counterparty bears 
counterparty risk, that is, the risk of the other party defaulting on the derivative contract. 
For Commonwealth organisations where the legal power associated with derivative 
contracts is unclear, counterparty risk is greater. As a result of this increased risk, 
Commonwealth organisations may face higher transaction costs than private sector 
organisations. This would place Commonwealth organisations at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to private sector organisations. 
Furthermore, the legal uncertainty surrounding the use of derivatives by Commonwealth 
authorities makes it unclear as to who bears the risks of default. For some 
Commonwealth organisations the Commonwealth explicitly guarantees their liabilities. 
However, if a derivative contract is held to be unenforceable it is unclear who, if anyone, 
could be sued. There is similar uncertainty as to who would be liable if a Commonwealth 
company speculated using derivatives and incurred significant financial losses. 
A further implication of the uncertainty in the legal power of Commonwealth 
organisations to enter derivative contracts is the potential for a lack of appropriate risk 
management within these organisations. In many cases, derivatives are cost effective in 
managing risk. The uncertainty surrounding the legal power to use derivatives translates 
to an unnecessary increase in cost. Failure to effectively hedge foreign exchange or 
interest rate risk may result in lower than expected future cash flows. This has 
implications for budget allocations and the charges and levies imposed by some of these 
organisations. 
6.4 Possible Solutions 
Except in clearly defined situations, the use of derivatives for purposes other than hedging 
by Commonwealth authorities and companies would not be in the Commonwealth's 
interest. For example, there is little need for Commonwealth organisations to use 
derivatives for speculative purposes. Therefore, some limitation on the use of derivatives 
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is necessary. The only way that the power of a company can be limited is through the 
corporate constitution. 53 A clause could be included in the constitution of the company 
restricting the use of derivatives for hedging purposes only. It would then be the 
responsibility of company officers to ensure that derivative contracts are used only for 
hedging purposes. If a Commonwealth company did use derivatives for purposes other 
than hedging, the Commonwealth would be able to bring action against management. 
Regardless, third parties would still have a legally enforceable contract with the company 
and certainty in legal power would prevail. 
The solution for Commonwealth statutory authorities is more complex. Amending the 
enabling legislation to ensure that these organisations have clear power to enter derivative 
contracts removes the uncertainty with respect to the legal power, but it provides the 
opportunity for possible use of derivatives for speculation. However, assuming that the 
Government does not wish these organisations to use derivatives for purposes other than 
hedging, a solution would be to amend the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
Act 1997 (CAC Act). This legislation is intended to regulate certain aspects of the 
financial affairs of Commonwealth authorities. Therefore, a requirement could be 
included in this legislation that imposes upon officers of statutory authorities the 
responsibility to ensure that derivatives are used for hedging purposes only. There 
already exist sections in the CAC Act that impose penalties on officers for breaches of the 
legislation. This solution provides a similar outcome to the solution proposed for 
Commonwealth companies. 
The two proposed solutions provide consistency in the legal power to use derivatives 
across statutory authorities and companies as well as consistency within them. In all 
cases the legal power to enter derivatives would be established. Officers of the 
organisations would be responsible for ensuring that derivatives are used for hedging 
purposes only. 
53 Amendments to Corporations Law or other legislative change to restrict the power of Commonwealth 
companies creates further problems. For example, having different laws for Commonwealth public sector 




The uncertainty surrounding the use of derivative contracts by statutory authorities as well 
as all other public sector organisations is highlighted by the Hammersmith case in the 
U.K. To ensure that a similar problem does not arise at the Commonwealth level, the 
uncertainty surrounding the use of derivative contracts for statutory authorities should be 
resolved. 
For Commonwealth companies there is no uncertainty regarding their power to enter 
derivative contracts. The concern is that these organisations can legally use derivatives 
for speculation, possibly exposing the Commonwealth to greater risks. Imposing 
restrictions on the use of derivatives in the memorandum or articles of association would 
send the appropriate signal to officers of these organisations that derivatives are to be 
used only for hedging purposes. This would also ensure that if a Commonwealth 
company used derivatives for purposes other than hedging, the Commonwealth could take 
appropriate action against management. Restricting management to the use of derivatives 
only for hedging purposes would not result in contracts being unenforceable. 
For statutory authorities, the legal position relating to derivatives is very uncertain and 
inconsistent. There are two issues that a third party ( counterparty) must consider when 
entering into a derivative contract with a Commonwealth statutory authority. The first 
issue is whether the authority has the power to enter the particular contract. Many 
enabling statutes, although giving broad powers to an authority, do not give sufficient 
power to ensure derivative contracts are legally enforceable. Second, even if the 
legislation is specific in relation to any particular derivative contracts, it may be necessary 
to ascertain that the derivatives have been entered for 'hedging purposes'. This imposes 
considerable costs on all parties. Therefore, the enabling legislation of statutory 
authorities should be amended to ensure consistency and clarity in the legal power of 
these organisations to enter derivative contracts. Amendment to the CAC legislation is 
suggested as a solution to limit the officers of these organisations to use derivatives for 
hedging purposes only. As with Commonwealth companies, the derivative contracts 
could not then be considered unenforceable. 
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Chapter 7 
The Use of Derivatives for Hedging in Australian 
Commonwealth Organisations* 
7 Introduction 
The importance of financial risk for profitability and the long-term viability of public 
sector organisation ha~ increased over time due to a variety of reasons including a greater 
reliance on capital markets for sources of funding, a shift by the public sector to operate 
in traditional private sector markets, an apparent increase in the volatility of financial 
markets and the enhanced globalisation and integration of capital markets (Brailsford 
1994). 
The Australian public sector is not immune from exposure to financial risk. As an 
example, consider the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). At June 1997, the 
ABC had loans in Japanese Yen equivalent to $40 million. Although the financial 
statements of the ABC state that currency swaps have been undertaken to remove the 
currency risk, a foreign exchange loss of $661,000 was recorded in 1996 and a foreign 
exchange gain of $641,000 recorded in 1997.54 Many other Commonwealth organisations 
have large financial risk exposures. 
The purpose of this chapter is to document the extent of and attitudes towards derivatives 
use for hedging in a sample of Australian Commonwealth public sector organisations, in 
particular Commonwealth companies and statutory authorities. As documented in chapter 
six, there exists considerable uncertainty with respect to the legal power of many of these 
• Funding for this chapter was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council and the 
Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration. 
54 It is unclear whether the reported profit and losses on the foreign exchange transactions were the result of 
translation risk or transaction risk. 
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organisations to use derivatives and this chapter extends this work by considering whether 
public sector organisations consider this an important issue. 
The public sector provides a unique setting from which to investigate derivative use, as 
many of the reasons suggested in chapter four for derivative use in the private sector may 
not apply in the public sector. For instance, Commonwealth public sector organisations 
do not suffer similar risks of bankruptcy or financial distress as private sector 
organisations. The debts of Commonwealth organisations are either explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed. Furthermore, many may not be liable for income taxation. Given 
that these are some of the traditional reasons for the use of derivatives in the private 
sector, what factors motivate derivative use in the public sector and are they consistent 
with the private sector? This chapter considers these issues. 
Sub-section 7.1 provides a brief summary of recent evidence of the use of derivatives. 
Sub-section 7.2 provides a description of the data and sub-section 7.3 provides the results 
of a survey of Commonwealth organisations. Sub-section 7.4 considers implications of 
the results and sub-section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
7.1 Recent Evidence of Derivative Use 
Generally, there is little evidence on the extent of derivative use in Australia. Only 
recently has the disclosure of derivative use in annual reports been required by accounting 
standards.55 This has made it difficult to obtain information from annual reports 
regarding derivative use unless firms voluntarily disclosed the information. Difficulty in 
obtaining information on derivative use is similar in the U.S.A. and Europe (De Ceuster 
et al. 2000). Furthermore, information from annual reports is often limited in scope. 
Therefore, most of the evidence is obtained through surveys and recent surveys have 
concentrated on publicly listed companies. Surveys by Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998) 
and Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) are on publicly listed firms in the U.S.A. and Germany, 
respectively. A survey by Heaney et al. (1999) considers the use of derivatives by firms 
55 See chapter two, sub-section 2.4.8 for details. 
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in Japan and a survey by Grant and Marshall (1997) considers the use of derivatives by 
large U.K. firms. 
Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998) survey approximately 400 U.S. firms on a range of 
issues relating to derivative use. Approximately 50% of firms indicate that they use 
derivatives. Heaney et al. (1999) find 60% of their sample of 302 Japanese firms use 
derivatives and Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) find approximately 80% of their sample of 
126 large listed and non-listed German firms use derivatives. Grant and Marshall (1997) 
find approximately 90% of the firms in their sample of 55 large U.K. firms use 
derivatives. 
Some of the key findings are that derivative use is higher amongst larger firms than 
smaller firms. Exposures that are commonly hedged include foreign exchange and interest 
rate risk and the major types of derivative contracts used to hedge these risks are forward 
foreign exchange contracts and interest rate swaps. There is also a general tendency to 
hedge less than 100% of the total foreign exchange exposure. Furthermore, the majority 
ofhedges have a relatively short maturity (Bodnar, Marston and Hayt 1998, p. 10). 
In relation to Australian Commonwealth public sector organisations, a recent audit report 
from the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO 2000), although not specifically 
related to the use of derivatives by public sector organisations, considers Commonwealth 
foreign exchange risk management practices in the Commonwealth Departments of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Finance and Administration and the Australian 
Agency for International Development. Generally, the report found the Commonwealth to 
have significant foreign exchange risk exposures and the management of such exposure to 
be inadequate. The inadequacy of risk management is due to a long period of self-insuring 
at the whole-of-government level and budget funding of exchange rate risk for particular 
agencies (p. 9). The extent of derivative use and attitudes regarding the use of derivatives 




The current Commonwealth government consists of approximately eighteen portfolios. 56 
Within each portfolio there are numerous Commonwealth companies and statutory 
authorities. The Commonwealth consolidated financial statements provide a 
comprehensive list of Commonwealth controlled entities. This includes Departments of 
State and Commonwealth authorities and companies. 
From the 1998 Commonwealth Consolidated Annual Report, 160 organisations were 
identified (not including Commonwealth Departments).57 This number was reduced to 
136 as a result of reorganisation within the Commonwealth public sector. 58 A list of the 
136 organisations is provided in Appendix 1. The 1998 annual reports were obtained for 
each organisation and inspected for details of any evidence of derivative disclosure or 
activity. Of the 136 organisations, 14 (1 0%) were initially identified through the annual 
reports as derivative users; these are also identified in Appendix 1. This represents a 
considerably smaller proportion of derivative users than that reported in studies on private 
sector organisations (for example, Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998) report that 50% of 
their sample of firms in the U.S.A. use derivatives). Legal restrictions concerning the use 
of derivatives may be a reason for this, as well as the expense of hiring an expert. 
Two survey instruments were developed.59 The first was for organisations that were 
identified as not being users of derivative financial instruments and the second was 
developed for derivative users. 60 The two instruments were used to capture the many 
issues relating to derivative use that would not necessarily be relevant to both derivative 
user and non-user organisations. The two instruments are shown in Appendix 2. These 
56 The number and structure of government portfolios varies over time. A portfolio is an area of 
government with a particular public sector interest. For example, the Defence portfolio covers the Navy, 
Air Force and Army. 
57 Commonwealth Departments were not considered due to the general lack of contractual power that they 
have. 
58 These 24 organisations were absorbed back into Departments, wound up or sold since 1998. 
59 The survey instruments were developed from Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998). 
60 The cover letter to these organisations provided a mechanism whereby if the organisation was incorrectly 
classified as a derivative user or non-derivative user, the respondent could return the questionnaire for the 
alternative. There was only one organisation that returned a questionnaire for replacement. 
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instruments were addressed to the Chief Finance Officer or equivalent and posted in 
January 2000 to all organisations in the sample with a self-addressed return envelope. 
7.3 Results 
Eighty organisations responded to the surveys. This represents an overall response rate of 
59% (80/136]. The response rate is divided between derivative non-users and derivative 
users, 55% [67/122] and 93% [13/14], respectively.61 The higher response rate for 
derivative users is the result of follow-up action.62 
The following discussion of results is divided into four sub-sections. The first considers 
responses from organisations that do not use derivatives, the second considers responses 
from organisations that use derivatives, the third provides a comparison between the users 
and non-users, and the final sub-section discusses implications of the results. 
7.3.1 Summary Results for Non-derivative Users 
Respondents were asked to consider the level of importance on a range of issues in 
relation to the perceived use of derivatives for hedging purposes. The issues and the 
responses from respondents in organisations that do not use derivatives are shown in 
Table 7 .I. Of the 67 non-derivative user responses, 14 did not rate the importance of any 
of the issues. This left 53 usable responses. Respondents were asked to rank the 
importance of each issue from 1-most important to 5-least important. Column two of 
Table 7.1 provides the mean score for each issue and column three the standard deviation 
of the responses. Column four provides the ranking of each issue based on the mean 
score. The remaining columns show the number of responses given for each level of 
importance for each issue. 
61 A response was not obtained from one organisation that was partly privatised and used derivatives. 
62 Originally only seven responses to the questionnaire were obtained from organisations that used 
derivatives. A further six responses were obtained through telephone contact with the Chief Finance Officer 
or equivalent in the organisation. Although non-response bias was not tested formally by way of a follow-up 
questionnaire non-response bias was tested in the sample of organisations that did not use derivatives by 
comparing means of the first ten and last ten responses received (the means of the frrst and last twenty 
responses received were also tested). No significant differences in means were found. 
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Table 7.1: Responses on Issues in Relation to Derivative Use From Commonwealth 
Organisations That Do Not Use Derivatives. 
Respondents were asked to rank the following issues on level of importance in relation to the 
use of derivatives for hedging (see Appendix 2, page 205, question 4). 
Number of responses 
Issue Most important<-> Least important 
Mean Std. Rank 1 2 3 4 5 
Dev. 
a. Change the volatility of accounting earning 3.40 1.41 9 6 9 14 6 18 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows 3.13 1.49 4 9 12 11 5 16 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios 3.96 1.22 14 3 4 10 11 25 
d. Reduce taxation 4.50 1.09 19 2 3 3 3 41 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress 4.28 1.21 15 2 5 6 3 37 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance 4.44 1.02 18 1 2 8 3 38 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 4.41 1.04 17 1 2 3 2 37 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 3.94 1.23 13 2 6 10 9 21 
i. Improve management/employee compensation 4.30 0.89 16 0 2 9 13 29 
j. Improve value of the organisation 3.39 1.33 8 3 12 15 4 17 
k. Budgeting purposes 3.07 1.38 2 9 8 17 6 12 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 3.17 1.31 6 6 10 17 7 12 
m. The organisation has alternative means to 3.14 1.40 5 10 5 15 10 11 
manage financial risks 
n. There are difficulties pricing and valuing 3.62 1.33 12 4 7 14 7 20 
derivatives 
o. The disclosure requirements of accounting 3.58 1.28 11 5 3 19 7 18 
standards 
p. Legal restrictions on the use of derivatives 2.81 1.58 1 17 6 12 4 13 
q. The necessary accounting treatment is too 3.56 1.38 10 6 6 11 11 18 
complex 
r. The perceptions of derivatives use by 3.29 1.44 7 7 11 10 8 16 
investors, regulators and the public 
s. Reduce risks faced by management 3.08 1.51 3 11 7 11 7 13 
Based on the mean score, the most important issue regarding the use of derivatives for 
hedging from respondents in organisations that do not use derivatives is legal restrictions 
which is not surprising (mean score = 2.81). This is to be expected given the legal 
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uncertainty surrounding the use of derivatives by many of these organisations.63 The 
issue that ranked second on mean scores is the use of derivatives for budgeting purposes. 
It is unclear why budgeting is given such a high ranking. Possibly it is related to the third 
ranked issue being the use of derivatives for reducing the risks faced by management. 
This issue is similar to a reason for derivative use in the private sector, namely that 
derivatives are u~ed for management purposes (Smith and Stulz 1985).64 The importance 
of derivative use for hedging to reduce the risks faced by management supports the claim 
that managerial risk aversion affects risk management policy (Tufano 1996). However, 
the use of derivatives to improve management compensation is not ranked as very 
important. For example, it is ranked fourth last on mean scores. Therefore, respondents 
from these organisations do not consider the use of derivatives relatively important for 
increasing management compensation, but they do consider derivatives relatively 
important for reducing the risks faced by management. In other words, derivatives are 
considered important to alter managerial risk, but not managerial return/compensation. A 
reason for this may be the relatively inflexible management compensation packages in 
Commonwealth public sector organisations. 65 
The uses of derivatives to reduce taxation, influence capital structure and to reduce 
bankruptcy and financial distress have lower ranks based on mean scores relative to other 
issues. Most organisations in the sample are not liable for income taxation and most have 
little or no reliance on external capital markets for debt, so these issues are unlikely to be 
considered important in relation to derivative use.66 Factors contributing to this may be 
that the organisations in the sample are either explicitly or implicitly Commonwealth 
government guaranteed, so bankruptcy and financial distress should not be an issue in 
relation to their operations. Furthermore, organisations th~t suffer losses through financial 
risks are likely to recoup these losses through additional budget allocations (ANAO 
2000). 
63 See chapter six for details. 
64 See chapter five, sub-section 5.1.5 for details. 
65 A review of the notes to recent fmancial statements of all organisations responding to the survey did not 
reveal any evidence of any organisation that had senior management compensation packages directly linked 
to the financial performance of the organisation. 
66 Some organisations do use external capital markets for financing and are liable for income taxation. This 
issue is beyond the scope of this chapter and is left for future research. 
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To gauge the extent of extreme views on issues associated with the use of derivatives the 
number of responses in the most important and least important categories for each issue 
are shown in Table 7.2 panel A and panel B, respectively. Column one of panel A 
provides the list of issues ranked as the most important and column two provides the 
number of responses in the most important category. Column three of panel A provides 
the percentage of responses in the most important category. The most important issue 
regarding derivative use based on the number of scores (and percentage) ranked in the 
most important category is legal restrictions. Also ranked highly are the use of 
derivatives to reduce the risks faced by management and the use of alternative methods to 
manage financial risk other than with derivatives. 
Column one of panel B in Table 7.2 provides the list of issues ranked as the least 
important and column two of panel B provides the number of responses in the least 
important category. Column three in both panels provides the percentage of responses in 
each category. Issues ranked highly as least important are reducing taxation and the use 
of debt. Generally, these results are consistent with the results based on the mean scores 
(Table 7.1). Regression analysis on the ranked scores from Panel A in Table 7.2 and the 
ranks based on the means from Table 7.1 provided a coefficient of 0.94 (p-value=0.48). 
This is insignificantly different from 1, confirming consistency in the results. 
Irrespective of whether derivatives are used, a documented risk management plan or 
policy is recognised as a necessary part of appropriate risk management. 67 Approximately 
two-thirds of respondent organisations that do not use derivatives do not have a 
documented financial risk management plan or policy.68 Within the last 12 months of 
completing the survey, four organisations had considered the use of derivatives. Three of 
the four organisations considered hedging as the purpose for possible derivative use, one 
organisation also considered derivative use for speculation and/or arbitrage. These results 
are shown in Table 7.3. 
67 The Australian Standard on Risk Management (AS/NZS 4360: 1995) requires that each stage of the risk 
management process should be documented. Documentation should include assumptions, methods, data 
sources and results (section 5.1, p.19). 
68 Although not directly comparable, Heaney et al. (1999) show that 36% of a sample of private sector firms 
in Japan have a documented policy on derivatives. This compares to 79% offmns in a sample ofU.S. fmns 
(Bodnar, Marston and Hayt 1998). 
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Table 7.2: Ranking of Most Important and Least Important Issues Associated with 
Derivative Use for Non-derivative Users 
Panel A Panel B 
Ranked on most important issue (No. of Percent of Ranked on least important issue (No. of Percent of 
scores for responses scores for responses 
1-most (%) 5-I east (%) 
important) important) 
Legal restrictions on the use of 17 33 Reduce taxation 41 79 
derivatives 
Reduce risks faced by management II 22 Reduce the use of debt finance 38 73 
The organisation has alternative 10 20 Increase the use of debt finance 37 72 
means to manage financial risks 
Change the volatility of cash flows . 9 17 Reduce bankruptcy and financial 37 70 
distress 
Budgeting purposes 9 17 Improve management/employee 29 55 
compensation 
The perceptions of derivatives use by 7 13 Change balance sheet accounts or 25 47 
investors, regulators and the public ratios 
Change the volatility of accounting 6 II Reduce the cost of capital 21 40 
earning 
Reduce political risk/pressure 6 II There are difficulties pricing and 20 38 
valuing derivatives 
The necessary accounting treatment is 6 II The disclosure requirements of 18 35 
too complex accounting standards 
The disclosure requirements of 5 10 Change the volatility of accounting 18 34 
accounting standards earning 
There are difficulties pricing and 4 8 The necessary accounting treatment 18 34 
valuing derivatives is too complex 
Change balance sheet accounts or 3 6 Improve value of the organisation 17 33 
ratios 
Improve value ofthe organisation 3 6 The perceptions of derivatives use 16 31 
by investors, regulators and the 
public 
Reduce taxation 2 4 Change the volatility of cash flows 16 30 
Reduce bankruptcy and financial 2 4 Reduce risks faced by management 13 26 
distress 
Reduce the cost of capital 2 4 Legal restrictions on the use of 13 25 
derivatives 
Reduce the use of debt finance I 2 Reduce political risk/pressure 12 23 
Increase the use of debt finance I 2 Budgeting purposes 12 23 
Improve management/employee 0 0 The organisation has alternative II 21 
compensation means to manage financial risks 
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Table 7.3: Use of Risk Management Plans for Non-users of Derivatives and the 
Consideration of Derivative Use 
(See Appendix 2, page 205, questions 1 to 3). 
Question Yes No 
Documented risk management plan 21 46 
Considered use of derivatives 4 63 
Purpose - Hedging 3 -
Purpose- Speculation/arbitrage 1 -
Given that a documented risk management plan is part of appropriate risk management, it 
is important to determine whether responses from organisations with a documented risk 
management plan differ relative to responses from organisations without a risk 
management plan. Table 7.4 shows the results of at-test of differences in mean scores 
between organisations with a risk management plan and those without such a plan.69 
There is no significant difference in responses between organisations with a risk 
management plan and organisations without such a plan for many of the issues. However, 
there are four issues where there are significant differences. These are: 
• The use of derivatives to improve the value of the organisation 
• The use of derivatives for budgeting purposes 
• The necessary accounting treatment for derivatives is too complex 
• The organisation has alternative means to manage financial risk 
69 For all t-tests reported in this chapter, the Levene's test for equality of variance is first conducted to 
determine which t-test is appropriate. Also, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is undertaken to provide 
further support for the t-test results. In all cases the Kruskal-Wallis test leads to the same conclusions to the 
t-test results and is not reported. 
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Table 7.4: Comparison of Mean Scores for Responses from Non-Derivative Users 
With and Without a Risk Management Plan on Issues Associated with Derivative 
Use for Hedging 
No risk Risk management t-test for 
Issue 
Management plan plan difference 
(N=36) (N=17) in mean 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t 
a. Change the volatility of accounting 3.50 1.32 3.17 1.59 0.78 
earning 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows 3.19 1.55 3.00 1.41 0.44 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios 4.00 1.15 3.88 1.41 0.32 
d. Reduce taxation 4.53 1.11 4.44 1.09 0.27 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress 4.36 1.17 4.12 1.32 0.68 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance 4.44 1.05 4.44 0.96 0.02 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 4.51 0.98 4.19 1.17 1.04 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 4.06 1.21 3.71 1.26 0.97 
i. Improve management/employee 4.36 0.83 4.18 1.01 0.70 
compensation 
j. Improve value ofthe organisation 3.69 1.25 2.80 1.29 2.45* 
k. Budgeting purposes 3.36 1.33 2.40 1.31 2.31 * 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 3.28 1.34 2.90 1.24 0.86 
m. The organisation has alternative means 3.36 1.29 2.60 1.55 1.81 ** 
to manage financial risks 
n. There are difficulties pricing and valuing 3.50 1.30 3.90 1.41 -0.94 
derivatives 
0. The disclosure requirements of 3.50 1.25 3.80 1.39 -0.64 
accounting standards 
p. Legal restrictions on the use of 2.72 1.60 3.00 1.59 -0.58 
derivatives 
q. The necessary accounting treatment is 3.33 1.41 4.10 1.18 -I. 78* 
too complex 
r. The perceptions of derivatives use by 3.19 1.43 3.50 1.51 -0.70 
investors, regulators and the public 
s. Reduce risks faced by management 3.21 1.51 2.80 1.52 0.86 
*Denotes significance at 5% (two-tailed). 
** Denotes significance at 10% (two-tailed). 
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Based on differences in mean scores, respondents m organisations that have a risk 
management plan consider derivatives for hedging to improve the value of the 
organisation (mean score = 2.80) significantly more important than respondents in 
organisations that do not have a risk management plan (mean score = 3.69). Similarly, 
respondents in organisations with a risk management plan consider the use of derivatives 
for budgeting purposes (mean score = 2.40) as significantly more important than 
respondents in organisations without a plan (mean score = 3.36). Having alternative 
methods to manage financial risk with derivatives is also significantly more important for 
organisations with a risk management plan (mean score = 2.60) compared to those 
without a plan (mean score= 3.36). Conversely, respondents in organisations that have a 
risk management plan consider the complexity in accounting for derivatives as 
significantly less important (mean score = 4.1 0) than respondents in organisations without 
a plan (mean score= 3.33). 
Although these results are not expected a reason for the statistically significant 
differences could be that organisations with a risk management plan have considered in 
more detail the use of derivatives than those organisations without a risk management 
plan. Organisations with a risk management plan recognise the importance of derivatives 
for improving the value of the organisation and budgeting and recognise that there are 
alternative methods to hedge financial risks. Furthermore, given that these organisations 
have developed a risk management plan, they are likely to have considered and resolved 
any major uncertainties surrounding the accounting treatment of derivatives. A factor that 
may also be relevant in helping to explain these differences is organisation size. 
Evidence from the private sector indicates that derivative use is higher for larger firms 
(Bodnar, Marston and Hayt 1998). Organisations that have a risk management plan may 
also be larger organisations. This issue is left for further research. 
Twenty three percent [15/66] of respondents consider their organisation to have foreign 
currency risk exposures, while 50% [33/66] consider their organisation to have interest 
rate exposure. Only 6% [ 4/66] consider their organisation to have commodity price 
exposure. Other types of financial risk exposures stated include liquidity risk, credit risk, 
professional indemnity and volatility in the amount of contracted work. 
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Approximately half of the responses [36/66] indicate that no evaluation of the financial 
risk management function is undertaken. The types of evaluations that were selected, and 
the number of responses include: 
• Reduced volatility to a benchmark [6/66]. 
• Increased profit (reduced costs) relative to a benchmark [7/66]. 
• Absolute profit or loss [9/66]. 
• Risk adjusted performance (profits or savings adjusted for volatility [6/66]. 
7.3.2 Results for Derivative Users 
Of the fourteen organisations identified as derivative users, thirteen responded to the 
survey. All of these organisations use derivatives for hedging and two also use 
derivatives for speculation and/or arbitrage. Table 7.5 provides details of the responses. 
Column one in Table 7.5 details the issue, column two details the mean score for each 
issue based on the responses in the last five columns, column three provides the standard 
deviation of the scores and column four gives the ranking of each issue based on the mean 
score. 
From Table 7.5, the issue of most importance (lowest mean score of 2.18) regarding 
derivative use in relation to hedging is for budgeting purposes. One reason for this issue 
being regarded as most important is that the use of derivatives may allow organisations to 
more accurately estimate funds required for loan repayments (interest rate risk), foreign 
exchange transactions (foreign exchange risk) and purchases of commodities (asset price 
risk). 
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Table 7.5: Responses on Issues in Relation to Derivative Use From Commonwealth 
Organisations Who Use Derivatives for Hedging 
Respondents were asked to rank the importance of the following issues in relation to the 
use of derivatives for hedging (see Appendix 2, page 211, question 4): 
Number of responses 
Most important<-> Least 
Issue important 
Mean Std. Dev. Rank I 2 3 4 5 
a. Change the volatility of accounting_earnings 2.91 1.70 5 4 0 3 1 3 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows 2.83 1.64 4 3 4 0 2 3 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios 4.27 0.90 9 0 0 3 2 6 
d. Reduce taxation 4.64 0.81 12 0 0 2 0 9 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress 3.73 1.42 7 1 1 3 1 5 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance 4.36 1.29 11 1 0 1 1 8 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 4.73 0.65 13 0 0 1 1 9 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 3.91 1.14 8 0 1 4 1 5 
i. Improve management/employee compensation 4.27 1.35 10 1 0 2 0 8 
j. Improve value of the organisation 2.64 1.43 2 3 2 4 0 2 
k. Budgeting purposes 2.18 1.60 1 6 1 1 0 2 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 2.73 1.49 3 3 2 3 1 2 
m. Reduce risks faced by management 2.92 1.62 6 3 3 1 2 3 
There is some uncertainty as to whether the use of derivatives provides opportunities for 
private sector firms to increase or decrease debt levels (Adam 1996 and Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein 1993).70 Table 7.5 shows that the issue of using derivatives to increase the use 
of debt is of least importance (highest mean score of 4.73). The use of derivatives to 
reduce debt is also ranked of relatively low importance (mean = 4.36). This indicates that 
the use of derivatives for altering capital structure is not considered relatively important 
in public sector organisations that use derivatives. This is similar to the responses from 
organisations that do not use derivatives (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). Generally, the 
use of derivatives for altering capital structure is considered relatively unimportant for 
public sector organisations. These differences may be due to the fundamental differences 
70 See chapter five for details. 
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between public and private sector organisations. For example, private sector 
organisations often have as a major purpose a profit motive whereas public sector 
organisations often have as a major purpose the delivery of a public service. 
Table 7.5 also shows that the use of derivatives to reduce taxation is relatively less 
important (mean = 4.64). The use of derivatives to reduce taxation is regarded as a 
purpose of derivative use in the private sector, particular if there is convexity in tax rates 
(Smith and Stulz 1985). The use of derivatives to reduce taxation is not regarded as of 
high importance relative to the other issues from the sample of public sector 
organisations. Reasons for this may be that these organisations are not liable for taxation 
(or that there is no convexity in their tax schedules). 
To gauge the extent of extreme views on issues associated·with the use of derivatives, the 
number of responses with the most important and the least important scores are shown in 
panel A and panel B of Table 7.6, respectively. Column one of panel A provides the list 
of issues ranked according to the highest number of responses on the most important 
issue and column two provides the number of responses in the most important category. 
Column three provides the percentage of responses in the most important category. The 
use of derivatives for budgeting purposes obtains the most number of responses as most 
important. Regression analysis on the ranked scores from Panel A in Table 7.6 and the 
ranks based on the means from Table 7.5 provided a coefficient of 0.87 (p-value=0.46). 
This is insignificantly different from 1, confirming consistency in the results. 
The use of derivatives to reduce taxation is least important (most number of scores on 5-
least important). This is also consistent with ranking based on mean scores in Table 7.5. 
Increasing or decreasing the use of debt is also of low importance to respondents (high 
number of scores for 5-least important). Again, this is consistent with results in Table 7.5. 
Again, improving management compensation is relatively less important. Also of 
relatively less importance is the use of derivatives to change balance sheet accounts or 
ratios. These issues again highlight differences between public and private sector 
organisations and the managerial incentive structures that are in place. 
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Table 7.6: Ranking of Most Important and Least Important Issues Associated with 
Derivative Use for Users of Derivatives 
Panel A Panel B 
Ranked on most important No. of scores Percent of Ranked on least important No. of scores Percent of 
issue for 1-most responses issue for 5-least responses 
important (%) important (%) 
Budgeting purposes 6 60 Reduce taxation 9 8I 
Change the volatility of 4 60 Increase the use of debt finance 9 8I 
accounting earnings 
Change the volatility of cash 3 25 Reduce the use of debt finance 8 72 
flows 
Improve value ofthe 3 25 Improve management/employee 8 72 
organisation compensation 
Reduce political 3 25 Change balance sheet accounts 6 55 
risk/pressure or ratios 
Reduce risks faced by 3 25 Reduce bankruptcy and 5 45 
management financial distress 
Reduce bankruptcy and I 9 Reduce the cost of capital 5 45 
financial distress 
Reduce the use of debt I 9 Change the volatility of 3 25 
finance accounting earnings 
Improve I 9 Change the volatility of cash 3 25 
management/employee flows 
Change balance sheet 0 0 Reduce risks faced by 3 25 
accounts or ratios management 
Reduce taxation 0 0 Budgeting purposes 2 18 
Increase the use of debt 0 0 Improve value ofthe 2 18 
finance organisation 
Reduce the cost of capital 0 0 Reduce political risk/pressure 2 I8 
In relation to exposures that are hedged, there are six organisations that indicate that 
interest rates and foreign exchange rate risks are hedged and five that hedge only foreign 
exchange rate risk. There is one organisation which hedges only interest rate risk and one 
that also indicates it hedges credit risk. These types of financial risks are commonly 
hedged in private sector organisations (Heaney et al. 1999 and Bodnar, Marston and Hayt 
1998). 
In regard to foreign exchange risk management, respondents were asked what 
benchmarks their organisation uses for evaluation of foreign currency risk management. 
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The responses are relatively evenly spread across all five choices, with three organisations 
indiGating that they do not use a benchmark. The choices and the number of responses 
are shown in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Benchmarks for Evaluating Foreign Currency Risk Management 
(See Appendix 2, page 212, question 7). 
Benchmarks used by derivative users for evaluating FX Responses Percent of 
exposure responses(%) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark 3 19 
b. Forward rates available at the beginning of the period 4 25 
c. Spot rates at the beginning of the period 4 25 
d. Baseline percent hedged strategy (i.e. X% hedged) 3 19 
e. Other benchmark 2 13 
A variety of methods are used for evaluating interest rate risk management. Of the nine 
responses, three do not use any benchmark for evaluating the management of interest rate 
risk, one uses the volatility of revenue to interest rate exposure and five use a variety of 
individually tailored benchmarks such as the average of bond rates or swap rates. These 
are shown in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8: Benchmarks for Evaluating Interest Rate Risk Management 
(See Appendix 2, page 213, question 11). 
Benchmarks used by derivative users for evaluating Responses Percent of 
interest rate exposure responses(%) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark 3 33 
b. Volatility of revenue to interest rate exposure 1 11 
c. Other benchmarks 5 56 
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The types of derivative contracts used to manage foreign currency risk also vary, but 
forward contracts are common and are used by all but one organisation. In regard to 
interest rate risk exposure there is a similar range of contracts used. However, forward 
contracts are not as common for interest rate risk as they are for foreign exchange risk. 
Swaps are the most common instrument used to manage interest rate risk. Table 7.9 
shows the responses across the different contracts and exposures. These results are 
consistent with studies from the private sector. For example, Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) 
report that both U.S. and German firms regard forward foreign exchange contracts as 
most common followed by foreign exchange option contracts, then swaps and finally 
futures. In regard to interest rate derivatives Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) report that 
swaps are most commonly used followed by options, forwards then futures. 
Table 7.9: The Different Contracts Used to Manage Foreign Exchange Risk and 
Interest Rate Risk 
(See Appendix 2, page 212, question 8 and page 213, question 12). 
Types of contracts used to manage exposure FX exposure Interest rate 
exposure 
a. Options 5 3 
b. Forwards 12 2 
c. Futures I 2 
d. Swaps 3 4 
The annual average percentage of foreign currency exchange exposure hedged varies 
across a wide spectrum of choices, as does the annual percentage of interest rate risk 
hedged. Table 7.10 shows these results. The proportion of hedged exposures range from 
1-25 percent through to 100 percent of foreign exchange and interest rate risk. Many 
organisations do not hedge 100 percent of exposure, which indicates that they may be 
speculating to some extent on movements in foreign currency and interest rates. For 
instance hedging less than 100% of the exposure means that there is a possibility of gains 
or losses being made on movement in the foreign exchange rates or interest rates. 
However, these organisations may also have natural hedges in place, in which case the 
remaining exposure to 1 00% may be covered. Again, these results are consistent with 
results from studies in the private sector. There are only five organisations that indicate 
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that they have other types of exposures. These exposures are credit risk (three 
organisations, with one indicating that it hedges this risk), changes in funding risk (one 
organisation) and financial market risk (one organisation). 
Table 7.10: Annual Average Percentage of Foreign Exchange Exposure and Interest 
Rate Exposure Hedged 
(See Appendix 2, page 212, question 9 and page 213, question 13). 
Annual average Foreign Interest rate 
percentage of exposure exchange risk risk 
hedged 
a. 0% 0 0 
b. 1-25% 3 1 
c. 26-50% 3 I 
d. 51-75% 2 2 
e. 76-99% 1 0 
f. 100% 3 1 
There are five responses on reasons why options contracts are not used- three relate to the 
upfront premium often required on options. These organisations consider the premium to 
be a disadvantage in the use of options. One organisation considers forward contracts 
more effective than options. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that although 
optimal hedging does not generally mean complete hedging, the use of options (non-
linear) will be preferred over forwards or futures (linear). Non-linear derivatives will 
typically allow firms to co-ordinate investment and financing plans more precisely than 
linear instruments (p. 165 5). 
Three respondents indicate that their organisation has exposure to commodity price risk 
but that this exposure is not hedged. Two indicate that no benchmark is used for the 
evaluation of commodity price risk and one indicates that the organisation benchmarks 
the volatility of revenue to commodity price exposures. 
The most common method or technique in regard to the risk management associated with 
derivatives is a regular check of the market value of the derivative contracts. Regular 
checks of the nominal amount (face value) of the contract are also undertaken. Only three 
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organisations (23%) use Value-at-Risk (VAR).71 The breakdown of the responses is 
provided in Table 7.11. Most of the respondents (77%) check the market value of their 
derivatives regularly, while only two use sensitivity analysis of volatility to assess 
unrealised gains or losses. However, some of the issues in Table 7.11 are not specifically 
management issues, for example, 54% of respondents indicate that they regularly check 
the nominal amount of derivative contracts. This is unlikely to be regarded as an 
appropriate method to manage derivative contracts (AFMA Manual 1996, GC-117), but 
few substantive conclusions can be drawn from the small sample size, given the range of 
methods in use to manage derivatives. 
Table 7.11: Methods Used to Manage Derivatives 
(See Appendix 2, page 216, question 24 ). 
Method 
a. Regular checks of the nominal amount (face value) of derivative 
contracts. 
b. Regular checks ofthe market value of derivative contracts. 
c. Use ofthe "basis point value (BPV)" to assess unrealised gains/losses. 
d. Use of "sensitivity analysis" of volatility to assess unrealised 
gains/losses. 
e. Use of"Value-at-Risk" as an internal risk measure. 
f. Outright position limits. 









7.3.3 Comparison of Responses from Organisations that Use Derivatives 
with Responses from Organisations that Do Not Use Derivatives 
The previous results indicate that attitudes to the use of derivatives for hedging in the 
sample of Commonwealth public sector organisations are different from that expected in 
private sector organisations. This may be due to fundamental differences in motives 
between public and private sector organisations. However, it is not known whether there 
exist differences in responses between Commonwealth public sector organisations that 
71 In comparison, Heaney et al. (1999) fmd 3% of respondents from private sector organisations in Japan 
use VAR and Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998) fmd 44% ofrespondents from private sector organisations 
in the U.S.A. use VAR. 
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use derivatives and those that do not use derivatives. A test of the differences in responses 
between users and non-users is shown in Table 7.12. At-test is used to compare the mean 
responses from users versus non-users on each issue. The first column in Table 7.12 lists 
the issue associated with derivative use; the second column and third columns report the 
mean and standard deviation of responses from organisations that use derivatives (from 
Table 7.5). The fourth and fifth columns provide the mean and standard deviation of 
responses from organisations that do not use derivatives (from Table 7.1). The sixth 
column gives the results of the t-test of the difference in mean responses between users 
and non-users. 
There is a significant difference (at the 10% level) between mean responses from 
derivative users and non-users on two issues. These are: 
• Improving the value of the organisation 
• Budgeting purposes 
The mean of responses from organisations that use derivatives consider the use of 
derivatives for improving the value of the organisation to be significantly more important 
(lower) than the mean responses from organisations that do not use derivatives. Similarly, 
the mean of responses from organisations that use derivatives consider the use of 
derivatives for hedging to be significantly more important (lower) for budgeting purposes 
than the mean of responses from organisations that do not use derivatives. Further 
research is required to ascertain whether there are different incentives between the two 
groups. 
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Table 7.12: Comparison of Issues Relating to Derivative Use From Users and Non-
Users of Derivatives 
Users Non-Users t-test 
Issue (See Table 7.5) (See Table 7.1) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t 
a. Change the volatility of accounting earning 2.91 1.70 3.40 1.40 -1.00 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows 2.83 1.64 3.13 1.49 -0.61 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios 4.27 0.90 3.96 1.22 0.80 
d. Reduce taxation 4.64 0.81 4.50 1.09 0.39 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress 3.73 1.42 4.28 1.21 -1.34 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance 4.36 1.29 4.44 1.02 -0.22 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 4.73 0.65 4.41 1.04 1.29(1) 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 3.91 1.14 3.94 1.23 -0.08 
i. Improve management/employee 4.27 1.35 4.30 0.89 -0.07(!) 
compensation 
j. Improve value ofthe organisation 2.64 1.43 3.39 1.33 -1.69** 
k. Budgeting purposes 2.18 1.60 3.08 1.38 -1.90** 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 2.73 1.49 3.17 1.31 -1.00 
m. Reduce risks faced by management 2.92 1.62 3.08 1.51 -0.33 
(IJ For these cases the Levene's test for equality of variance is rejected and the t-statistic assuming unequal variances is 
reported. 
**Denotes significance at 10% (two-tailed). 
Given the results in Table 7.4 and Table 7.12, there is sufficient evidence to consider 
whether responses from organisations that use derivatives differ from responses from 
organisations that do not use derivatives, but have a risk management plan. Based on the 
t-test, the results indicate that there is no significant difference in responses between 
organisations that use derivatives and organisations that do not use derivatives, but have a 
risk management plan. 72 These results are not reported. 
As there are no significant differences in mean responses between organisations that have 
a risk management plan, further analysis of derivative users and non-users without a risk 
72 All the organisations that use derivatives have a risk management plan. 
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management plan is carried out. These results are shown in Table 7.13. The t-test of the 
differences in the mean scores between responses from users of derivatives and from 
responses from non-users of derivatives, but without a risk management plan is reported 
in the second last column ofTable 7.13. In addition, an ANOVA test is also undertaken 
to determine whether the issues differ across all three groups- derivative users, non-
derivative users without a risk management plan and non-derivative users with a risk 
management plan. The results of these tests are reported in the final column of Table 
7.13. The t-tests and the ANOVA test reveal that the only issues where the responses are 
significantly different are the use of derivatives for improving the value of the 
organisation and the use of derivatives for budgeting purposes. 
Although the results generally indicate insignificant differences between responses from 
derivative users and non-users, issues may be ranked differently in level of importance. 
For instance, although there is no significant difference in mean scores between derivative 
users and non-users on the issue of derivatives for reducing risks faced by management, 
this issue may be ranked differently in importance for users and non-users. To consider 
how respondents from each group of organisations consider the importance of each issue, 
the mean scores are ranked. The issue with the lowest mean score is ranked first, while 
the issue with the highest mean score is ranked thirteenth for responses from 
organisations that use derivatives as well as organisations that do not use derivatives. 
These results are shown in Table 7.14. The first column of Table 7.14 provides the issue 
associated with derivative use. The following four columns in Table 7.14 provide the 
ranking of each issue based on the mean scores from responses from organisations that 
use derivatives (column two) and those that do not use derivatives (column three). 
Rankings for organisations that do not use derivatives are further separated into those 
with a risk management plan (column four) and those without a risk management plan 
(column five). 
The final four columns of Table 7.14 provide the difference in rankings between 
responses from organisations that use derivatives compared to all organisations in the 
sample that do not use derivatives, organisations that do not use derivatives and have a 
risk management plan and those organisations that do not use derivatives and do not have 
a risk management plan and those organisations that do not use derivatives without a risk 
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management plan with organisations that do not use derivatives but have a risk 
management plan. 
Table 7.13: Comparison of Mean Scores for Responses from Derivative Users and 
Non-Derivative Users Without a Risk Management Plan on Issues Associated with 
Derivative Use for Hedging 
Non-users with no t-test ANOVA 
Issue 
Users risk management 
(See Table 7.5) plan 
(See Table 7.4) 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t F 
a. Change the volatility of accounting 2.91 1.70 3.50 1.32 1.21 0.79 
earning 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows 2.83 1.64 3.19 1.55 0.69 0.28 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios 4.27 0.90 4.00 1.15 -0.72 0.37 
d. Reduce taxation 4.64 0.81 4.53 1.11 -0.30 0.11 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial 3.73 1.42 4.36 1.17 1.49 1.11 
distress 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance 4.36 1.29 4.44 1.05 0.21 0.02 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 4.73 0.65 4.51 0.98 -0.67 1.07 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 3.91 1.14 4.06 1.21 0.36 0.49 
i. Improve management/employee 4.27 1.35 4.36 0.83 0.21(1) 0.21 
compensation 
j. Improve value of the organisation 2.64 1.43 3.69 1.25 2.34* 4.40*(2) 
k. Budgeting purposes 2.18 1.60 3.36 1.33 2.45* 4.41 *(2) 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 2.73 1.49 3.28 1.34 1.16 0.85 
m. Reduce risks faced by management 2.92 1.62 3.21 1.51 0.56 0.42 
(IJ For thes.e cases the Levene's test for equality of variance is rejected and the t-test assuming unequal variances is 
reported. 
<
2J For these cases the Turkey honestly significance difference test was undertaken for pairwise multiple comparisons. 
The results show a significant difference at the 10% level between means for item j and a significant difference at the 
5% level between means for item k. 
* Denotes significance at 5% (two-tailed). 
Three results are evident from Table 7.14. The first is the difference in rank associated 
with the use of derivatives to change the volatility of cash flows. Although there is no 
significant difference between responses from derivative users and non-users on this issue 
(as shown in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13), the mean responses from organisations that do 
not use derivatives and do not have a risk management plan indicate that this is the most 
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important issue. However, for organisations which have a risk management plan (and 
either use derivatives or not) this issue is ranked only fourth and fifth, respectively. 
The second result from Table 7.14 concerns the use of derivatives for reducing risks faced 
by management. Responses from organisations that do not use derivatives (irrespective 
of whether they have a risk management plan) result in this issue being ranked on mean 
scores as the second most important issue. Responses from organisations that use 
derivatives rank this issue sixth most important. It is unclear why respondents m 
organisations that use derivatives consider this issue of less importance relative to 
respondents in organisations that do not use derivatives, especially when managerial 
issues have been suggested as a motivation for derivative use in the private sector (Smith 
and Stulz 1985). One possible reason may be that respondents in organisations ·that use 
derivatives do not wish to indicate that derivatives in their organisation are being used for 
managerial purposes. Organisations that do not use derivatives may be aware of the 
importance of derivatives to reduce management risks, but due to other factors, such as 
legal restrictions, their organisation cannot use them. This provides another area for future 
research. 
The third result from Table 7.14 is that the two issues reported as significant in Tables 
7.12 and 7.13 also have relatively large differences in rankings as shown in Table 7.14. 
This provides further confirmation of the previous results that there is a difference 
between responses from organisations with a risk management plan (irrespective of 
derivative use) and organisations without a risk management plan on the use of 
derivatives for budgeting and improving the value ofthe organisations. 
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Table 7.14: Differences in Ranking of Issues Based on Mean Scores 
Rank of Issue 
Issue Difference in ranks 
Non-derivative Users 
Users 
All With No Plan Users Users Users Non-Users: 
v v v No Plan v Plan Non- Non- Non- Non-Users: 
Users: Users: Users: With Plan 
All With No 
Plan Plan 
a. Change the volatility of 5 6 6 5 1 1 0 1 
accounting earning 
b. Change the volatility of cash 4 3 5 1 1 1 3 4 
flows 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or 9 8 8 7 1 1 2 1 
ratios 
d. Reduce taxation 12 13 12 13 1 0 1 1 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial 7 9 9 9 2 2 2 0 
distress 
£ Reduce the use of debt finance 11 12 13 11 1 2 0 2 
g. Increase the use of debt finance 13 11 11 12 2 2 1 1 
h. Reduce the cost of capital 8 7 7 8 1 1 1 1 
i. Improve management/employee 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 
compensation 
j. Improve value ofthe organisation 2 5 2 6 3 0 4 4 
k. Budgeting purposes I 1 1 4 0 0 3 3 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure 3 4 4 3 1 1 0 1 
m. Reduce risks faced by 6 2 3 2 4 3 4 1 
management 
7.4 Implications of the Results 
The research on private sector firm use of derivatives (as documented in chapter five) 
identifies a range of explanations for private sector firms' use of derivative contracts. 
These include the use of derivatives to: 
• Reduce corporate taxation 
• Reduce costs of bankruptcy and financial distress 
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• Influence the level of external finance 
• Reduce the agency costs of debt (reducing the asset substitution problem) 
• Maximise managerial utility 
• Creating a valuable security and/or improving contractual terms, reducing trading 
costs and contract scale 
Responses from the sample of organisations in the Commonwealth public sector indicate 
that the more important uses of derivatives include: 
• Budgeting 
• Improving the value of the organisation 
• Reducing the risks faced by management 
However, these issues are not consistent across public sector organisations that have 
either a risk management plan or use derivatives. Therefore, any attempt to map the 
responses onto the private sector is difficult. Apart from differences across organisations, 
there are other inconsistencies. For instance, although reducing risks faced by 
management can be regarded as similar to maximising managerial utility (a private sector 
motive), this issue is regarded as relatively important by respondents in public sector 
organisations that do not use derivatives. It would be expected that if this was an 
important issue, respondents in organisations that use derivatives would recognise it as 
such. There is no clear reason for this inconsistency. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In the last decade, financial risk management in public sector organisations has become of 
greater interest to the public, politicians and regulators. Although the reasons for this 
greater interest in the financial management of public sector organisations are unknown, 
it has resulted in greater financial accountability for these organisations. However, the 
greater accountability has not resulted in the Australian Commonwealth public sector 
being immune to poor financial risk management. The use of derivatives to manage 
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financial risk has been documented in previous chapters and it was the purpose of this 
chapter to document the use of and attitudes towards the use of derivatives in a sample of 
Commonwealth organisations. This chapter represents an exploratory study into issues 
that may determine the use of derivatives for hedging in public sector organisations, as 
there is no previous published research. 
A survey instrument was used to obtain views on the importance of issues associated with 
the use of derivatives for hedging financial risk. Approximately 80 Commonwealth 
organisations responded to the survey. Approximately 16% of organisations use 
derivatives. This is considerably less than derivative use in the private sector. The 
responses indicate considerable inconsistency with the research on derivative use in the 
private sector. Specifically, respondents do not rank the use of derivatives for reducing 
taxation, bankruptcy and costs of capital and for altering capital structures as important. 
Different views on the importance of issues associated with derivative use emerge when 
organisations are divided into those with and those without a risk management plan. 
Approximately half of the organisations in the sample have a risk management plan. 
Specifically, responses from organisations with a risk management plan (irrespective of 
whether the organisation uses derivatives) regard the use of derivatives for improving the 
value of the organisation and for budgeting as significantly more important than 
responses from organisations without a risk management plan. A possible reason for these 
differences is that organisations that have developed a risk management plan have 
considered issues associated with the use of derivatives in more detail, but there is no 
substantive evidence to support this reason. 
Based on differences in mean responses, organisations that do not have a risk 
management plan consider the accounting treatment as more complex than organisations 
with a plan. This further supports the notion that organisations that have a risk 
management plan have considered in greater detail derivative uses (including the 
accounting treatment) than organisations without a risk management plan. It is not known 
whether this is size related or related to a particular type of organisation. 
129 
For organisations that do not use derivatives, legal restrictions are considered important 
as expected. This supports the work in chapter six on the uncertainty regarding the 
legality of public sector organisations using derivatives. 
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SECTION3 
EFFICIENCY OF DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS IN AUSTRALIA 
Overview 
The use of derivatives for hedging requires firms or organisations to enter into particular 
derivative contracts. To improve the success of the hedge, the markets in which the 
contracts are traded should be such that the prices of the derivatives are not in excess of 
their fair value or trading with excessive volatility. If these derivatives are traded on 
organised exchanges then, even though market prices may exist, there may be particular 
times that volatility is excessive or prices are not at their fair value. Hedge contracts that 
are unwound at these times may be less effective than otherwise. 
Most derivative contracts have a maturity date. If, at these dates, the expiration of the 
derivative contracts results in excessive pressure on prices in the underlying asset market 
then hedge contracts which are unwound at this date are likely to be less than efficient. In 
the U.S.A. some futures contracts, options on futures contracts and option contracts on 
the same underlying asset all expire at the same time. The hour before the expiration of 
these three contracts has been associated with excessive price and volume volatility. The 
hour before the expiration is known as the 'triple-witching hour'. Chapter eight explores 
this issue in the Australian 90-day Bank Accepted Bills market where futures and options 
on futures expire at the same time. 
The Black-Scholes option pricing model is commonly used to price options. However, 
evidence has shown that when options are more out-of-the-money, the Black-Scholes 
model exhibits greater pricing differences. This bias is reflected in higher implied 
volatilities and is known as the volatility smile or volatility skew. Options contracts may 
be used to hedge risks and therefore it is important from a risk management perspective to 
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obtain efficient estimates of option prices. Chapter nine examines the Australian share 
options market for evidence of the bias in the implied volatilities from the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model. 
The use of the Black-Scholes model to estimate option prices requires, amongst other 
variables, an estimate of the future volatility of the underlying share returns. Also, when 
constructing hedge ratios, the volatility of the underlying share returns is required. There 
have been many refinements over time to the Black-Scholes model but, despite these 
refinements, the original model remains very popular. Nevertheless, a major problem in 
using the model continues to be the estimation of the future volatility of the underlying 
share returns. Under the Black-Scholes model the future volatility of the underlying share 
returns is assumed constant over the life of the option. An often used estimate of this 
future volatility has been the variance of past share returns. If the assumption of constant 
volatility were accurate then estimation of the variance (and standard deviation) would be 
a relatively straightforward task. However, there is now considerable evidence that share 
return variances are not constant over time (Brailsford and Heaney 1998). The 
development of AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) models allows 
point estimates of time-varying volatility to be calculated. There have been few studies 
that have sought to incorporate ARCH volatility estimates into the Black-Scholes model. 
Even so, it is an empirical issue as to whether ARCH estimates provide improvements to 
the pricing of options using the Black-Scholes model. Chapter ten explores the use of 
different estimates of volatility in pricing equity options. 
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Chapter 8 
Unwinding of Hedge Positions- Price Effects in 
the 90-day Bank Accepted Bills Market* 
8 Introduction 
Derivative contracts have expiration or maturity dates. For example, futures and options 
contracts on 90-day Bank Accepted Bills mature at the same time. In the U.S.A., some 
share index options, share index futures and options on share index futures all mature at 
the same time. The hour before the maturity of these contracts is known as the 'triple-
witching hour'. Price imbalances between these contracts prior to maturity provided 
arbitrage opportunities and the arbitrageurs either closed or rolled over their positions on 
expiration day. 
Hedging with derivatives requires the hedging firm or organisation to enter particular 
contracts and unwind those contracts at some future point in time. Therefore, if price or 
volatility imbalances occur, hedgers could be exposed to increases in volatility in 
derivative contracts when they are closed out or rolled over at maturity. This may result in 
reductions in the effectiveness of the hedge. 
Contracts that can be used for interest rate risk management can have as the underlying 
asset the Australian 90-day Bank Accepted Bill. This chapter investigates whether there 
are unusually large fluctuations in yields (and hence prices) of Australian 90-day Bank 
Accepted Bills (BABs) when futures contracts and options on futures contracts written on 
BABs expire.73 No previous study in Australia has investigated this question. 
• This chapter has been edited and published in Oliver, B. and Tahir, M., 1997, A note on the expiration day 
~rice effect in the Australian 90-day bank accepted bills market, Pacific Accounting Review 9(1), 43-50. 
3 Since the data on trading volumes of BABs are not available, this chapter does not investigate the 
expiration day volume effect. 
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The plan of the chapter is as follows. Sub-section 8.1 reviews some prior research 
dealing with empirical evidence on expiration day effects, while sub-section 8.2 
documents the data, the research method and hypotheses to test for the existence of any 
expiration day price effect in the Australian 90-day BAB market. Sub-section 8.3 
provides the results and sub-section 8.4 concludes the chapter. 
8.1 Prior Research 
There has been extensive discussion in the literature about the impact of trading in share 
index futures and options on the price volatility (the price effect) and the trading volume 
(the volume effect) ofthe underlying share (Stoll and Whaley 1986, 1987, 1990, Edwards 
1988, Feinstein and Goetzmann 1988 and Chamberlain, Cheung and Kwan 1989). Much 
of this discussion has focused on the unusually large price fluctuations and volume 
increases occurring during the so-called triple-witching hour. These expiration day price 
and volume effects have been attributed to speculation because of its net destabilizing 
impact and program trading associated with index futures arbitrage and the order 
imbalances that arise when arbitrageurs unwind their cash positions upon the expiry of 
options or futures contracts (Edwards 1988, p. 421 and Chamberlain, Cheung and Kwan 
1989, p. 67). 
The equilibrium relationship between the futures price and the underlying spot price is 
governed by the well-known cost-of-carry no arbitrage relationship, which provides a link 
between the futures and the cash markets. Violation of this relationship can act as a 
signal for program trading. If, at expiration, many arbitrage programs are unwound in the 
same direction, this may result in order imbalances causing closing prices to move in one 
direction or the other. Thus, futures trading may affect cash prices in at least two ways. 
"First, destabilizing speculation in futures markets might be transmitted to the cash 
markets and result in increased price volatility. Second, deliverable supplies of securities 
could become so low that price distortions in the cash markets could be precipitated by 
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the attempts of holders of futures contracts to cover positions in the cash markets" 
(Simpson and Ireland 1985, p. 371).74 
In contrast to the large number of studies investigating the impact of futures trading in 
non-financial contracts and the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 Index on the cash market 
volatility, there have been relatively few studies ofT -Bill and T -Bond futures (Figlewski 
1981, Corgel and Gay 1984, Simpson and Ireland 1985 and Edwards 1988). 
Stoll and Whaley (1986, 1987 and 1990) investigate expiration day price and volume 
effects in the S&P 500 Index, the S&P 100 Index and the Major Market Index (MMI) in 
the U.S.A. from May 1982 to December 1985. They use daily, hourly and minute-by-
minute data. They conclude that both the volume and the volatility of price changes in 
the share market are significantly higher on expiration days. Shares not in the S&P 500, 
however, exhibit no price effects. Price effects seem also to be associated only with the 
S&P 500 futures contract expirations; index option expirations do not lead to abnormal 
market movements. 
Edwards (1988) examines both the day-to-day and intraday price volatility of the share 
market (the S&P 500 Index and the Value Line Index) and of short-term debt instruments 
(90-day Eurodollars and 90-day T -bills) over the period from 1973 to 1987, and 
concludes that the introduction of futures on these assets does not result in an increase in 
price volatility. While there is some evidence of futures-induced short-run volatility, such 
as that which occurs on futures contract expiration days, this does not carry over to large 
periods of time. 
Chamberlain, Cheung and Kwan (1989) study expiration day effects for the leading 
Canadian share index, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300. They are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that the trading volume on expiration Fridays is equal to that on non-
expiration Fridays. However, they find evidence of unusual price behaviour. The rate of 
74 This latter scenario can, however, be mitigated when perfect substitutes of the underlying asset are 
available. Although expiration day price and volume effects are generally attributed to program trading, the 
absence of these effects in an empirical study does not necessarily imply the absence of program trading. 
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return during the last half-hour of trading is significantly higher and more volatile on days 
on which index options and futures expire than on other Fridays. Moreover, the 
abnormally high expiration day returns tend to be reversed during the first half-hour of 
trading on the following Monday. 
Feinstein and Goetzmann (1988) test for the effect of the triple-witching hour on the share 
market volatility by using a distribution-free statistical procedure. They use the daily 
price of the S&P 500 Index from January 1983 to May 1987, and conclude that the 
change in prices over the course of the triple-witching hour day is likely to be greater than 
the price changes experienced over most non-expiration days. 
Simpson and Ireland (1985) investigate the effect of futures trading in Treasury bills on 
the volatility of yields in the cash market. They find that futures trading leads to a 
decrease in volatility initially, but the effect disappears if futures volume becomes large 
and possibly results in increased volatility in the secondary cash market. 
In summary, the evidence on expiration day effects is somewhat mixed. While some 
studies find evidence consistent with expiration day effects, others fail to do so. 
8.2 Tests for Expiration Effects in the Australian BABs Market 
8.2.1 Data 
Data used in this chapter consist of 90-day BAB yields obtained from the National 
Australia Bank Ltd for the period 1 November 1979 to 1 November 1993.75 The choice 
of the commencement date has been made on the basis that it is the first month after 
futures contracts on 90-day BABs began trading. Unlike some of the overseas studies in 
which hourly and even minute-by-minute prices have been used, this chapter uses daily 
yields because more precise data are not available over the sample period. 
75 These yields are not traded yields, but are an arithmetical average of the quoted yields (compiled by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia) which eight authorised money market dealers are willing to accept for 90-day 
BABs at II a.m. on each day of trading. A major Australian bank guarantees the acceptance of a 90-day 
BAB. The actual authorised money market dealers providing the yields vary from time to time, as do the 
approved acceptors. 
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From daily quoted yields, a series of prices is calculated for 90-day BABs by using the 
following formula: 
FV p =-----




= the price of the 90-day BAB on day t, 
= the quoted annual yield of the 90-day BAB on day t, and 
=the face value of$500,000.76 
... 8.1 
The absolute value of the change in log prices is used as a measure of price volatility,77 
that is: 
Volatility ... 8.2 
The 90-day BAB futures contract specifications are set out in By-laws BAB.1 to BAB.29 
of the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE BAB.l-29). BAB futures contracts trade up to 12 
quarters ahead and the settlement day is the second Friday in the delivery months of 
March, June, September and December.78 There are, therefore, four expiration Fridays 
per year or a total of 56 expiration Fridays over the sample period. 
8.2.2 Research Method and Hypotheses 
Although many of the studies investigating expiration day effects have focused 
exclusively on the expiration day, there is no theoretical or practical reason for such 
effects to be one-day events. Empirical evidence from options research finds that the 
effects come in as early as two weeks prior to expiry (for example, Day and Lewis 1988). 
Besides, there is no trading regulation that requires any outstanding position to be closed 
out only on an expiration day. Reasons such as funds flow requirements may result in 
76 This amount was changed to $1,000,000 on 1 May 1995. 
77 It is common in the literature to defme changes in prices in terms of logarithms, and to use the absolute 
value of these changes as a measure of price volatility. See, for example, Brailsford (1996) and Ekman 
( 1992). Volatility may well have been defmed as the absolute value of changes in prices. Taking the 
logarithm of prices is a matter of scaling. 
78 Trades up to 20 quarters ahead are now common. 
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settlement-related transactions in the spot and/or the futures market to be carried out prior 
to, or even after, the expiration day. It is, therefore, appropriate to study expiration day 
effects over a period surrounding the expiration day. 79 In order to implement this, the 
series of absolute log price changes is divided into three mutually exclusive groups: 
G 1: The expiration group comprising absolute log price changes within two weeks 
prior to expiration Friday; 
G2: The non-expiration group comprising absolute log price changes starting from 
four weeks prior to expiration and ending two weeks prior to expiration Friday; 
and 
G3: The post-expiration group consisting of absolute log price changes which are 
within two weeks after expiration Friday. 
As the trading activities in the futures market subsequent to the quotation of the spot 
prices on expiration Friday are likely to be revealed in the spot prices quoted on the 
following Monday, a second set of three similar groups (M1, M2 and M3) of absolute log 
price changes is constructed which treats the expiration Mondays as if they were the 
expiration Fridays. This is intended to capture any possible price effect carried over from 
the previous Friday. 
In order to determine whether parametric or non-parametric tests are appropriate for the 
statistical analysis, the data set is first tested for normality. It is found that the 
Kolmogorov, Smimov and Lilliefors D statistic is 0.279417, which rejects normality at 
0.001 levels. Consequently, non-parametric tests are used in testing the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis one (Price effect): There is no significant difference in the volatility 
measure for the expiration group, non-expiration group and post-expiration group 
surrounding the expiration days. 
79 Ideally, one would have liked to collect a time series of the prices of Treasury notes on which there are no 
futures contracts, subtract these prices from those of BABs and carry out the analysis on the differenced 
series. This approach would have removed the confounding effect and singled out the impact of futures 
expiry on the BABs market. For an alternative view see Edwards (1988, p. 433). The choice of two-week 
intervals for the various groups, although seemingly arbitrary, is regarded as reasonable to capture any price 
effects. This categorisation, however, uses only a subset of the full data set. Comparisons were also carried 
out on individual days surrounding and including the expiration days with other similar non-expiration days. 
There was no evidence of any significant expiration day effects. 
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That is, the volatilities of the groups G 1, G2 and G 3 are equal, and so are the volatilities 
ofMl, M2 and M3. 
Hypothesis two (Price reversal effect): There is no significant difference between (a) 
changes in log prices, or (b) absolute changes in log prices (that is, volatilities) on 
expiration Fridays and those on the following Mondays. 
By comparing the changes in log prices, or in absolute log prices on an expiration Friday 
with those on the following Monday, hypothesis two tests whether the temporary 
deviations of prices from their equilibrium values were reversed after the expiry of the 
futures contracts. 
8.3 Results 
Two tests are used to test hypothesis one, the sign test and the Wilcoxon matched-pair 
signed-ranks test. The results of these tests are provided in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, 
respectively. Referring to Table 8.1, at 0.05 significance level, the sign test does not show 
any significant difference between the volatility measure of the expiration group versus 
non-expiration and post-expiration groups for both expiration Fridays and the following 
Mondays. Nor can the equality of the volatility measures of non-expiration and post-
expiration groups be rejected at 0.05 significance level. 
Table 8.1: The Results of the Sign Test (Hl) 
Groups Compared No. of+ Signs No. of- Signs z-value* 
G1,G2 278 241 1.58 
Gl,G3 251 272 0.87 
G2,G3 235 280 1.94 
M1,M2 274 247 1.14 
M1,M3 225 245 0.87 
M2,M3 211 250 1.77 
*At 5% significance level, the critical value ofz is 1.96. 
The Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-ranks test (Table 8.2) finds results consistent with the 
. null hypothesis at 0.05 level, except for the equality of the volatility measure of non-
expiration and post-expiration groups G2 and G3 corresponding to the expiration Fridays. 
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Hence, the results for expiration day groups from both tests provide evidence that there is 
no expiration day price effect in the Australian 90-day BAB market. 
Table 8.2: The Results of the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test (Hl) 
Groups compared No. of-Ranks No. of+ Ranks z-value* 
G1,G2 278 241 -1.3215 
Gl,G3 251 272 -1.3192 
G2,G3 235 280 -1.9722** 
M1,M2 274 247 -1.0012 
M1,M3 225 245 -1.2749 
M2,M3 211 250 -1.5938 
*At 5% significance level, the critical value ofz is 1.96. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
Using the sign test, hypothesis two was also tested and the results are given in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: The Results of the Sign Test (H2) 
Data Compared No. of+ Signs No. of- Signs z-value* 
Changes in log prices on 19 30 1.4286 
expiration Fridays vs. those 
on following Mondays 
Absolute changes in log 18 28 1.3270 
prices on expiration 
Fridays vs. those on 
following Mondays 
*At 5% significance level, the critical value ofz is 1.96. 
Table 8.3 shows that the sign test fails to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, there is no 
evidence of reversal either of log price changes, or of absolute changes in log prices (that 
is, volatility). This indicates that there are no significant expiration day effects in the 90-
day BAB market in Australia. Firms and organisations which hedge financial risk 
exposures are unlikely to face any reductions in the efficiency of unwinding derivative 
contracts around the day that the derivative contracts expire. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
The application of financial derivatives for financial risk management reqmres that 
derivative positions be closed or unwound at a future point in time. Expiration day 
effects are abnormal price or volatility movements that occur when derivative contracts 
expire. If derivative contracts are being used for financial risk management then at some 
future point in time those contracts will either expire or be reversed. If the expiration of 
the derivative contract coincides with the unwinding ofthe hedge position then the hedge 
may be less effective if abnormal price and volatility effects occur at that time. This may 
create increased risks. 
In the Australian 90-day BAB market, futures and options on futures expire at the same 
time. These contracts provide an opportunity to test for any expiration day effects in this 
market. 
A number of empirical studies have investigated the expiration day impact of trading in 
derivative securities on the price volatility and trading volume of the underlying asset. 
Results of these studies are generally mixed. The present chapter studies the impact on 
the volatility of Australian 90-day BABs prices when the futures contracts written on 
BABs expire. 
Absolute value of changes in log prices is used as a measure of volatility. Since the data 
are found to be not normal, non-parametric tests are used to test for the existence of any 
price effect. Data are divided into three groups to enable a study of price effects 
surrounding expiration Fridays as well as the following Mondays. 
Tests indicate that there is no significant difference between the volatility measures of the 
expiration group versus the other two groups. Any change in prices, or the price volatility 
between expiration Fridays and the following Mondays, is also tested. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in this case as well. Hence, the results of this chapter 
provide evidence consistent with the absence of price and price reversal effects in the 
Australian 90-day BAB market over the sample period. 
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The chapter, however, has some limitations. First, the primary data available are not the 
traded, but quoted yields of BABs which have been converted into a price series. 
Secondly, these quoted yields are on different bills. Ideally, one would like to have a 
price series on the same bill. Absence of a continuum forces one to make an assumption 
of flat term structure of interest rates, which is reasonable only for short time horizons. 
Finally, the data used in this chapter are imprecise. If more frequent data such as hourly or 
minute-by-minute data were available, it would have been possible to test whether there 
are any price effects during the period immediately preceding the expiration of the futures 
contracts. It is during periods that are very close to the actual time that the contract 
expires where expiration effects are most likely to be observed. 
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Chapter 9 
Pricing Bias in the Black-Scholes Option Pricing 
Model* 
9 Introduction 
Risk management often includes the use of options. A valuable attribute of options for 
risk management is their non-linear payoff. This non-linear payoff is created through the 
terms of the option contract as the holder has the right to decide whether to exercise the 
option. If the underlying asset's price moves in a favourable way, the option can expire 
worthless, if the underlying asset's price moves in an unfavourable way, the option can be 
sold or exercised to recoup the loss suffered. The non-linear payoff of the option comes at 
a price, which is the option premium. Valuing options using a closed-form model, such 
as the Black and Scholes (1973), hereafter Black-Scholes, model, has received 
considerable academic and professional recognition and it is widely used in practice. 
However, correctly applying the model requires an understanding ofthe inherent biases of 
the model. This chapter considers one bias in the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
There have been many refinements to the Black-Scholes model over time such as Black 
(1975), Whaley (1981), Geske and Roll (1984) and Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1986, 
1987) which have presented adjustments for dividend paying shares and American style 
options. The valuation of options with stochastic interest rates has been considered by 
Merton (1973). Hull and White (1987) have developed a model that assumes stochastic 
share price volatility. However, despite these developments, the original Black-Scholes 
1973 model remains a very popular method of option valuation among practitioners. Hull 
(1997, p. 509) comments: 
At present, there does not seem to be any really compelling arguments for 
using any ofthe [alternative] models in preference to Black-Scholes. 
• This chapter has been edited and published in Oliver, B. 1996, An examination of volatility smiles in the 
Australian options market, Accounting Research Journa/9(2), 30-37. 
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There is considerable evidence of a bias in the Black-Scholes option pricing model, but 
there exists little evidence of the volatility 'smile' that is the result of this bias. Beckers 
(1981), Chiras and Manaster (1978) in the U.S.A. and Brown and Shevlin (1983) in 
Australia provide evidence that the Black-Scholes option pricing model gives different 
implied volatility estimates for options that are identical except for their strike prices.80 
Even though this bias is well documented, many practitioners still use the Black-Scholes 
model to price options (Hull 1997). The bias in option prices caused by using the Black-
Scholes model is known as the volatility 'smile' (Hull 1997). The term 'smile' is used 
because of the shape of the curve of implied volatility plotted over a range of strike 
prices. That is, options that are at-the-money have lower implied volatility than those that 
are further in-the-money or further out-of-the-money.81 There are methods that attempt to 
account for this bias in modelling option prices. Latane and Rendleman (1976), Chiras 
and Manaster (1978) and Whaley (1982) discuss various weighting schemes. Beckers 
(1981) found that the best approach when using the Black-Scholes model to value options 
is to use only the implied volatility from those options whose price is most sensitive to 
the volatility of the share. However, no one method of adjustment has achieved universal 
support. 
Recent developments in the area of volatility smiles have considered models that either 
allow for volatility smiles or explicitly incorporate them into the option pricing process 
(Mayhew 1995). For example, Skiadopoulos (2000) describes the various models that 
have been developed and Zou and Derman ( 1999) propose a method for estimating the 
volatility smile from information embedded in historical prices. This is then used to 
estimate the volatility smile for illiquid or thinly traded options. 
Different options on the same share can exhibit different implied volatility due to 
stochastic volatility (Hull and White 1987), transactions costs (Constantinides 1997), 
bid/ask spreads and non-synchronous data (Clewlow and Xu 1993). Navatte and Villa 
(2000) extend this research by considering how implied volatility skewness and kurtosis 
80 The term 'implied volatility' is used interchangeably with 'implied standard deviation'. 
81 A call option is 'in-the-money' when the stock price is above the strike price. A call option is 'out-of-the-
money' when the stock price is below the strike price. Put options are the opposite. An option is 'at-the-
money' when the stock price equals the strike price. 
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change in magnitude over time. In particular, they find that different shapes of the 
volatility smile are consistent with different distributions of the underlying returns. 
Although a substantial literature on the bias in option prices when using the Black-
Scholes model exists, very little Australian research has been documented that relates this 
bias to changing variance through analysis of implied volatility. This chapter presents 
evidence confirming the existence of the volatility smile in Australian share option prices. 
The volatility smile is compared with sample sizes and trading day effects in an attempt 
to explain the bias. A quadratic polynomial is found to provide a better explanation of the 
data than other polynomials, including a linear model. The estimated polynomial 
regression from actual option prices is then used to estimate the smile patterns for the 
share options in the sample. A similar approach is taken, but on a monthly basis across 
the period. The dynamic nature of the smile pattern is evident. 
The structure of the implied standard deviations across options with different intrinsic 
values and different terms to maturity is not specifically considered in many studies on 
option prices.82 However, the general conclusion is that the Black-Scholes model 
incorrectly prices options that are not at-the-money. The. analysis of the pricing errors by 
considering the bias in the implied volatility across different options has not been covered 
sufficiently in the literature. This chapter documents the existence of the volatility smile. 
Quadratic polynomial regressions provide the highest adjusted R2 of all models tested. 
Furthermore, the volatility smile is found to be reasonably consistent over time. Sub-
section 9.1 outlines the research design. Sub-section 9.2 provides the results and sub-
section 9.3 concludes the chapter. 
9.1 Research Design 
The volatility smile was modelled using various regression techniques. The sample was 
divided into sub-samples based on term-to-maturity and trading month to investigate the 
impact of these variables on the volatility smile. This chapter focuses on call options 
rather than put options. Call options are traded more frequently and are therefore of 
82 Intrinsic value is defmed here as the stock price to strike price ratio. 
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greater interest. More frequent trading also reduces non-synchronous trading problems. 83 
The option pricing model used in this chapter is the Black-Scholes model that can be 
written as:84 
-r(T -t) 
c = SN ( d 1)- Xe N ( d 2) ... 9.3 
where: 
ln (Yx)+ ( r + cr/{) (T- t) 
d 1 = ' (1~ 
... 9.4 
dz=d 1 -cr~, ... 9.5 
and where: c = the call option price, 
s = the share price, 
X = the exercise price, 
r = the risk-free interest rate, 
T =the original term to maturity, 
t =the expired term to maturity, 
cr = the standard deviation on the underlying share's returns, and 
N(.) = the cumulative probability for a unit normal variable. 
Using the Black-Scholes model and given that all variables except cr are observable, then 
the value of cr can be obtained from the model.85 The value of cr is the implied volatility. 
Therefore, certain types of data are required to be input into the model to allow the 
implied volatility to be estimated. Specifically, share prices, the risk-free interest rate, 
time to option maturity and option prices are required. Once the implied volatility is 
obtained, then it is used in the regression models to estimate the volatility smile. The 
various regressions are discussed at a later stage. 
83 
'Non-synchronous trading' is used interchangeably with 'thin trading'. Further problems associated with 
thin trading are considered at a later stage. · 
84 Australian options are of the American type and the Black-Scholes model assumes that the option is of 
the European type. However, Merton ( 1973) has shown that, in the absence of dividends, there is no price 
difference between American and European options. 
85 The implied standard deviations are obtained by the Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
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The sample period chosen is the twelve-month period covering January 1991 through 
December 1991. The sample comprises 25 shares that are listed in Appendix 3. At any 
one time, each share has many different option series that vary according to maturity date 
and exercise price. Initially, all call options for all shares for all trading days during 1991 
are selected. To focus on the issue of volatility, steps need to be taken to ensure (as far as 
possible) that the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model are maintained. Consequently, 
where prior evidence indicates obvious situations in which violations of the model 
conditions occur, then option prices violating these conditions are excluded. 
First, the Black-Scholes model in its original form does not allow for dividends. 
Therefore, data are not required for months during which the underlying share went ex-
dividend or for months prior to an ex-dividend date where the ex-dividend date is prior to 
option maturity.86 Second, for similar reasons, data are not required on options in months 
during which the underlying share went ex-capitalisation or for months prior to an ex-
capitalisation date where the ex-capitalisation date is prior to option maturity.87 Third, 
options with more than four months to maturity are excluded due to a lack of traded 
option prices. Fourth, options with less than one month to maturity are excluded due to 
possible expiration effects. 88 
The resulting sample consists of approximately 8,114 daily option prices.89 These prices 
were hand collected from various issues of the Australian Financial Review.90 Taking 
into account the requirements of the data as discussed above, the final sample consists of 
6,251 option prices. Ninety-day Bank Accepted Bill (BAB) rates are used as the proxy 
for the risk-free rate of return. A proxy for the risk-free rate of return must be used and 
using a security that has a maturity not equal to the option maturity results in a maturity 
86 Evidence in Brown and Rainbow (1981) and Oliver (1994) indicate irrational option behaviour 
surrounding ex-dividend dates. 
87 Further justification is provided by Brown, Easton and Lalor (1995) who demonstrate that the contract 
adjustment procedure used by the ASX on ex-rights dates provides imperfect protection to call option 
holders. 
88 For example, see Day and Lewis (1988). 
89 For many series, especially out-of-the-money, the options did not trade every day. This is considered at a 
later stage. 
90 At least eight validation and boundary violation tests are conducted to help ensure data accuracy. Of the 
8,114 option prices collected, 1,347 are outside the bid/ask spread and 516 do not converge to an implicit 
volatility. 
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mismatch problem. The use of 90-day BAB rates is only consistent with an option with 
90 days to maturity. However, Chance (1991, pp. 129-130) documents the relative 
insensitivity of Black-Scholes prices to the choice of the risk-free proxy. Furthermore, 
Brown and Easton (1992) demonstrate that the put-call parity relationship is also 
insensitive to the choice of the risk-free proxy. Hence, the results should similarly be 
largely insensitive to this proxy. 
9.2 Results 
To illustrate the volatility smile, the sample of options is divided into seven different sub-
samples based on different terms to maturities and intrinsic values (IV).91 For each sub-
sample an average implied volatility is calculated and the results are mapped according to 
intrinsic value, term to maturity and implied volatility. Figure 9.1 presents the results. 
As shown in Figure 9.1, the volatility smile is obvious and pervasive across options with 
different terms to maturity and different intrinsic values. Options that are further out-of-
the-money or further in-the-money have higher implied volatility than options that are at-
the-money. Figure 9.1 also shows that the volatility smile is more pronounced for shorter 
term-to-maturity options. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test results in the rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the average implied volatilities in each sub-sample are equal. 
91 For ease of analysis one ( 1) has been subtracted from the ratio of stock-to-strike price. Therefore, an at-
the-money option has a stock-to-strike price ratio of zero (0). 
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The structure of the volatility smile is modelled using polynomial regression techniques 
for each of the five terms to maturity sub-samples and for the overall sample. A variable 
for the term to maturity is also included. In each case a quadratic polynomial provides the 
highest adjusted R2 of all models tested.92 The polynomial form is: 
where Yi = estimated implied volatility of option i, 
Xi= (intrinsic value of option i)-1, 
=((share price/strike price)-1),93 
ti = term to maturity of option i, and 
Ei = error term with a mean of zero. 
... 9.6 
Table 9.1 shows the number of observations, the estimated co-efficients (and probability 
values) and the adjusted R2 for each sub-sample. The probability values indicate the 
significance of the estimates, which in most cases are highly significant. 
('-· 
92 Polynomials to the sixth degree and a linear model were estimated, but not reported. The F-values for the 
quadratic regressions were all highly significant. 
93 The value of a is the estimated level of implied volatility for at-the-money options. 
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Table 9.1: Quadratic Polynomial Estimation 
Coefficient Estimates 
Term to (probability values) 
Maturity Number of 
(Days) Observations a p y 0 Adjusted R2 
30-49 1,800 0.31 -0.18 5.43 -0.0017 0.417 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0014) 
50-69 1,375 0.26 -0.19 3.31 -0.0002 0.239 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.6080) 
70-89 1,274 0.22 -0.16 1.91 0.0004 0.157 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.3348) 
90-109 1,210 0.25 -0.02 1.48 0.0000 0.151 
(0.0001) (0.4388) (0.0001) (0.8633) 
110-129 592 0.55 0.01 2.03 -0.0026 0.196 
(0.0001) (0.8330) (0.001) (0.0093) 
ALL 6,251 0.28 -0.19 3.01 -0.0004 0.250 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Table 9.1 indicates that for options in the 30-49 days-to-maturity group the value of a is 
31%. This means that an at-the-money option from this group has an estimated implied 
volatility of 31% less the impact of the term-to-maturity. For an at-the-money option with 
30 days to maturity this results in an estimated implied volatility of approximately 26%.94 
Table 9.1 also shows that the estimated co-efficients on the quadratic variable (y) 
generally decrease as term-to-maturity increases. This indicates that the volatility smile 
becomes less pronounced as term-to-maturity increases. This is also apparent from the 
adjusted R2, which decreases as term-to-maturity increases, although the longest term-to-
maturity sub-sample does not produce this result. The intercept variable (a) also 
decreases as term-to-maturity increases, but again the exception is the longest term-to-
maturity sub-sample. These results reinforce those in Figure 9.1 although the decrease in 
the estimated implied volatility for at-the-money options is not as pronounced in Figure 
9.1 as in Table 9.1.95 
94 Implied volatility= 0.31- 0.18x0 + 5.43x02- 0.00 17x30 = 0.259. 
95 Note that the implied volatilities obtained in Figure 9.1 are averages of implied volatilities from observed 
option prices in each term-to-maturity sub-sample. 
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Although interesting, the results in Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1 do not provide any 
information on the stability of the 'smile' over time. To determine the impact of time on 
the smile structure, analysis is conducted on observations grouped by month. An 
interesting feature in Table 9.2 is the estimated implied volatilities for at-the-money 
options that are highest in January, July and October. Furthermore, the quadratic variable 
for these months is also the highest indicating that the smile is most pronounced during 
these periods. However, a much larger sample would be required before any statistically 
significant conclusions could be drawn on possible seasonal effects. 
Table 9.2: Quadratic Polynomial Estimation by Month 
Coefficient Estimates 
Term to (prob-values) 
Maturity Number of 
(Days) Observations a. 13 y 0 Adjusted R1 
0.37 0.16 4.76 -0.0017 
January 678 (0.0001) (0.0209) (0.0001) (0.0001) 0.440 
February 
0.23 0.01 1.44 0.0009 513 (_0.0001) (0.82091 _(0.0001) (_0.0001} 0.208 
March 
0.32 -0.14 1.65 -0.0004 
460 (0.0001) (0.0082) (0.0001) (0.0846) 0.109 
April 
0.32 -0.13 2.23 -0.0005 
418 (_0.0001) (0.0054) (0.0001) (0.0009) 0.171 
May 
0.26 -0.19 1.58 0.0001 
463 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.3037) 0.187 
0.26 -0.16 3.05 -0.0003 
June 507 (0.001}_ _(0.0040} _(0.0001) {0.0534) 0.202 
July 
0.37 -0.34 4.16 -0.0016 
922 (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 0.398 
0.21 -0.16 3.09 0.0000 
August 580 (0.0001) (0.0001} (0.0001) (0.8350) 0.205 
0.19 -0.08 2.88 0.0001 
September 292 
. (0.0001} _(_0.17911 _(_0.0001) (0.566V 0:169 
0.36 -0.46 6.82 -0.0019 
October 192 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 0.614 
0.21 0.04 2.00 0.0004 
November 510 (0.0001) (0.4495) (0.0001) (0.0021) 0.209 
December 
0.27 0.03 1.89 -0.0001 
716 (0.0001) (0.3904) (0.0001) (0.3360) 0.165 
The volatility smile may be the result of non-synchronous trading (Rubinstein 1985). 
One assumption of the Black-Scholes model is that the observed share price is traded at 
the same moment in time as the observed option price. This assumption may not hold 
even though options that are selected are within the bid-ask spread. The problem of non-
synchronicity is more likely to occur in thinly traded or illiquid markets. Therefore, to 
determine whether there is a relationship between volatility smiles and non-synchronous 
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data, the actual trading time is required. This can then be matched with the same trade 
times for the underlying share and the risk-free security. The data required to achieve this 
degree of refinement are too costly. Therefore, a proxy for non-synchronicity is required. 
One proxy for non-synchronous trading is the sample size of options in each term to 
maturity/intrinsic value sub-sample. If there is a relatively larger number of option trades 
in a particular sub-sample there is a greater depth in the market and, therefore, a greater 
likelihood of synchronous prices being obtained. As all options with a given term to 
maturity for any particular share are collected, the numbers of options in each different 
intrinsic value sub-sample provide one measure of the depth of the market. 
A review of the sample sizes in each term-to-maturity sub-sample indicates that sample 
size diminishes as options move away from being at-the-money and as term to maturity 
increases. This is expected and consistent with other studies. Correlation analysis on the 
relationship results in a negative relationship (p= - 0.50) between sample size and implied 
volatility. This indicates that there is a positive association between non-synchronicity 
and implied volatility although this association is not particularly strong. However, this 
result may be due to the proxy selected for non-synchronicity. 
Another proxy for non-synchronous trading is the number of days between trades. If an 
option has not traded for any length oftime, the problem associated with thin trading may 
increase. Options that did not trade on the previous day are excluded from the sample 
and the model parameters estimated again. The sample size for this group is 3,132 
observations and the coefficients on the quadratic polynomial are estimated. The results 
are similar to those obtained for the original sample of 6,250 observations with one 
notable exception. The estimate on the quadratic coefficient is much larger than that 
obtained for the original sample. The results for the quadratic variable are shown in 
Table 9.3. All other estimates are similar to Table 9.1 and are not reported. 
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Table 9.3: Quadratic Polynomial Estimation of Gamma (y) for Heavily Traded 
Options 
Days to maturity Number of observations 
_y 
30-49 886 6.44 
50-69 688 3.66 
70-89 690 3.48 
90-109 616 1.74 
110-129 252 22.32 
ALL 3,132 4.41 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter documents the existence of volatility smiles in the Australian options market 
using daily option prices. Over 6,250 option prices are used to confirm the volatility 
smile. That is, options that are near-the-money have lower implied volatility than those 
further in-the-money or out-of-the-money. This phenomenon has obvious implications 
for option pricing using the Black-Scholes option pricing model. A quadratic polynomial 
is found to be the best estimator in explaining the relationship between implied volatility 
and intrinsic value and this is consistent across options with different terms to maturity. 
However, as term to maturity increases, the explanatory power of the quadratic model 
generally decreases. The correlation between the sample sizes of sub-samples and the 
volatility smile is negative suggesting some impact of thin trading although the effect is 
not sufficient for thin trading to fully explain the volatility smile effect. Furthermore, 
when options without a trade on the previous day are excluded the volatility smile 
becomes more pronounced. Therefore, the general conclusion is that the volatility smile 
is most pronounced for shorter term-to-maturity, heavily traded options. 
When considering the use of options for hedging strategies the bias in the volatility smile 
should be taken into consideration in the pricing process. If the options are far in-the-
money or far out-of-the-money, then the implied volatility will be significantly higher 
than for options at-the-money. Options that are not at-the-money will be priced in the 
market at a premium to those options at-the-money. Furthermore, a term-to-maturity 
effect in implied volatility is also present. This requires that not only should the ratio 
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between the strike price and the underlying asset price be taken into account when pricing 
options, but that the term to maturity should also be considered. The next chapter extends 




The Use of Different Estimates of Volatility in the 
Black-Scholes Model* 
10 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the difference in implied volatilities that occur for 
options with different strike prices and terms to maturity. To develop a hedging strategy 
that uses options, an option price is required. In some cases a market price may not be 
available and a fair value for the option must be calculated. In the Black-Scholes model, 
the future price volatility of the underlying asset is one of the more difficult variables to 
estimate. This chapter extends the work of the previous chapter by considering the use of 
different estimates of volatility when pricing options with the Black-Scholes model. 
Although there have been many refinements to the Black-Scholes model over time, a 
major problem in using the model and subsequent modifications continues to be the 
estimation of the input parameters. Specifically, the estimation of the standard deviation 
of the underlying share's returns remains a substantial limitation. The lack of 
measurement accuracy of this parameter has been offered as an explanation of the 
model's apparent mispricing (Hull 1997). 
Under the Black-Scholes model, the standard deviation of the underlying share's returns 
is assumed constant until option maturity. If this assumption were accurate, then 
estimation of the standard deviation would be a relatively straightforward task. However, 
there is now considerable evidence that share return variances are not constant over 
• This chapter has been published in Brailsford, T. and Oliver, B., 1997, Time-varying volatility estimates 
in option pricing: can superior estimates be obtained?, Advances in Pacific Basin Financial Markets 3, 191-
212. 
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time.96 Indeed, the implied volatility estimates produced by the Black-Scholes model 
vary significantly over time. While there has been some work on the pricing effects of 
different standard deviation estimates, such as Beckers ( 1981) and Chiras and Manaster 
(1978) in the U.S.A. and Brown and Shevlin (1983) in Australia, there is still no standard 
deviation estimate that has been shown to 'price' options correctly. The development of 
the AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) family of models provides a 
useful further test of option pricing. ARCH models can be used to obtain point estimates 
oftime-varying volatility. It is the time-varying nature of these estimates that makes their 
study interesting.97 
To date, there have been only a few studies that have sought to incorporate ARCH 
volatility estimates in option pricing. The majority of this research has been conducted 
using North American data and the results have generally been mixed with some evidence 
showing that Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) 
processes can explain at least part of the variation in implied volatilities (Choi and Wohar 
1992 and Day and Lewis 1992). Lee (1993) examines the issue in Australia, although not 
from a direct pricing perspective. Lee uses option prices from eight shares over a two-
month out-of-sample period to compare GARCH volatility forecasts with implied 
volatilities. He claims that the GARCH process produces better forecasts than the 
implied standard deviations. The implication of superior GARCH estimates is that the 
options market is not fully incorporating all past information in forming its expectation of 
future volatility. In this sense it is inefficient. 
Jorion (1995) compares GARCH volatility estimates for options on currency futures with 
moving average estimates and implied volatilities and finds that implied volatilities 
outperform the time-series models. 
96 As Hodges et al. (1992, p. 4 7) note, " ... there is massive evidence, that for most asset processes, we have 
distributions with fat tails, due in part at least to the volatility changing through time ... ". For specific 
evidence, see Akgiray (1989), Schwert (1989) and Swidler and Diltz (1992), and for a summary, see 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). 
97 The use of ARCH volatility estimates violates the assumption of constant volatility in the Black-Scholes 
model. However, the concern is with empirical estimation of the model rather than technical accuracy. 
Option pricing models that assume stochastic volatility have been developed by Hull and White (1987), 
Madan and Senata (1990) and Stein and Stein (1991). Furthermore, Duan (1995) has developed a GARCH 
option pricing model. Nevertheless, it is the popular Black-Scholes model which is the focus. 
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In this chapter, the pricing of call options in the Australian options market is examined 
using time-varying estimates of volatility. These estimates are produced from GARCH 
models and the resultant implied price is compared to the option's traded price. As a base 
for comparison, implied prices are also constructed using immediate past implied 
volatilities and using historical (naive) volatility estimates. The results have obvious 
implications for estimating the standard deviation parameter in the Black-Scholes model. 
10.1 Prior Research 
Early studies such as Beckers (1981), Chiras and Manaster (1978), and Latane and 
Rendleman (1976) show that future volatility is related more closely to implied 
volatilities than to historical volatility estimates. However, most of the early research 
compare implied volatility to a rather cumbersome type of historical mean, and thus these 
results are not surprising. 
Only recently have studies attempted to incorporate time-varying volatility estimates into 
option pricing models. Day and Lewis (1992) examine the information content of 
implied volatility in a GARCH framework using weekly prices of S&P 100 index options. 
Their analysis involves testing for the significance of the coefficient on implied volatility 
when that coefficient is added as an exogenous variable to the conditional variance 
equation of GARCH and EGARCH (Exponential GARCH) models. Results of Day and 
Lewis (1992) suggest that implied volatility estimates contain no additional information 
content for the EGARCH model and no additional information content for the GARCH 
model using Wednesday weekly closing prices, but that implied volatility does have 
additional information content for the GARCH model when using weekly Friday prices. 
Day and Lewis ( 1992) speculate that the general lack of support for implied volatilities 
having additional information content may be due to measurement error in the implied 
volatility series. 
Choi and Wohar (1992) examine weekly data on S&P 500 index options. The GARCH-
M (GARCH-in-Mean) model is used to forecast conditional variance, however the model 
parameters are updated only once every two months. Thus, conditional standard 
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deviation estimates are obtained using an s-step ahead forecasting model in which the 
model is required to forecast out to two months. The GARCH-M estimates are compared 
with a 24-week moving average of historical volatilities and a one-period lagged implied 
volatility series. These three forecast series are compared against the actual implied 
volatility. Choi and Wohar's results indicate that the historical estimates perform the 
worst, that lagged implied volatility is preferred for mid-maturity options and that 
conditional volatility estimates are preferred for both near-maturity and distant options. 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993) show that volatility information from historical share 
price data has information content above implied volatility for ten U.S. equity options. 
Specifically, they document that a naive historical estimate based upon the mean of past 
sample volatilities is a significant variable in explaining realised volatilities. Lamoureux 
and Lastrapes also show that implied volatility tends to under-estimate realised volatility 
and that GARCH forecasts perform relatively poorly, especially when required to forecast 
over long time horizons (of more than 90 days). Rather than attribute their findings to 
market inefficiency, Lamoureux and Lastrapes claim that market prices incorporate a 
variance risk premium that is not reflected in option pricing models. This assumes 
investor indifference to variance risk. 
Day and Lewis (1993) compare GARCH and EGARCH forecasts to implied volatilities 
obtained from call options on the crude oil futures contract. The results show that the 
GARCH and EGARCH forecasts contain no information content that is not already 
impounded into implied volatilities. This finding is robust across both near and distant 
maturity options. 
J orion (1995) focuses on options on currency futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and investigates both the informational content and the predictive power of the 
volatility implied in the option prices. Rather than consider the errors in option pricing, 
J orion considers the ability of the volatility estimate to forecast 1-day ahead volatility and 
volatility over the remaining days of the option contract. Volatility estimates are obtained 
from a 20-day moving average of futures returns, a GARCH model and implied standard 
deviations from options on three currency futures contracts. The results show that the 
implied standard deviations provide superior forecast of exchange rate volatility. 
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Research on the Australian options market is limited. Following the work of Brown 
(1978), Brown and Shevlin (1983) investigate the pricing ability of the Black-Scholes 
(dividend-adjusted) model in the Australian call options market between 1976 and 1980. 
They use last day-of-the-month closing data on four shares and employ historical 
estimates of standard deviation and lagged (weighted) implied standard deviations. It is 
found that the historical estimates provide significant under-estimates of option prices, 
while the lagged implied standard deviations eliminate much of this under-pricing. 
However, there was some tendency for the lagged implied standard deviations to over-
price, and long maturity options continued to be priced less accurately than their shorter-
term counterparts. 
Lee (1993) compares the information content of implied volatility to the information 
content of conditional volatility derived from GARCH processes. In addition to in-
sample tests, Lee compare forecasts from an AutoRegressive Moving Average (ARMA) 
model of implied volatility and forecasts from a rolling GARCH model to realised 
volatilities for eight shares over two months. The implied volatility series is calculated as 
a weighted average of the implied volatilities across option series trading on the share for 
each day, although details ofthe weighting scheme were unspecified. Lee's results show 
that the GARCH process produce better estimates of volatility than the implied volatility 
senes. 
Freund and Chu (1996) compare the mispricing of option valuation models using various 
estimates of volatility. They find that the implied volatility results in the least mispricing 
as compared to estimates from historical forecasts and that the use of GARCH models 
also significantly reduce model mispricing. 
Although the research on the use of GARCH estimates of volatility in the Black-Scholes 
model is mixed, the research in the area is extended by Duan (1995). Duan (1995) shows 
that options can be priced assuming the price for the underlying asset follows a GARCH 
process. However, the design of efficient numerical procedures for pricing options 
assuming a GARCH process is lacking. Ritchken and Trevor (1999) attempt to resolve 
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this by developing a lattice algorithm for pricing options under numerous volatility 
estimates, including GARCH. Unfortunately these pricing models do not have the 
simplicity of the Black-Scholes model. 
Christensen and Prabhala (1998) extend the previous research on implied volatility by 
considering whether it predicts future volatility. They do not consider whether other 
estimates of volatility, such as GARCH, are better at predicting future volatility than 
implied volatility, but whether implied volatility predicts future volatility efficiently. 
Christensen and Prabhala (1998) find that implied volatility does predict future realised 
volatility in isolation as well as in conjunction with the history of past-realised volatility. 
These results are significantly different from previous results and they attribute this to 
lower sampling frequency and non-overlapping data. Again there is no comparison of 
implied volatility with other estimates of future volatility. 
10.2 Research Design 
This chapter focuses on call options rather than put options. Call options are traded more 
frequently and are of greater interest. More frequent trading also increases the potential 
sample size, as thin trading could be problematic in this type of study. The option pricing 
model used in this chapter is the Black-Scholes model that can be written as:98 
-r(T -t) 
c = SN (d 1)-Xe N(d2) .. .10.1 
where variables are defined in chapter nine, sub-section 9 .1. 
Data are required to estimate the input parameters of the model. Specifically, share return 
data are required to estimate the underlying share's volatility (cr) and option price data are 
required to estimate implied volatility. 
The sample period is chosen as the twelve-month period covering January 1991 through 
December 1991. A maximum of two years immediately preceding the relevant forecast 
98 Australian options are of the American type and the Black-Scholes model assumes that the option is of 
the European type. However, Merton (1973) has shown that the American-European distinction is irrelevant 
in the absence of dividends. 
160 
period is selected for the estimation of various model parameters. The use of pre-sample 
data to estimate model parameters avoids the complications arising from data snooping 
(Dimson and Marsh 1990 and Lo and MacKinlay 1990). All shares on which call options 
traded throughout 1991 are selected for analysis.99 This involves 25 shares that are listed 
in Appendix 3. At any one time, each share has many different option series that vary by 
maturity date and exercise price. Initially, all call option series for all shares for all 
trading days during 1991 are selected. 100 
Constraints on data are then imposed. By design, any test of this nature is inherently a 
joint test of the validity of the pricing model, market efficiency and the implicit 
hypothesis concerning the accuracy of volatility estimates. Thus, to focus on the issue of 
volatility, steps need to be taken to ensure (as far as reasonable) the validity of the pricing 
model. Consequently, where prior evidence indicates situations in which violations of the 
model conditions occur, then options violating these conditions are excluded. 
First, the Black-Scholes model in its original form does not allow for dividends. Thus, 
data are not collected on options in months during which the underlying share went ex-
dividend or for months prior to an ex-dividend date where the ex-dividend date is prior to 
option maturity. Secondly, for similar reasons, data are not collected on options in 
months during which the underlying share went ex-capitalisation or for months prior to an 
ex-capitalisation date where the ex-capitalisation date is prior to option maturity. 101 
Thirdly, options with more than four months to maturity are excluded due to a lack of 
traded option prices. Fourthly, options with less than one month to maturity are excluded 
due to the problem of maturity 'mismatch'. 
The standard deviation estimate in the Black-Scholes model refers to the average standard 
deviation over the remaining life of the option. However, standard deviation estimates 
based on share price data are period-to-period measures. Thus, there is a mismatching of 
99 One stock (Coles-Myer) was excluded because of problems associated with data availability and validity. 
100 This is the same data as used in chapter nine. 
101 Further justification is provided by Brown, Easton and Lalor (1995) who show that the contract 
adjustment procedure used by the Exchange on ex-rights dates provides imperfect protection to call option 
holders. 
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maturities in the volatility estimates. The degree of mismatching becomes more severe as 
the maturity date approaches. One way to deal with this problem is to examine only long 
dated options. However, this leads to a lack of generalisability of results. In this chapter, 
one month is selected as the arbitrary cut-off recognising the inherent trade-off between 
generalisation and the problem of maturity mismatch. 102 
The resultant sample consisted of approximately 8,500 daily option prices that were hand-
collected.103 Finally, options for which the daily closing price fell outside the daily bid-
ask spread were excluded, as these prices were considered stale. Ninety-day Bank 
Accepted Bill rates were used as the proxy for the risk free rate of return. A proxy for the 
risk free rate of return must be used and the maturity mismatch problem arises again. The 
use of 90-day rates of return is consistent only with an option with 90 days to maturity. 
However, Chance (1991, pp. 129-130) documents the relative insensitivity of Black-
Scholes prices to the choice of the risk free proxy. Furthermore, Brown and Easton 
(1992) show that the put-call parity relationship is also insensitive to the choice of the risk 
free proxy. Hence, our results should similarly be largely insensitive to this proxy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare how various volatility estimates perform in the 
Black-Scholes model. The range of potential forecasting models combined with the 
range of data that can be used to form forecasts result in almost limitless combinations. 
Three categories of forecast models are chosen. First, forecasts based on an historical 
mean are constructed. Specifically, two historical mean forecasts are constructed which 
use 40 days (short-term mean) and two years (long-term mean) of immediate past share 
return data. These forecasts have traditionally been used in this type of study. These 
models are expected to perform the worst because of their naive assumptions concerning 
the stationarity of the volatility series. 
102 See Day and Lewis (1993) for further discussion of the maturity mismatch problem. 
103 Note that for many series, especially out-of-the-money, the options did not trade every day. 
162 
The second forecasting model uses the implied volatility estimate from the last daily 
traded price of the same option series (that is, same exercise price and maturity date). 104 
Prior evidence suggests that the implied volatility series differs by option type (that is, the 
degree of 'in-the-money') and by the term to maturity (Brown and Shevlin (1983) in 
Australia, MacBeth and Merville (1979) and Rubinstein (1985) in the U.S.A.). The term 
to maturity is an obvious cause of difference between implied volatilities because the 
estimate is of volatility over the time remaining to maturity. Thus, implied volatilities 
should be matched on options with the same maturity date. There is some evidence (for 
example, Beckers 1981) that at-the-money options provide the best estimate of implied 
volatility. However, this measure has not been consistently used in the literature. Day 
and Lewis (1992) use the option with the shortest term to maturity, while Choi and 
Wohar (1992) claim that their results are insensitive to any weighting scheme. 
In this chapter, the implied volatility estimate is obtained from the last daily traded price 
of the same option series. Hence, there is a match on maturity and exercise price and, 
given a short lag between option trades, the estimate is based on an option with the same 
degree of 'in-the-moneyness'. This approach is similar to Choi and Wohar (1992). For 
deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options, prior evidence shows that the 
implied volatilities will be less accurate (in a Black-Scholes framework) than those 
obtained from at-the-money option prices. However, as options have the same degree of 
'in-the-moneyness', any error in estimation of the implied volatility series will be 
consistent. This issue is further explored later in the chapter. A priori expectations are 
that this model will perform the best as it is based on market expectations. 
The final forecasting model uses a GARCH( 1,1) process. 105 The exact specification of 
the GARCH model is given as: 
104 The implied standard deviations are obtained by the Newton-Raphson algorithm. In 8 percent of cases, 
the algorithm would not converge. These options were subsequently discarded from the analysis. Brown 
(1978) encountered a similar problem with 6 percent of his sample not having an implicit solution. 
105 While there is general agreement that a GARCH process is an appropriate model to attempt to capture 
time-varying volatility, the exact order of the lags of the process is an empirical issue. The majority of 
research that has used GARCH models generally has focussed on the aggregate market (for example, see 
Baillie and DeGennaro 1990, Brailsford and Faff 1993 and Schwert 1989). Following the aggregate market 
fmdings that a GARCH(1,1) model appears the most appropriate and following the approach of others in 
this area such as Choi and Wohar (1992), Day and Lewis (1992) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993), here 
a GARCH( 1,1) model is adopted across all stocks. However, the exact order of the process could vary 
cross-sectionally across stocks. Note that the potential bias arising from misspecification of the order of the 
process is likely to bias against the superiority of the GARCH model. 
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where r1 = the return on the stock, 
Et = the error term with a mean of zero and a variance of h1, and 
2 
h t = co + P1 h t -1 + a 1 E t -1 
... 10.2 
... 10.3 
In the GARCH model, the conditional variance equation models the time varying nature 
of the volatility of the errors derived from the conditional mean equation as a linear 
function of lagged conditional volatility and of the lagged squared errors. The assumed 
conditional density function of student-! is preferred because of its ability to capture 
leptokurtosis, which is present. 106 It is common for the conditional mean equation to 
incorporate an error adjustment process such as a moving average (MA(l)) correction to 
account for the effects of non-synchronous trading. However, as the sample is limited to 
large companies with heavy trading, it is unlikely that non-synchronous trading presents a 
problem. 107 Thus, no error correction is required. 
The estimation procedure for the GARCH model involves running the model on two 
years (1989 and 1990) of immediate past share return data to estimate the model 
parameters CP1 and a1) for each share. 108 These parameters are then used to forecast the 
next trading day's (in 1991) conditional standard deviation: 
... 10.4 
The two-year estimation window is then rolled forward by one day and the model 
parameters are re-estimated and applied to yield the second trading day's (of 1991) 
conditional standard deviation. The process is repeated until a conditional standard 
deviation for each trading day in 1991 is estimated. Thus, the model is run 252 times for 
each share. The daily estimates are then annualised for use in the Black-Scholes model. 
106 Tests that the sample kurtosis estimates were not significantly different from three resulted in rejection of 
the null hypothesis for 20 of the 25 stocks. In these 20 cases, the calculated (absolute) value of the z-
statistic exceeded 2.0. 
107 In support of this claim, the average number of zero returns across sample firms across the combined 
estimation and forecasting periods (1989 to 1991) was 31 (12%) per company-year. 
108 GARCH models were estimated using the Berndt et al. (1974) algorithm employing numerical 
derivatives. 
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Note that the estimation procedure is not subject to any look-ahead bias as each forecast 
is out-of-sample and hence, the procedure can be implemented. 
Two methods are used to compare the volatility estimates produced from the three types 
of models. First, a regression is run in which the 'actual' volatility is regressed against 
the volatility estimates. This approach is common in the literature and the resultant 
information test is on the significance of the estimated coefficients. Secondly, in the 
spirit of Brown and Shevlin (1983), a comparison is performed by feeding the out-of-
sample standard deviation estimates back into the Black-Scholes model to obtain option 
prices. This enables a direct test of the degree of 'mispricing' and can be used to 
establish the economic significance of the volatility parameter. 
In order to compare the volatility estimates, a benchmark is required. Actual volatility of 
share returns cannot be observed. Prior studies have used a proxy for 'actual' or 
'realised' volatility that has typically been constructed as the square of realised returns or 
the square of residuals from a return model. Neither of these proxies can be claimed to be 
exact. Furthermore, both proxies suffer from the maturity mismatch problem. The 
purpose of this research is to determine the appropriate volatility parameter to enter the 
pricing model. The relevant volatility parameter in the Black-Scholes model is the 
standard deviation of the underlying share's returns until maturity of the option contract. 
Measures of volatility based on share returns have no maturity date and, as such, cannot 
be claimed to be the true volatility parameter in the option pricing model. 
Therefore, the implied volatility implicit within each option price on each trading day t is 
used as the proxy for 'actual' volatility. This procedure is the same as Choi and Wohar 
(1992). This volatility measure can be interpreted as the market's consensus and it avoids 
the maturity mismatch problem because it is a measure of volatility until option maturity. 
The formal test involves regressing the various volatility estimates on the actual volatility 
proxy in separate regressions: 
... 10.5 
where: a.Ajit =the actual volatility of share j on option series i in period t, and 
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crFjit =the estimated volatility of share j on option series i in period t where the 
estimates are based on a 40-day mean, 2-year mean, lagged implied 
volatility and GARCH model. 
For a perfect fit of the data, the slope coefficient would be unity and the intercept would 
be zero. 
10.3 Results 
10.3.1 Volatility Estimates 
Table 10.1 presents the average annualised standard deviation estimate for each of the 
forecasting models for each of the 25 companies. Of note is the variation across models 
in addition to the variation across shares. During 1991, all sample shares ranked in the 
top fifty by market capitalisation and, therefore, it is suspected that other shares in the 
market would generally have higher standard deviation estimates. 
Table 10.2 presents the results from the regression model of equation 10.35. From Table 
1 0.2, all estimates of Y1 are highly significant. Using adjusted R2 as the basis of 
comparison, lagged implied volatility performs particularly well with the GARCH model 
ranking a distant, but clear, second. The 2-year mean and the 40-day mean models are 
ranked third and fourth. These results are somewhat contradictory to prior evidence, but 
note that different measures of implied volatility and actual volatility have been used 
here. The results are consistent with the notion that the market incorporates all 
information in its assessment of volatility. Also of note from Table 10.2 are the relatively 
high measures of adjusted R2, implying that each model has reasonably high explanatory 
power. 
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Table 10.1: Mean(%) Annualised Standard Deviation Estimates for 1991 
Lagged implied 
Company 40-day mean 2-year mean volatility . GARCH forecast 
AMC 25.65 23.8I 20.36 I9.89 
ANZ 31.35 27.16 26.1 I 27.33 
BHP 22.57 21.66 20.52 20.67 
BOR 21.05 25.13 21.23 22.24 
BRY 45.40 51.10 44.1 I 40.64 
BTR 28.46 29.68 30.32 28.94 
CRA 27.72 25.63 25.23 23.97 
CSR I9.66 20.63 I9.74 I9.02 
FBG 32.07 40.9I 30.1 I 29.08 
FLC 30.73 31.42 28.76 27.75 
GMC 29.88 35.42 30.43 28.67 
LLC I9.04 22.27 I8.99 21.14 
MIM 34.25 35.05 34.0I 33.24 
NAB 20.50 23.09 I7.89 I8.85 
NBH 39.45 35.3I 28.54 33.07 
NCP 82.75 6D.62 46.08 53.79 
PDP I8.32 22.5I 23.24 20.69 
PLP 36.35 39.04 36.88 33.54 
PNI 26.48 30.83 24.20 27.34 
QRL 36.07 31.37 32.I2 30.40 
STO 25.07 22.44 28.45 23.10 
TNT 66.84 56.04 66.25 72.90 
WBC 27.03 26.00 23.65 25.15 
WMC 21.5I 26.29 26.18 24.24 
WPC 22.14 26.78 25.53 26.99 
ALL 30.95 30.32 28.38 28.7I 
Table 10.2: Comparison of Volatility Forecasts Using Simple Regression 
Model a YI Adjusted R2 
40-day mean: (Djit) 0.141 0.465 0.447 
(58.24) (69.41) 
2-year mean: (Yjit) 0.031 0.838 0.492 
(8.80) (76.02) 
Lagged implied: (Iji1) 0.025 0.916 0.804 
(13.62) (156.30) 
GARCH: (Gjit) 0.121 0.572 0.541 
(53.69) (83.79) 
Notes: 
I. The results are from the model: 
a Ajit =a+ YlO'Fjit + Ejit 
where: cr Ajit =the actual volatility of share j on option series i in period t, and 
O'fjit = the estimated volatility of share j on option series i in period t where the estimates are based on a 40-
day mean, 2-year mean, lagged implied volatility and GARCH model. 
2. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
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To test for the superiority of one forecast over another, the approach suggested in Fair and 
Shiller (1990), and employed by Day and Lewis (1993) is followed. A multi-variate 
regression is used as an 'encompassing test', although no constraints are placed upon the 
coefficient estimates. If the forecasts contain independent information in explaining the 
variation in actual volatility, then the coefficient estimates on the forecasts should be non-
zero. However, if the information in one forecast is subsumed by the information in 
another forecast, then the coefficient estimates on that model's forecasts should be zero. 
Thus, the test is for the significance of Yn in the following regression: 
a Ajit = a + Y 1 crojit + Y 2crYjit + Y 3 crljit + Y 4 crojit + E jit ... 10.6 
where the variables are defined in Table 1 0.2. 
Table 10.3 presents the results. All estimates are significant, which is somewhat 
surprising given the high degree of correlation among the independent variables. The 
implication of these results is that there ·is additional information content in each 
forecasting model that is not fully captured by the implied volatility. However, while the 
t-statistics are significant, from an economic viewpoint, the combination of all forecast 
information adds only 1.2% (0.816-0.804) to the explanatory power of the simple 
regression model of implied volatility. In summary, the implied volatility estimate stands 
out as the most significant and most explanatory. From a purely statistical viewpoint, 
there is additional information content in the volatility estimates from the other models. 
However, from an economic viewpoint, there is little improvement in overall explanatory 
power when the additional forecasts are added to the implied volatility forecasts. 
Table 10.3: Multi-variate Regression of all Forecasts of Volatility 
A A A A A 
Adj. &2 a Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
0.007 -0.016 0.139 0.756 0.091 0.816 
(3.17) (-2.14) (12.73) (75.78) (11.10) 
Notes: 
1. The regression model is: 
2. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
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10.3.2 Option Mispricing 
The previous analysis is subject to the inherent limitations associated with proxy 
measures and has focussed on the prediction of volatility per se. An interesting follow-on 
is to examine how the volatility forecasts translate into prices and to measure the extent of 
mispricing to gain some economic significance of the issue. Thus, the out-of-sample 
volatility estimates from each model are used as the standard deviation parameter in the 
Black-Scholes model and a series of implied option prices are obtained for each volatility 
model. 
The degree of mispricing of each model is assessed by the following error metrics: 
Mean Error: 
l J I T 
ME= K ·L L: L:(cN jit -cjit) 
j= li=l t=l 
Root Mean Squared Error: 
1 J I T " 
RMSE = -·LLL(cN jit -cjitf 
K j=I i=l 1=1 
Median Absolute Percentage Error: 





where: there are J shares, each with I option senes for t = 1,2 ... T for N volatility 
forecasting models, and 
K = the total number of observations. 
The results are presented in Table 10.4. 
Table 10.4: Error Metrics of Option Mispricing 
Model N ME RMSE MAPE 
40-day mean 6442 0.0324 0.1602 0.1818 
2-year mean 6442 0.0231 0.0680 0.1538 
Lagged implied 5936 0.0003 0.0335 0.0714 
GARCH 6442 0.0061 0.0848 0.1304 
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The results in Table 10.4 have economic significance. The mean error (ME) is the 
average value of mispricing per option in dollars. For example, the 40-day mean 
volatility estimate over-prices options by an average of a little over 3 cents per option 
whereas the GARCH model over-prices by a little over half a cent per option. From 
Table 1 0.4, all models over-price on average as indicated by the positive mean error 
scores. 109 However, the mean error is of little use in ranking models because positive and 
negative errors offset each other. 
The RMSE and MAPE metrics indicate that lagged implied volatility is preferred. Under 
both metrics, the short-term ( 40-day) mean ranks the worst, which is interesting as this is 
a common method cited in textbooks. The GARCH model is ranked second. While the 
2-year and 40-day models have a median absolute mispricing of over 15 and 18 percent 
(respectively) of the option's value, the GARCH model misprices 13 percent of option 
value. This compares to lagged implied volatility, which has a median absolute 
mispricing of around 7 percent of option value. As a result, it appears that the implied 
volatility model outperforms the other three volatility models. 
10.3.3 The Effect of At-the-Money on Mispricing 
Research into the pricing accuracy of the Black-Scholes model has shown that it is most 
accurate for options that are at-the-money. The model tends to misprice in-the-money 
and out-of-the-money options. Further, the degree of mispricing increases as the option 
becomes more in/out-of-the-money (MacBeth and Merville 1979, 1980). 110 Not 
surprisingly, it is claimed that the best implied volatility estimate is from at-the-money 
options (Beckers 1981 ). Thus, it is important to examine whether the other models also 
109 The over-pricing from the lagged implied volatility series may be due to a function of the construction of 
the original implied volatility series and the sample which contains roughly equal numbers of in-, at- and 
out-of-the-money options. 
Ho MacBeth and Merville (1979, 1980) fmd that the Black-Scholes model under-prices in-the-money 
options and over prices out-of-the-money options, whereas Black (1975) reports the opposite. Brown and 
Shevlin (1983) report under-pricing for both in-the-money and out-of-the-money options in Australia. An 
explanation of these inconsistent fmdings is offered by Jarrow and Rudd (1982), who demonstrate that 
mispricing of such options is dependent on the stock price distribution. 
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have difficulty with options that are not at-the-money and to examine the resultant degree 
of mispricing. 
The sample is broken into options that are in-, at- and out-of-the-money. An option is at-
the-money if the share price is within 2 percent of the present value of the exercise 
price. 111 Table 10.5 presents the results. 
Table 10.5 reveals the consistent over-pricing for all options other than out-of-the-money 
options which use lagged implied volatility. Out-of-the-money options have the greatest 
pricing error for all models using the MAPE metric. The same metric indicates that the 
lowest pricing errors are obtained from in-the-money options. This evidence appears 
somewhat inconsistent with the previous literature. However, a standard metric used in 
prior research is the RMSE statistic and this indicates that at-the-money options are 
priced most accurately for the 40-day mean and GARCH models. Thus, there is an 
obvious conflict between the RMSE and MAPE rankings. 
An intuitive explanation of the apparent inconsistency in Table 10.5 is that out-of-the-
money options are most susceptible to error in volatility estimation. Furthermore, in-the-
money options typically have a greater market price and hence the relative error measure 
(MAPE) is less influenced by the magnitude of the pricing error. 112 Indeed, the mean 
option prices of the three types of options support this assertion. The mean option prices 
for in/at/out-of-the-money options are $0.52, $0.24 and $0.10, respectively. A further 
explanation is that of non-synchronous observations between the share and option 
prices. 113 This may induce a bias in both the option pricing model and the classification 
of option type. 114 
111 The analysis was also run redefining at-the-money as (1) ±5% of difference between the share price and 
present value of the exercise price, (2) ±2% of the difference between the share price and exercise price, 
and (3) ±5% of the difference between the share price and the exercise price. The results from these 
variations are similar to those reported. 
112 For example, consider an option with a market price of $0.01. Suppose that a model predicts a price of 
$0.02, with the result that the one cent error will create a percentage error of I 00 percent. 
113 In-the-money options are the most frequently traded option type and hence are least likely to suffer from 
the problem of non-simultaneity. 
114 Easton's ( 1994) simulation of the effect of non-simultaneity on the put -call parity relationship found the 
induced bias to be highest for in-the-money options and lowest for out-of-the-money options. 
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Table 10.5: Error Metrics of Option Mispricing by Option Type 
Model N ME RMSE MAPE 
40-day mean In-the-money 2203 0.0369 0.1635 0.0769 
At-the-money 1250 0.0339 0.1405 0.1818 
Out-of-the-money 2989 0.0284 0.1653 0.3333 
2-yearmean In-the-money 2203 0.0252 0.0702 0.0714 
At-the-money 1250 0.0309 0.0683 0.1719 
Out-of-the-money 2989 0.0183 0.0662 0.2941 
Lagged implied In-the-money 2016 0.0014 0.0416 0.0455 
At-the-money 1161 0.0002 0.0356 0.0769 
Out-of-the-money 2759 -0.0004 0.0250 0.1143 
GARCH In-the-money 2203 0.0087 0.0831 0.0571 
At-the-money 1250 0.0067 0.0814 0.1250 
Out-of-the-money 2989 0.0039 0.1003 0.2667 
As share prices tend to rise at the close of the trading day (Aitken, Brown and Walter 
1993), to the extent that the options market does not exhibit similar behaviour, there is a 
tendency to overstate the number of in-the-money options. This does not appear an 
adequate explanation, since re-defining in-the-money options as those where the share 
price exceeds the present value of the exercise price by more than 1 0 percent yields 
similar results to those reported in Table 10.5. 
In a straight comparison of models, the superiority of lagged implied volatility is evident 
across the three option types. The model has the lowest RMSE and MAPE statistics for 
all three option types. Furthermore, the variation in the MAPE metric is lowest for this 
model. In rankings across option types, the GARCH model is second followed by the 2-
year mean then the 40-day mean. 
10.3.4 The Effect of Time-to-Maturity 
Prior evidence has shown that the time to maturity is a factor in the accuracy of option 
pricing. There is some evidence that the Black-Scholes model is more successful in 
pricing short-dated options (Brown and Shevlin (1983) in Australia and MacBeth and 
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Merville (1979) in the U.S.A.).ll 5 Intuitively, both the Black-Scholes prices and market 
prices converge to the minimum of zero or the share price less the exercise price at 
maturity, and hence the Black-Scholes model should price very short dated options well. 
Furthermore, as the time to maturity decreases, the lagged implied volatility model is 
expected to become more dominant as it does not suffer from the 'maturity mismatch' 
problem. For instance, if an option has one month left to maturity, the Black-Scholes 
model requires the estimate of standard deviation of the share over the next month, 
whereas the other volatility models are estimating volatility on the share over an 
indefinite life. 
Table 10.6 presents the mispricing results of options categorised by time to maturity. A 
long-dated option is defined as one having 90 days or more left to maturity. A short-dated 
option is defined as one with 40 days or less left to maturity. Focussing on the RMSE 
metric, all models tend to improve as the time to maturity decreases. This finding is 
consistent in improvement in the general Black-Scholes model itself. However, the 
MAPE metric does not lead to the same conclusions. 
All models record their highest MAPE for short-dated options, implying that the models 
are severely over-estimating volatility on these options. It is notable that all models are 
susceptible to recent fluctuations in the share price, particularly the 40-day mean 
model. 116 Also of note is the problem (alluded to earlier) that some categories of options 
have an inherently lower market price. Hence, the price level for a given magnitude of 
error can influence a relative measure such as the MAPE. The mean market prices on 
shorUmid/long-dated options are $0.22, $0.28 and $0.29, respectively. 
The major focus of this chapter is on the relative accuracy between models. From Table 
1 0.6, it is difficult to compare the relative improvement in the models because of the 
conflicting measures. If focus is on the RMSE, then the GARCH model experiences the 
greatest rate of improvement as the time to maturity decreases. The next best 
improvements are recorded by the 40-day mean, and then lagged implied volatility and 
then the 2-year mean. Thus, contrary to expectations, lagged implied volatility becomes 
115 Although Chiras and Manaster (1978) report that short maturity options are the most over-priced. 
116 Some stocks were particularly volatile over the sample period (refer to Table 10.1). For instance, News 
Corporation Ltd stocks commenced 1991 with a price of$5.24, closed 1991 with a price of$14.00 and in 
between hit a high of$16.02 and a low of$3.30. 
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less dominant as the time to maturity decreases. 117 Prior research has shown that the 
performance of GARCH forecasts changes inversely with the length of the forecast 
horizon (Lamoureux and Lastrapes 1993) and therefore, these results are not totally 
surpnsmg. 
Table 10.6: Error Metrics of Option Mispricing by Time to Maturity 
Model N ME RMSE MAPE 
40-day mean Short dated 1225 0.0205 0.0775 0.2005 
Mid-term 3417 0.0313 0.1419 0.2000 
Long dated 1800 0.0427 0.2225 0.1476 
2-yearmean Short dated 1225 0.0125 0.0510 0.1667 
Mid-term 3417 0.0257 0.0745 0.1665 
Long dated 1800 0.0254 0.0651 0.1310 
Lagged implied Short dated 1122 -0.0001 0.0276 0.0833 
Mid-term 3214 --0.0000 0.0343 0.0714 
Long dated 1600 0.0011 0.0356 0.0625 
GARCH Short dated 1225 -0.0012 0.0436 0.1429 
Mid-tenn 3417 0.0032 0.0645 0.1333 
Long dated 1800 0.0166 0.1287 0.1250 
10.4 GARCH Biases 
The use of a GARCH process to model conditional variance assumes the presence of 
auto-regressive conditional heteroscedastic errors in the residuals of the underlying share 
return series. Furthermore, the exact order of the GARCH process can vary across shares. 
It has been assumed that a GARCH(1,1) process is applicable for all shares. This is 
almost certainly an inaccurate assumption, although marginal differences in the order of 
the process are unlikely to have a substantial impact on the aggregate results. 
Nevertheless, this sub-section presents a brief analysis of the validity of the assumption. 
Engle's (1982) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the presence of ARCH errors in 
residuals is conducted for all shares in the sample. The results are presented in Table 
10.7. 
117 Although it should be noted that very short-dated options (with less than 20 trading days to maturity) are 
excluded in the research design. 
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Table 10.7: LM Test for ARCH Errors in the Underlying Share Return Residuals 
Company Full sample 1989-91 
AMC 130.691* 
ANZ 2.567 
BHP 4.606 • 























Test statistic is calculated as TR2 from the following regression: 
A2 A2 
et = ~ +yet-1 + 0t 
*Critical value at the 5 percent level ofthe test statistic is 3.84 x2(l). 
Table 10.7 reveals that the test statistic is significant for 19 of the 25 shares' returns 
indicating the presence of ARCH errors. Thus, the implication is that the GARCH model 
is inappropriate for the remaining six shares' returns. To overcome this potential bias, 
tests were re-run excluding option prices for the six shares which did not exhibit ARCH 
errors. The results are very similar to the previous results. Table 10.8 is a reproduction 
of Table 1 0.4, but with the inclusion of results for the 19 shares that exhibit significant 
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ARCH errors. Table 10.8 shows that the results do not substantially change. Similar tests 
are conducted for options with different time-to-maturity and different intrinsic value; 
again the results are not markedly different. However, it should be noted that the 
presence of ARCH errors do not necessarily imply a GARCH(1,1) model as the most 
appropriate fit. 
Table 10.8: Error Metrics of Option Mispricing- 19 Shares (with ARCH errors) 
Model N ME RMSE MAPE 
40-day mean 4936 0.0418 0.1816 0.1818 
(6442) (0.0324) (0.1602) (0.1818) 
2-year mean 4936 0.0272 0.0762 0.1667 
(6442) (0.0231) (0.0680) (0.1538) 
Lagged implied 4550 0.0005 0.0356 0.0714 
(5936) (0.0003) (0.0335) (0.0714) 
GARCH 4936 0.0079 0.0956 0.1402 
(6442) (0.0061) (0.0848) (0.1304) 
Note: To allow ease of comparison the results from Table 10.4 (testing across all 25 shares) are reproduced in brackets. 
10.5 Conclusion 
The key results of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
1. Lagged implied volatility estimates are superior to volatility estimates obtained from 
GARCH and naive mean models when pricing share options in Australia. 
2. Examination of option mispricing shows that lagged implied volatility is preferred, 
however the GARCH forecasts do not result in substantial pricing errors. 
3. Analysis of option type reveals that out-of-the-money options are the worst priced. 
Lagged implied volatility estimates dominate across option type. 
4. Option mispricing errors decrease as the time to maturity decreases, and the lagged 
implied volatility model becomes less dominant as the time to maturity decreases. The 
GARCH model experiences the greatest rate of improvement as time to maturity 
decreases. 
Thus, superior volatility estimates are obtained from lagged implied volatility. This 
conclusion is somewhat contrary to some of the results of similar studies in the U.S.A. 
which find support for the GARCH model. However, the results are generally consistent 
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with Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993). These results are consistent with a view of the 
market as a rational and sophisticated entity that incorporates full information into its 
prices. However, it should be noted that the methodology is biased against the GARCH 
process due to the assumption of the constant order of the process across all shares. 
Nevertheless, the GARCH model still performs reasonably well with a small average 
pricing error and thus could prove an adequate substitute dependent on the error 




Thesis Conclusions and Summary 
This thesis is an investigation into issues associated with financial risk management in 
Australia. The thesis is presented in three main sections. Section one, titled Financial Risk 
Management, considers answers to the following questions: 
• What are financial risks? 
• What are the professional standards and guidelines for the management of 
financial risks in Australia? 
• What are the different types of derivative contracts and the purpose of derivatives 
in financial risk management? 
• How are financial risks identified and measured? 
• Why do firms hedge financial risks? 
Risk is the chance of an event that will impact upon the objectives of the firm. Risk can 
be divided into pure risk or dynamic risk. Pure risk is when the event can only cause 
losses to the firm and dynamic risk is when the event can cause both gains and losses. 
Financial risks are often dynamic risks and types of financial risks include interest rate 
risk, foreign exchange rate risk and commodity price risk. In these cases the firm or 
organisation may incur losses if the prices or rates move in an adverse or unfavourable 
manner or they may obtain gains if the prices or rates move in a favourable manner. 
There are numerous professional standards and guidelines for the management of risk, 
however they do not cover financial risk management in detail, but concentrate on the 
broader aspects of risk management generally. One approach for the management of risk 
within the firm is through a six-stage process and this can be applied to management of 
financial risks: 
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1. Define the context of risk within the firm 
2. Identify the risks facing the firm 
3. Analyse the risks by ascertaining the likelihood and consequences of the risk 
4. Assess the risk to determine whether they are to be accepted or not 
5. Consider the options for dealing with the risk, that is, treating the risks 
6. Monitor and review the risks to ensure changing circumstances do not result in 
risks being missed 
Financial risk management can be pursued through the operations of the firm, through 
financial structures, through accounting choices or through the use of derivatives. 
However, financial risks are commonly managed through the use of derivative financial 
contracts and hedging is one strategy of financial risk management that often involves the 
use of derivatives. Hedging allows financial risks to be transferred to other parties. 
Often a major problem in the identification and measurement of exposure to financial 
risks is the temporary nature of them. Many studies have considered the sensitivity of 
share returns to interest rates, foreign exchange rates and commodity price changes and 
often little evidence of significant relationships is reported. Furthermore, if firms are 
hedging their financial risks then such results are not surprising. In the past, a lack of 
information in published annual reports limited the identification and extent that firms 
hedged financial risks. Recent changes in accounting standards requiring greater 
disclosure of information on risk management may provide opportunities for future 
research in identifying and measuring financial risk exposures. 
Apart from the lack of evidence to identify financial risks in firms there is a lack of 
general theory as to why organisations choose to hedge financial risks. The reasons 
suggested in the literature as to why firms in the private sector choose to hedge financial 
risks include: reducing corporate taxation, reducing the costs of bankruptcy and financial 
distress, influencing the level of external finance, reducing the agency costs of debt, 
maximising managerial utility and creating a valuable contract. These have all been 
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developed from a private sector perspective. An avenue for future research is to consider 
the development of a general theory on hedging. 
One area of increased awareness of risk management in Australia is in the 
Commonwealth public sector. Section two, titled Derivatives and the Commonwealth 
Public Sector, considers two aspects of derivative use in the Commonwealth public 
sector. These are: 
• What is the legal capacity of Commonwealth organisations to enter derivative 
contracts? 
• What are the reasons for derivative use in these organisations? 
Many Commonwealth public sector organisations are facing increased pressure from the 
central government to ensure appropriate risk management practices are adopted. In 
addition, these organisations provide a rich ground to extend the understanding of 
derivative use since many of the factors stated above as reasons for derivative use have 
been developed from the private sector. These reasons may not apply in the public sector. 
Before investigating the reasons for derivative use in the public sector this thesis 
considers the legal capacity of these organisations to enter derivative contracts. This 
thesis presents argument to conclude that there is considerable legal uncertainty with 
respect to the use of derivatives by Commonwealth organisations, particularly 
Commonwealth authorities. 
A survey of Commonwealth organisations reveals that derivatives are being used for risk 
management purposes. Whether these organisations have the legal capacity to enter such 
contracts is unclear and is an avenue for future research. However, the survey confirms 
that legal issues are important to these organisations. The survey also reveals a difference 
in views on the use of derivatives for hedging in organisations with risk management 
plans compared to those organisations without risk management plans, irrespective of 
whether the organisation uses derivatives. Organisations with a risk management plan 
believe that the use of derivatives for budgeting and improving the value of the 
organisation are significantly more important than organisations without a risk 
management plan. In addition, the use of derivatives to reduce the risks faced by 
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management is ranked more important by organisations that do not use derivatives 
relative to those that do. Least important reasons include the use of derivatives to reduce 
taxation, to alter debt levels and to reduce bankruptcy and financial distress. This 
evidence suggests that the reasons for derivative use in public sector organisations are not 
consistent with evidence from studies in the private sector. These differences may be due 
to fundamental differences between private and public sector organisations. However, 
there is little evidence from private sector organisations in Australia. One avenue for 
future research is to conduct a similar survey of Australian private sector firms to help 
determine the reasons for derivative use in the Australian private sector. This would 
allow more detailed comparisons to be made regarding the use of derivatives in the two 
sectors. 
The use of derivatives for effective risk management requires the derivative markets to be 
efficient. The third and final section of the thesis, titled Efficiency of Derivatives 
Markets in Australia, considers three issues associated with the efficiency of derivative 
markets. Specifically, the three issues are: 
• What is the extent of price and volatility effects surrounding expiration of 
derivative contracts in Australian 90-day Bank Accepted Bills? 
• What is the level of pricing bias associated with the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model? 
• What is the pricing error in using different estimates of volatility in the Black-
Scholes option pricing model? 
Many derivative contracts have expiration dates and if a firm is using derivatives for 
hedging purposes, then those derivatives may need to be closed out or reversed at 
maturity. One financial instrument that is commonly used for interest rate risk 
management is the Australian 90-day Bank Accepted Bill. This instrument has both 
futures contracts and options on futures contracts that expire simultaneously. An 
investigation into daily price and volatility effects surrounding the expiration of the 
derivative contracts did not reveal significant pricing or volatility effects in the spot 
market. However, an avenue for future research is to consider intra-day prices and the 
impact on volatilities. 
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Risk management often involves the use of option contracts and a valuable attribute of 
options is their non-linear payoffs. However, modelling option prices has generated a 
plethora of research with the result that the Black-Scholes model has considerable 
academic and professional recognition. The Black-Scholes model is not perfect in 
valuing options and understanding the biases in this model will help improve risk 
management involving option contracts. Most notably in the U.S.A. and the U.K., the 
Black-Scholes model has been shown to have higher implied volatilities for options 
further from-the-money. Evidence of the Black-Scholes volatility bias using Australian 
option prices is documented in this thesis. The bias is modelled using non-linear 
regression and the results are significant. When modelling option prices the bias should 
be taken into account. Extensions of this research are to consider option prices that are 
time-matched to stock prices. 
The use of the Black-Scholes model is extremely popular and many of the variables 
necessary for the model are readily observable. One variable required as input to the 
Black-Scholes model is the estimate of the future volatility of the underlying asset return. 
For share options, the future share return volatility is not readily observable and the 
Black-Scholes model is relatively sensitive to errors in estimating this variable. In 
addition, the Black-Scholes model assumes that volatility of the underlying returns are 
constant, but there is considerable evidence to indicate that volatility is time-varying. 
This thesis uses an ARCH model to obtain point estimates of time-varying volatility and 
compares option prices with estimates of volatility based on variance of share returns and 
implied volatility from the previous option price. This thesis reports that the lowest 
pricing error occurs when the implied volatility from the previously traded option price is 
used as an estimate of the volatility of the underlying asset return for the remaining life of 
the option. The ARCH model has the second lowest pricing error. In cases where 
options are not traded, volatility estimates based on ARCH models would be useful for 
estimating option prices using the Black-Scholes model. An extension of this work would 
be to consider the effects of non-synchronous trading. 
This thesis contains research into issues associated with financial risk management. The 
issues cover a range of subject material and provide several avenues for future research. 
Risk management has become an increasingly important tool in the management of 
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modem businesses. It is argued that appropriate and well employed risk management 
practices can add significant value to an entity and its stakeholders. However, the area is 
relatively new from a research perspective and our understanding is hampered by the 
relative infancy of the literature. Risk management has traditionally been seen within the 
context of private sector organisations. However, the issue is becoming increasingly 
relevant and important to public sector entities as governments around the world 
implement policies that involve corporatisation, devolution of financial responsibility and 
impose competitive neutrality on their departments and bodies. Australia is no different 
and in some circles is seen as a world leader in the evolution of a business-orientated 
public sector. However, the strict translation of private sector theories and practices to the 
public sector, in which there are inherent differences, may not be feasible nor desirable. 
Further, risk management in the public sector may require different practices and methods 
to achieve the desired outcomes. In this thesis, several issues associated with risk 
management in general are addressed within the Australian environment, in addition to 
specific issues relevant to the public sector. The importance of this research is highlighted 
by the recent failure of several government entities due to poor risk management. This 
thesis adds to our stock of knowledge in the area of risk management. The findings have 
wide applicability, both to managers and the various stakeholders, including government 
itself. The thesis highlights key issues to be considered in the adoption of risk 
management practices and more broadly explores some policy issues. 
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Appendix 1: List of Commonwealth Organisations Selected for Survey 
of Financial Risk Management 
Appendix 1 provides a list of 136 Commonwealth organisations selected from the 1998 
Commonwealth Consolidated Annual Report. These organisations were surveyed in 
respect of their use of derivative contracts and the results are reported in chapter seven. 
Organisations that are classified as derivative users were identified through analysis of 
annual financial statements. 
No. Organisation Derivative use 
I Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Commission 
2 Aboriginal Hostels Limited 
3 Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
4 Affirmative Action Agency 
5 Airservices Australia Yes 
6 Albury-Wodonga Development Corporation 
7 Anglo-Australian Telescope Board 
8 Australia Council 
9 Australia Japan Foundation 
10 Australia New Zealand Food Authority 
II Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 
12 Australian Broadcasting Authority 
13 Australian Broadcasting Corporation Yes 
14 Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence 
15 Australian Bureau of Statistics 
16 Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
17 Australian Communications Authority 
18 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
19 Australian Customs Service 
20 Australian Dairy Corporation Yes 
21 Australian Dried Fruits Board 
22 Australian Electoral Commission 
23 Australian Federal Police 
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Appendix 1 continued. 
No. Organisation Derivative use 
24 Australian Film Commission 
25 Australian Film Finance Corporation 
26 Australian Film Television and Radio School 
27 Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
28 Australian Foundation for Culture and the Humanities 
29 Australian Greenhouse Office 
30 Australian Hearing Services 
31 Australian Heritage Commission 
32 Australian Horticultural Corporation 
33 Australian Industrial Registry 
34 Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC) 
35 Australian Institute of Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Studies 
36 Australian Institute of Criminology 
37 Australian Institute of Family Studies 
38 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
39 Australian Institute of Marine Science 
40 Australian Law Reform Commission 
41 Australian Marine Science and Technology Limited 
42 Australian Maritime College 
43 Australian Maritime Safety Authority Yes 
44 Australian National Audit Office 
45 Australian National Maritime Museum 
46 Australian National Training Authority 
47 Australian National University Yes 
48 Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 
49 Australian Pork Corporation 
50 Australian Postal Corporation Yes 
51 Australian Rail Track Corporation Ltd 
52 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
53 Australian Sports Commission 
54 Australian Sports Drug Agency 
55 Australian Taxation Office 
56 Australian Technology Group Pty Limited (ATG) 
57 Australian Tourist Commission Yes 
58 Australian Trade Commission (AUSTRADE) 
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No. Organisation Derivative use 
59 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
60 Australian War Memorial 
61 Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation 
62 Australian Wool Research and Promotion Organisation Yes 
63 Bundanoon Trust (Company Limited by Guarantee) 
64 Centre link 
65 Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
66 Coal Mining Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation 
67 Comcare Australia 
68 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Authority (CSIRO) Yes 
69 Commonwealth Superannuation Administration (Comsuper) 
70 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee 
7I Cotton Research and Development Corporation 
72 Criminology Research Council 
73 Dairy Research and Development Council 
74 Defence Housing Authority (DHA) 
75 Defence Service Homes Insurance Scheme 
76 Employment National Limited (EN) 
77 Energy Research and Development Corporation 
78 Export Finance Insurance Corporation Yes 
79 Family Court of Australia 
80 Federal Court of Australia 
81 Film Australia Limited 
82 Fisheries Research and Development Corporation 
83 Forest and Wood Products Research and Development Corporation 
84 Grains Research and Development Corporation 
85 Grape and Wine Research and Development Corporation 
86 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
87 Health Insurance Commission 
88 Health Services Australia Limited 
89 High Court of Australia 
90 Horticultural Research and Development Corporation 
91 Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
92 Indigenous Land Corporation 
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No. Organisation Derivative use 
93 IP Australia 
94 Joint Coal Board 
95 Joint House Department 
96 Land and Water Resources Development Corporation 
97 Landcare Australia Limited 
98 Medibank Private Limited Yes 
99 Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
100 National Australia Day Council 
101 National Capital Authority 
102 National Competition Council 
103 National Crime Authority 
104 National Gallery of Australia 
105 National Library of Australia 
106 National Museum of Australia 
107 National Native Title Tribunal 
108 National Occupational Health & Safety Commission 
109 National Rail Corporation Limited 
110 National Registration Authority for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals 
111 National Road Transport Commission 
112 National Standards Commission 
113 NEPC Service Corporation 
114 Office of Asset Sales and Information Technology Outsourcing 
115 Office of Inspector-General of Intelligence & Security 
116 Office of National Assessments 
I17 Office of Parliamentary Counsel 
118 Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
119 Office of the Official Secretary to the Governor General 
120 Pig Research and Development Corporation 
121 Private Health Insurance Administration Council 
122 Productivity Commission 
123 Professional Services Review 
I24 Public Service and Merit Protection Commission 
125 Reserve Bank of Australia Yes 
126 Royal Australian Air Force Veterans' Residences Trust Fund 
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No. Organisation Derivative use 
127 Royal Australian Air Force Welfare Trust Fund 
128 Royal Australian Navy Relief Trust Fund 
129 Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation 
130 Snowy Mountain Hydro-Electric Commission 
131 Special Broadcasting Service Corporation Yes 
132 Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee 
133 Sugar Research and Development Corporation 
134 Telstra Corporation Limited Yes 
135 Tobacco Research and Development Corporation 
136 Torres Strait Regional Authority 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire Details 
Appendix 2 provides the details of the questionnaires distributed to 136 Commonwealth 
organisations in respect of their use of derivative contracts. Details of the results are 






Please find enclosed a survey on financial risk management. This survey is part of 
research being undertaken at the Australian National University by a team of researchers 
headed by Professor Tim Brailsford, Dean, Faculty of Economics and Commerce. 
Your response to the survey will form part of a study that will provide valuable 
information on the way financial risk is managed across different countries, industries, 
sectors and organisations. There are similar studies occurring in the U.S.A., Japan and 
Germany. The Department of Finance and Administration supports this research and 
encourages your completion of the questionnaire, which should take only a few minutes. 
This research also has the support of the Australian Society of CP As and is being partly 
funded by the Australian Research Council. 
Your organisation has been identified through 1998 Annual Reports as not being a user 
of derivative financial contracts. If this is not the case please check the box below and 
return this cover page in the self-addressed envelope. An alternative questionnaire will be 
forwarded to you. 
D My organisation does use derivative financial contracts. 
203 
Appendix 2 continued. 
The information you provide will only be available to those researchers at the Australian 
National University who are directly involved in the project, and all information will be 
treated as commercial-in-confidence. Research reports will not identify any individual 
organisations. The Department of Finance and Administration will not have access to 
individual responses. 
A stamped self-addressed envelope is provided for the return of the completed 
questionnaire. Please complete the questionnaire and return it by January 31, 2000. 
I encourage your support of this project. If you would like a copy of the final report 
please cross the box below and return this cover page with your completed questionnaire. 
Yours sincerely, 
B. R. Oliver 
for Mr Stephen Bartos, General Manager, Executive, Department of Finance and 
Administration. 
Yes, I would like a copy of the final report. D 
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ANU Survey of Financial Risk Management 
by Commonwealth Organisations 
Please complete the questionnaire by following the instructions after each question. 
Q 1. Does your organisation have a documented financial risk management 
plan/policy? (Please circle the appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
Q2. Has your organisation considered the use of derivative financial products within 
the last 12 months? (Please circle the appropriate response.) 
Yes No (please skip to question 4) 
Q3. For what purpose were derivatives considered? (Please circle the appropriate responses.) 
a. Hedging (including the reduction in interest rates/costs) 
b. Speculation and/or arbitrage 
Q4. Please indicate the importance of the following issues in relation to the use of 
derivatives for hedging (irrespective of whether your organisation has 
considered the use of derivatives or not). 
(Please rank each reason: 1- Most important ..• S- Least important/not a consideration Please place a tick or cross 
in the appropriate box in each column.) 
Issue: 
a. Change the volatility of accounting earnings •••.••••.••••••••••••••.••••••••••••• 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows •••••••.••..••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••.•• 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios .••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
d. Reduce taxation ••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••..••••••.••••••..••••••.••••••••••..•.••••••• 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress •.••.•••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••• 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance •••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••• 
g. Increase the use of debt finance ...................................................... .. 
h. Reduce the cost of capital .............................................................. . 
i. Improve management/employee compensation ................................... . 
j. Improve value of the organisation ................................................... .. 
k. Budgeting purposes ..................................................................... .. 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure ......................................................... .. 
m. The organisation has alternative means to manage financial risks ......... 
n. There are difficulties pricing and valuing derivatives .......................... .. 
o. The disclosure requirements of accounting standards .......................... .. 
p. Legal restrictions on the use of derivatives ..................................... .. 
q. The necessary accounting treatment is too complex ........................... . 
r. The perceptions of derivatives use by investors, regulators and the public 
s. Reduce risks faced by management ................................................. .. 








Appendix 2 continued. 
Q5. Does your firm have exposure to foreign currency movements?(Piease circle the 
appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
Q6. Does your organisation have exposure to movements in interest rates? (Please circle the 
appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
Q7. Does your organisation have exposure to movements in commodity prices? (Please 
circle tire appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
Q8. Does your organisation have exposure to other financial risks not specified m 
questions 5,6 or 7? (Please circle the appropriate response.) 
No 
Yes- Please specify the main type of financial risk: ________ _ 
Q9. Does your organisation have a documented policy with respect to the use of 
derivatives? (Please circle tile appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
QlO. How does your organisation evaluate the financial risk management function? 
(Please circle the statement tflat best mate/res your practice.) 
a. Reduced volatility relative to a benchmark 
b. Increased profit (reduced costs) relative to a benchmark 
c. Absolute profit/loss 
d. Risk adjusted performance (profits or savings adjusted for volatility) 
e. No evaluation 
f. Other (please specify) __________________ _ 
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Q 11. If you have any other comments that you think may be useful to us please write 
them below. 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
Please mail it today in the enclosed postage-paid envelope. 
If you have further questions or comments, please contact: 
Mr. Barry Oliver, 
Faculty of Economics and Commerce, 
The Australian National University 
Telephone: (02) 6249-0729 






Please find enclosed a survey on financial risk management. This survey is part of 
research being undertaken at the Australian National University by a team of researchers 
headed by Professor Tim Brailsford, Dean, Faculty of Economics and Commerce. 
Your response to the survey will form part of a study that will provide valuable 
information on the way financial risk is managed across different countries, industries, 
sectors and organisations. There are similar studies occurring in the U.S.A., Japan and 
Germany. The Department of Finance and Administration supports this research and 
encourages your completion of the questionnaire, which should take only a few minutes. 
This research also has the support of the Australian Society of CP As and is being partly 
funded by the Australian Research Council. 
Your organisation has been identified through 1998 Annual Reports as a user of 
derivative financial contracts. If this is not the case please check the box below and 
return this cover page in the self-addressed envelope. An alternative questionnaire will be 
forwarded to you. 
D My organisation does not use derivative financial contracts. 
The information you provide will only be available to those researchers at the Australian 
National University who are directly involved in the project, and all information will be 
treated as commercial-in-confidence. Research reports will not identify any individual 
organisations. The Department of Finance and Administration will not have access to 
individual responses. A stamped self-addressed envelope is provided for the return of the 
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completed questionnaire. Please complete the questionnaire and return it by January 31, 
2000. 
I encourage your support of this project. If you would like a copy of the final report 
please cross the box below and return this cover page with your completed questionnaire. 
Yours sincerely, 
B. R. Oliver 
for Mr Stephen Bartos, General Manager, Executive, Department of Finance and 
Administration) 
Yes, I would like a copy of the final report. D 
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Appendix 2 continued. 
ANU Survey of Financial Risk Management 
by Commonwealth Organisations 
Please complete the questionnaire by following the instructions after each question. 
Q 1. Why does your organisation use derivatives? (Please circle all that apply.) 
a. Hedging (includes reducing interest rates/costs) 
b. Speculation and/or arbitrage 
Please complete questions 2 and 3 if you circled ONLY 'b' in question 1. 
Please continue over the page if you circled 'a'. 
Q2. Does your organisation have a documented financial risk management 
plan/policy? (Please circle the appropriate response.) 
Yes No 
Q3. Please indicate the importance of the following issues m relation to your 
organisation's decision not to use derivatives for hedging. 
(Please rank each reason: 1- Most important ... 5- Least important/not a consideration Please place a tick or cross 
in the appropriate box in each column.) 
Issue: 
a. Change the volatility of accounting earnings •••••••.••••••••••••••••••.•••• 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows ••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.• 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios ••••••••••••••...••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
d. Reduce taxation •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress •••••••.•••••.•••••••••••••.••.•••••••.••.• 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance •••••••••••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••• 
g. Increase the use of debt finance •••.•.•••••••••••••••.•..•.•••••••••.••••••••••••••••••• 
h. Reduce the cost of capital. •••••.•••••••••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.•••••••••••• 
i. Improve management/employee compensation .................................. .. 
j. Improve value of the organisation ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••.••••••• 
k. Budgeting purposes •••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••.••••••• 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure •••...••.•••••••••••••••.••••••••••••...••••••••••••••••••• 
m. The organisation has alternative means to manage financial risks •••••..•• 
n. There are difficulties pricing and valuing derivatives .•••••••••••••••.•.•.•.••• 
o. The disclosure requirements of accounting standards •••.•••••••••••..••••••••••• 
p. Legal restrictions on the use of derivatives •••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.••••••• 
q. The necessary accounting treatment is too complex ••••••••••••••••••••••••••.. 
r. The perceptions of derivatives use by investors, regulators and the public 
s. Reduce risks faced by management •••.••...•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 










Appendix 2 continued. 
Please complete the remainder o{this survey if you circled 'a' in question 1. 
Q4. Please indicate the importance of the following reasons why your organisation uses 
derivatives for hedging purposes. 
(Please rank each reason: I- Most important •.. 5- Least important/not a consideration 
Please place a tick or cross in the appropriate box in each column.) 
Reason: 
a. Change the volatility of accounting earnings ••••.•••.••••.•••••••••• 
b. Change the volatility of cash flows ••.•••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••.•• 
c. Change balance sheet accounts or ratios ••••••••••.••.•••.••••••••••• 
d. Reduce taxation •••••••••••••••.•••.••••••••••••.•••.••••••••••••.•••••••••• 
e. Reduce bankruptcy and financial distress ••.••••.•••••••••.•••..•.•• 
f. Reduce the use of debt finance •••••••••••.••••••••••••••••.•.•••.•.••••• 
g. Increase the use of debt finance •••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••• 
h. Reduce the cost of capital ••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• 
i. Improve management/employee compensation ••••••••••••••••••..• 
j. Improve value of the organisation •••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••.••••••• 
k. Budgeting purposes .•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••• 
I. Reduce political risk/pressure •••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••••• 
m. Reduce risks faced by management ••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••..•.•• 




2 3 4 5 
Least 
important 
Q5. Which of the following financial risks does your organisation hedge (either with 
derivatives or by any other means)? (Please circle all that apply.) 
a. Foreign currency exchange risk 
b. Interest rate risk 
c. Commodity price risk 
d. Other (please state type of risk) _______________ _ 
e. Other (please state type of risk) _______________ _ 
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Foreign Currency Exchange Risk: 
Q6. Does your organisation have exposure to movements in foreign currency? 
(Please circle tile appropriate response.) 
Yes No (please skip to question 1 0) 
Q7. Which benchmark does your organisation use for evaluating foreign currency 
risk management? 
(Please circle tile appropriate response.) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark. 
b. Forward rates available at the beginning of the period. 
c. Spot rates at the beginning of the period. 
d. Baseline percent hedged strategy (i.e. X% hedged). 
e. Other benchmark (please specify): 
If your organisation does not use foreign currency derivatives for hedging, 
please skip to question 10. 
Q8. Please indicate which derivative contracts your organisation uses to manage foreign 
currency exchange risk. 
(Please circle all that apply.) 
a. Options b. Forwards c. Futures d. Swaps e. Other 
Q9. Averaged over one year, what percentage of the foreign currency exchange 
exposure does your organisation typically hedge? 







Appendix 2 continued. 
Interest Rate Risk: 
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QlO. Does your organisation have exposure to movements in interest rates? 
(Please circle tile one tllat applies.) 
Yes No (please skip to question 14) 
Q 11. Which statement( s) best describes the benchmark your organisation uses for 
evaluating the management of interest rate risk? (Please circle all tllat apply.) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark for interest rate risk exposure. 
b. The volatility of revenue to interest rate risk exposure. 
c. The volatility of cash flows to interest rate exposure. 
d. The impact on liquidity of interest rate exposure. 
e. Other benchmark (please describe): ______________ _ 
Ifyour organisation does not use interest rate derivatives for hedging, 
please skip to question 14. 
Ql2. Please indicate which derivative contracts your organisation uses to manage interest 
rate risk. 
(Please circle all tllat apply.) 
a. Options b. Forwards c. Futures d. Swaps e. Other 
Q13. Averaged over one year, what percentage of the interest rate exposure does your 
organisation typically hedge? 








Appendix 2 continued. 
Commodity Price Risk: 
Q14. Does your organisation have exposure to movements in commodity prices? 
(Please circle tl1e o11e that applies.) 
Yes No (please skip to question 18) 
Q15. Which statement(s) best describes the benchmark your organisation uses for 
evaluating the management of commodity price exposures? (Please circle all that apply.) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark for commodity price 
exposures. 
b. The volatility of revenue to commodity price exposures. 
c. The volatility of cash flows to commodities price exposures. 
d. The impact on liquidity of commodity prices. 
e. Other benchmark (please describe): _____________ _ 
If your organisation does not use commodity derivatives for hedging, 
please skip to question 18. 
Q 16. Please indicate which derivative contracts your organisation uses to manage 
commodity price risk. (please circle all that apply.) 
a. Options b. Forwards c. Futures d. Swaps e. Other 
Q17. Averaged over one year, what percentage of the commodity price exposure does 
your organisation typically hedge? 
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Other Financial Risks: 
Q18. Are there any other major financial risks that your organisation faces which have not 
been covered previously in this questionnaire (ie other than interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange rate risk and commodity price risk)? 
(Please circle tile appropriate response.) 
Yes No (please skip to question 23) 
Q19. What are the two main financial risks your organisations faces that have not been 
covered previously in this questionnaire? 
1. ____________________________________ __ 
2. ____________________________________ __ 
Q20. Which statement(s) best describes the benchmark your organisation uses for 
evaluating the management of the risk stated in Question 19( 1) above? (Please circle all 
tllat apply.) 
a. Our organisation does not use a benchmark for the exposures identified in 
Question 19(1). 
b. The volatility of revenue to the exposures identified in Question 19(1). 
c. The volatility of cash flows to the exposures identified in Question 19(1). 
d. The impact on liquidity of the exposures identified in Question 19(1). 
e. Other benchmark (please describe): ________________ _ 
If your organisation does not use derivatives to hedge the risk stated in Question 
19(1), please skip to question 23. 
Q21. Please indicate which derivative contracts your organisation uses to manage the risk 
stated in Question 19(1 ). (Please circle all tllat apply.) 
a. Options b. Forwards c. Futures d. Swaps e. Other 
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Appendix 3: Australian Listed Companies with Call Options Trading 
over the period January to December 1991 
Appendix 3 consists of 25 Australian listed companies that had call options trading over 
the period January through December 1991. Call option prices from these companies are 
used in chapters eight and nine. 
=========================================--======= 
No. Company Code Australian Company Name 
1 AMC Amcor Limited 
2 ANZ Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
3 BHP Broken Hill Proprietary Limited 
4 BOR Boral Limited 
5 BRY Brierley Investments Limited 
6 BTR BTR Nylex Limited 
7 CRA CRALimited 
8 CSR CSRLimited 
9 FBG Foster's Brewing Group Limited 
10 FLC Fletcher Challenge Limited 
11 GMF Goodman Fielder Limited 
12 LLC Lend Lease Corporation Limited 
13 MIM M.I.M. Holdings Limited 
14 NAB National Australia Bank Limited 
15 NBH North Broken Hill Peko Limited 
16 NCP News Corporation Limited 
17 PDP Pacific Dunlop Limited 
18 PLP Placer Pacific Limited 
19 PNI Pioneer International Limited 
20 QRL QCT Resources Limited 
21 STO Santos Limited 
22 TNT TNT Limited 
23 WBC Westpac Banking Corporation Limited 
24 WMC Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited 
25 WPC Woodside Petroleum Limited 
